Patton v. Patton
| Decision Date | 17 March 1964 |
| Citation | 198 A.2d 578,413 Pa. 566 |
| Parties | Esther PATTON, Plaintiff, v. John D. PATTON and William Joseph Derr, Adm'r of the Estate of George Derr, Deceased, Defendants, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Garnishee. Appeal of STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY. William Joseph DERR, Adm'r of the Estate of Mary Derr, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. John D. PATTON and William Joseph Derr, Adm'r of the Estate of George Derr, Deceased, Defendants, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Garnishee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Isador E. Krasno, Pottsville, Leon H. Kline, Philadelphia, for appellees.
Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.
John D. Patton, [Patton], is the named insured in an automobile liability policy issued by State Farm Mutual Automobile Company, [State Farm], the garnishee in both these proceedings. Patton's automobile, then being operated by George Derr, [Derr], with Patton's permission, was involved in a collision with another motor vehicle and at the time, Patton's wife, Esther Patton, and Derr's wife, Mary Derr, passengers in the Patton automobile, sustained personal injuries.
Esther Patton and Mary Derr instituted separate trespass actions in the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County against the operator of the other motor vehicle and, in each action, Patton and Derr were joined as additional defendants. 1 At trial, the jury returned verdicts in each action against Patton and Derr and judgments in favor of Esther Patton and Mary Derr, respectively, were entered.
To enforce her judgment against Derr, Esther Patton issued an attachment execution against State Farm and, to enforce her judgment against Patton, Mary Derr issued an attachment execution against State Farm. 2 To the judgment holders' interrogatories State Farm filed answers; the judgment holders then demurred and moved for judgments on the pleadings. The court below sustained the demurrers and entered judgments on the pleadings against State Farm. From the entry of such judgments these two appeals have been taken.
One appeal (No. 66 January Term 1964) questions the right of the named insured's wife--a 'member of the family of the [named] insured residing in the same household as the [named] insured'--, to recover damages for bodily injury, under the provisions of the insurance policy, from the additional insured. The other appeal (No. 67 January Term 1964) questions the right of the additional insured's wife--a 'member of the family of the [additional] insured residing in the same household as the [additional] insured'--to recover damages for bodily injury, under the provisions of the insurance policy, from the named insured.
The relevant policy provisions are:
'Coverages A and B--(A) Bodily Injury Liability and (B) Property Damage Liability.
'(1) To pay all damages which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay because of
'(A) bodily injury sustained by other persons * * * caused by accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use * * * of the automobile.
'(a) Insured--with respect to the insurance afforded under coverages A and B, the unqualified word 'insured' includes the named insured and, * * * his spouse if a resident of the same household, and also includes any person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use is by the named insured or such spouse or with the permission of either. * * *'
'This policy does not apply under
'(e) coverage A, to any obligation * * * for bodily injury to the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured.'
Appellee's contention, and the rationale of the court below, is that the words 'the insured' in the exclusionary clause, supra, must be construed to refer only to the particular insured 'from whom a recovery is sought'. That is to say: (1) as to Esther Patton's claim, she not being a member of the family of, and residing in the same household as, Derr against whom she seeks to recover damages, her claim falls within the policy coverage A; (2) as to Mary Derr's claim, she not being a member of the family of, and residing in the same household as, Patton against whom she sought to recover damages, her claim falls within the policy coverage A.
On two occasions in recent years this Court has considered the effect of similar exclusionary clauses in automobile liability policies. Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175; Great American Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. et al., 412 Pa. 538, 194 A.2d 903. In both cases we construed the impact of such clauses upon the policy coverage of co-resident members of the family of the named insured. In Puller, we held that such class was excluded from policy coverage where members of such class sought to recover damages for bodily injuries, directly or indirectly by way of contribution to a third person, against the named insured. In Great American, we held that such class was excluded from policy coverage where members of such class sought to recover damages for bodily injury against an additional insured. The rationale of both decisions is that, no matter against which insured recovery is sought, recovery by co-resident members of the named insured's family is excluded from policy coverage.
Appellee's attack on Great American is two-fold: (a) that Great American does not control the instant situation because the policy language therein differs from the policy language in this case; (b) that, if Great American does control, it should be reconsidered and overruled.
Conceding that the exclusionary clause herein and that in Great American are 'substantially the same', appellee argues that the language of the 'omnibus clause' in this case differs from that in Great American. We have examined both 'omnibus clauses' and are satisfied that any distinction in language is a distinction without a legally significant difference and that, in this respect, Great American is indistinguishable from the case at bar.
In the light of appellee's request that Great American be reconsidered, we have re-evaluated that ruling and we are convinced that Great American should stand. The thrust of Great American is that the exclusionary clause of the policy excludes from policy coverage any claims for damages for bodily injuries of co-resident members of the family of the named insured. No matter upon whom--the named insured, the spouse of the named insured or an additional insured--may rest a legal obligation to pay damages for bodily injuries to co-resident members of the family of the named insured, such damage claims are not covered by the policy.
In the case at bar, there is a fact which does not appear in Great American. Esther Patton, the instant claimant, as the spouse of the named insured, is clearly an 'insured' under the 'omnibus clause' of this policy and to permit her to recover under the provisions of this policy against Derr, the additional insured, would extend policy coverage to damage claims of an 'insured' vis-a-vis an 'insured', a result completely at variance with the obvious intent and purpose of the parties to this insurance contract. Not only as a co-resident member of the named insured's family but as an 'insured' under the policy, the claim of Esther Patton against Derr, the additional insured, is not within the policy coverage.
In entering judgment in favor of Esther Patton and...
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