Patton v. Louisville Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't
| Decision Date | 25 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-00346-RGJ |
| Parties | AUSTIN PATTON Plaintiff v. LOUISVILLE JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT ET AL. Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
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Defendants, Officer Daniel Johnson, LT Michael Redmon, Officer Bradley Sheppard, Officer Joe Castellano, Officer Terrance White ("Officer Defendants"), Louisville Jefferson County Metro Government ("Louisville") and Louisville Metro Department of Corrections ("LMDC")(Louisville and LMDC collectively, "Municipal Defendants")1, move to dismiss Plaintiff Austin Patton's ("Patton") amended complaint. [DE 22]. Briefing is complete. [DE 23, DE 25]. For the reasons below, the Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED in part and ADMINISTRATIVELY REMANDED in part.
The Court takes the following factual allegations in the complaint as true for its consideration of the present motion. See Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)).
Patton is, and has been, in LMDC custody, awaiting trial. [DE 18 at 104, ¶ 22]. Patton has received death threats from inmates associated with Patton's alleged victim. Id., ¶ 23. A judgeordered that Patton be held in Christian County for his safety, however, LMDC has periodically transported Patton to Jefferson County for court appearances. Id., ¶¶ 24-25. While held in Jefferson County, LMDC placed Patton on the fifth floor in the general population with the individuals who had threatened him. Id., ¶ 27. LMDC was supposed to place him in protective custody or the fourth floor for seclusion from his alleged victim's friends. Id., ¶ 26. The alleged victim's friends assaulted Patton in the shower room on the fifth floor, and Patton "suffered a fractured skull, a fractured eye socket, a broken arm, and various other bodily injuries." Id., ¶ 28-29. Despite the known health and safety risk to Patton, the Unknown Officers, Unknown Supervisors, or Defendants Johnson, Redmon, Sheppard, Castellano, or White were not checking on Patton that day during their rounds. Id. at 105, ¶ 30-32. Patton lay "in the shower room seriously injured and nearly dead for five hours before Unknown Cos and/or Defendants Johnson, Redmon, Sheppard, Castellano and/or White found him, only after [Patton's] Mom visited [LMDC] and inquired into his whereabouts." Id., ¶ 105.
As with Patton's original complaint, Patton alleges in his amended complaint that Bolton is the "Director of the [LMDC] and a [Louisville] employee . . . and is responsible, in part for forming, administering, monitoring, and supervising the policies and activities involved in those of the . . . known and unknown [LMDC] employees." Id., ¶¶ 10-11. Patton alleges Clark is the "Chief of Staff of [LMDC] and a [Louisville] employee . . . and is responsible, in part for administering, monitoring, and supervising the policies and activities involved in those of the . . . known and unknown [LMDC] employees." Id., ¶¶ 12-13. Patton alleges that the Municipal Defendants are "responsible, in part, for administering, monitoring, and supervising the policies and activities . . . of the . . . known and unknown [LMDC] employees." Id., ¶¶ 8-9.
As with Patton's original complaint, he alleges in his amended complaint that unknown LMDC correctional officers ("Unknown Officers") were "under the authority, in part of The City, The Department, The Director, The Chief of Staff, Unknown Supervisors, and known Sergeants supra." Id., ¶ 16. As before, he also alleges that unknown LMDC ranked supervisors ("Unknown Supervisors") "are responsible, in part, for administering, monitoring, and supervising the policies and activities involved in those of the following known and unknown Department employees." Id., ¶ 15. The Unknown Officers and Unknown Supervisors are collectively called "Unknown Defendants."
Patton's amended complaint alleges that the newly named Officer Defendants Johnson, Redmon, Sheppard, Castellano, and White, were "employee[s] of The Department and [are] responsible, in part, for administering monitoring, and supervising the policies and activities involved in those of the following known and unknown Department employees." Id., ¶¶ 17-21. Patton also alleges that Defendants "should be deemed legally to have known [Patton] was not supposed to be on the fifth floor . . ." Id. at 105, ¶ 34. Patton did not name Officer Defendants Johnson, Redmon, Sheppard, Castellano, and White in the original complaint.
As with his original complaint, Patton alleges violations of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process (Federal Count I), Conspiracy to violate the Constitution (Federal Count II), Failure to train, supervise, audit, and discipline (Federal Count III), and violations of his rights under Kentucky law, violation of due process under the Kentucky Constitution (State Count I), Conspiracy to Violate the Kentucky Constitution (State Count II), Negligence (State Count III), Reckless/Negligent failure to train and supervise (State Count IV). Id. In his prayer for relief, Patton requests compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. Id. at 110.
The parties agree the alleged incident that supports Patton's complaint occurred on or about June 6, 2017. [DE 22-1 at 121; DE 23 at 129]. Patton's original complaint was filed on June 1, 2018. [DE 1].2 On October 4, 2018, Defendants moved to dismiss. [DE 4]. On October 15, 2019, the motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. [DE 6]. The parties submitted a Rule 26(f) planning report on November 12, 2019. [DE 9]. The Court issued a scheduling order on November 25, 2019. [DE 10]. The parties filed initial disclosures on December 9, 2019. [DE 12; DE 13]. Defendants initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i) stated that "the following witnesses are likely to have discoverable information that may be used to support the defense asserted by them . . . [t]hese witness may have information regarding the Plaintiff's complaints regarding his altercation . . . (a) Plaintiff Austin Patton (b) Defendants listed and potential other officers." [DE 13 at 87]. The Defendants' disclosure stated that "other officers" might have discoverable information but did not provide the names of the "other officers."
According to Patton he served discovery requests on Defendants on December 18, 2019. [DE 23 at 129]. According to Patton Defendants did not respond to the requests until March 9, 2020. [DE 23 at 129]. It was then Patton claims to have learned the names of the officers who were described in the original complaint as the unknown officers. [DE 23 at 129-30].
Patton filed his amended complaint on June 24, 2020. [DE 18]. He did not tender prepared summonses to serve on Defendants with his amended complaint as required by Rule 4. Patton claims he filed a motion for leave to presumably amend his complaint on June 8, 2020. [DE 23 at 130]. But there is no motion for leave to file an amended complaint in the record and Patton's amended complaint was filed without leave of the Court.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) instructs that a court must dismiss a complaint if the complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a claim, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When considering a motion to dismiss, courts must presume all factual allegations in the complaint to be true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits Plan. Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). "But the district court need not accept a bare assertion of legal conclusions." Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "A complaint will be dismissed . . . if no law supports the claims made, if the facts alleged are insufficient to state a claim, or if the face of the complaint presents an insurmountable bar to relief." Southfield Educ. Ass'n v. Southfield Bd. of Educ., 570 F. App'x 485, 487 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561-64).
Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) on grounds that it is barred by a limitations period is warranted only if "the allegations in the complaint affirmatively show that the claim is time-barred." Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). In other words, it must be "apparent from the face of the complaint that the limit for bringing the claim[s] has passed." Bishop v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 520 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original)(quoting Hoover v. Langston Equip. Assocs., Inc., 958 F.2d 742, 744 (6th Cir. 1992)).
When a pleading is amended without leave of court or consent of opposing parties, it may either be considered a nullity, United States ex rel. Mathews v. HealthSouth Corp., 332 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 2003), or taken as properly introduced "as long as the amendments do not unfairly surprise or prejudice the defendant," Hicks v. Resolution Tr. Corp., ...
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