Patton v. Jones

• Decision Date: 28 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 03-04-00389-CV.,03-04-00389-CV.
• Citation: 212 S.W.3d 541
• Parties: Ken PATTON, Appellant, v. Bobbie Kaye JONES, Individually; Barbara Ruth, Individually; John Wright, Individually; St. John's United Methodist Church; Oak Hill United Methodist Church; The Austin District of the United Methodist Church; and Southwest Texas Conference of the United Methodist Church, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

212 S.W.3d 541

Ken PATTON, Appellant, v. Bobbie Kaye JONES, Individually; Barbara Ruth, Individually; John Wright, Individually; St. John's United Methodist Church; Oak Hill United Methodist Church; The Austin District of the United Methodist Church; and Southwest Texas Conference of the United Methodist Church, Appellees.

No. 03-04-00389-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.

July 28, 2006.

Rehearing Overruled October 5, 2006.

Rebecca S. Whitehouse, Law Office of Rebecca S. Whitehouse, Austin, for Appellant.

J. Shelby Sharpe, Sharpe & Tillman, Fort Worth, for Jones, St. John's, Austin District Southwest Texas Conf.

Stephen A. Wood, for Barbara Ruth, Oak Hill Methodist Church, and John Wright.

Before Chief Justice LAW, Justices PATTERSON and PURYEAR.

OPINION

W. KENNETH LAW, Chief Justice.

We grant appellees' motion for rehearing, withdraw our opinion and judgment issued May 11, 2006, and substitute the following in its place.

Appellant Ken Patton urges that the trial court erred in dismissing his case for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the First Amendment's ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, which encompasses a ministerial exception, does not bar judicial review of his claims for defamation and tortious interference with an employment contract. Appellees, Pastor Bobbie Kaye Jones, Pastor Barbara Ruth, Pastor John Wright, St. John's United Methodist Church, Oak Hill United Methodist Church, The Austin District of the United Methodist Church, and the Southwest Texas Conference of the United Methodist Church (collectively, "The Church") respond that because Patton, as the Director of Youth Ministries for the Oak Hill United Methodist Church, was employed in a ministerial role, the First Amendment prohibits judicial review of the Church's actions and communications surrounding Patton's termination. We will affirm the dismissal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is functionally equivalent to a plea to the jurisdiction challenging the trial court's authority to determine the subject matter of a cause of action. Lacy v. Bassett, 132 S.W.3d 119, 122 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (discussing dismissal based on ecclesiastical doctrine) (citing Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex.2000)). We review the record de novo to determine whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1998). We consider only the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry and do not weigh the merits. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). Also, we construe the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff, accepting all his allegations as true. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 555. To prevail, the defense must show that, even accepting all of the plaintiff's allegations as true, an incurable jurisdictional defect remains on the face of the pleadings that deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Brenham Hous. Auth. v. Davies, 158 S.W.3d 53, 56 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).

Construing the allegations in Patton's pleadings as true, and considering the uncontested evidence, we find the following undisputed facts in the record.¹

BACKGROUND

Patton was employed by Oak Hill United Methodist Church as the Director of Youth Ministries from April 2002 until October 31, 2002.² In that position, Patton was responsible for "the administration and organizing of recreational events for the youth, such as camping outings and other social gatherings. . . . [Patton] coordinated the transportation, . . . oversaw the logistics, . . . [and] served as a chaperone." He also "managed the budget for the youth program, recruited [adult and youth] participants, registered the attendees at events, [] collected participation fees from attendees, [and] performed fundraising duties."

On October 24, 2002, appellee Jones (a Pastor at St. John's) discussed with appellee Wright (an Associate Pastor at Oak Hill) whether Patton should be terminated from Oak Hill. According to handwritten notes taken by Pastor Wright, Pastor Jones told him about allegations that Patton had upset congregation members by dating certain women and by putting his arm around girls at church. Pastor Jones also described a rumor that Patton had used internet pornography as being "unsolicited, anecdotal, [and] unsubstantiated." Patton contends that each of the rumors are false.

After this conversation, Pastor Wright relayed these rumors to appellee Ruth (a Pastor at Oak Hill). Pastor Ruth then met with the Staff Parish Relations Committee ("SPRC") and recommended that Patton be terminated from his position as Oak Hill's Director of Youth Ministries. Pastor Wright informed Patton of the decision. Shortly beforehand, Patton had discovered Pastor Wright's handwritten notes laying on the church photocopy machine.

In a subsequent letter to two concerned members of the congregation, the committee chairwoman wrote,

Please know that this committee and your pastors share your concern for the youth program. . . . A search for a new youth director will begin after the first of the year. . . . Before any action was taken, the Pastors discussed the situation with the District Superintendent and sought the backing of the SPRC, . . . [which] unanimously voted to accept the recommendation to support the decision reached by [Jones], [Wright], and myself. . . . I can assure you that [we] approached this decision prayerfully and in the best interests of the church. . . .

Patton also alleged that the chairwoman told a member of the congregation who asked about Patton's termination that, "It is really bad" and "We had to get him out before something happened at our church," and that Pastor Ruth responded to a member's question by stating, "[Patton] knows why he was fired" and "he wouldn't want anyone else to know."

Patton sued the Church, claiming it was liable for defamation and tortious interference with an employment contract.³ The Church defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss, which was granted by the trial court. This appeal followed. The sole question presented on appeal is whether, based on First Amendment principles, the trial court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

ANALYSIS

Free Exercise Clause

The First Amendment provides in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. Const. amend. I. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses apply to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 8, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004).

The Supreme Court interpreted the basis of the Free Exercise Clause at issue here in Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 80 U.S. 679, 728-33, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872). In often-quoted language, the Court held that "civil courts exercise no jurisdiction . . . where a subject-matter of dispute [is] strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character," such as disputes "concern[ing] theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required." Id. at 733, 13 Wall. 679. Instead, civil courts are to accept "as final, and as binding on them" the decisions of an ecclesiastical institution on such matters. Id. at 728, 13 Wall. 679. "[I]t would be of vain consent," the Court held, "if anyone aggrieved by one of [an ecclesiastical institution's] decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance." Id. at 730, 13 Wall. 679. In part, this is because ecclesiastical institutions "are the best judges of what constitutes an offense against the word of God" and "of matters of faith, discipline, and doctrine; and civil courts, if they should be so unwise to attempt to [decide such matters], would only involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty and doubt." Id. at 732, 13 Wall. 679 (citations omitted).

In the 135 years since Watson, many courts have applied these principles—often referred to as the "ecclesiastical abstention doctrine"—to cases concerning employment decisions by religious institutions.⁴ These cases have consistently held that civil courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to decide such controversies if the employment decision concerns a member of the clergy or an employee in a ministerial position. See, e.g., Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir.1999); Green v. United Pentecostal Church Int'l, 899 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, pet. denied).⁵ This is known as the "ministerial exception." See Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 656-57 (10th Cir. 2002) ("ministerial exception cases rely on a long line of Supreme Court cases affirming the church autonomy doctrine, which protects the fundamental right of churches to decide for themselves matters of church government, faith, and doctrine").

The "ecclesiastical abstention doctrine" provides a broader analysis that encompasses the "ministerial exception." The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of "theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required." Watson, 80 U.S. at 733, 13 Wall. 679.⁶ In cases relying on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, courts consider the substance and nature of the plaintiff's claims to determine whether the First Amendment prevents subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Williams v. Gleason, 26 S.W.3d 54, 58-60 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).

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