Patton v. Secretary of Dept. of Health and Human Services

• Decision Date: 02 June 1994
• Docket Number: 94-5002,Nos. 93-5187,s. 93-5187
• Citation: 25 F.3d 1021
• Parties: James M. PATTON and Joann Patton, Legal Guardians for Thomas Edward Patton, Petitioners-Appellants, v. SECRETARY OF the DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

Page 1021

25 F.3d 1021

29 Fed.R.Serv.3d 682

James M. PATTON and Joann Patton, Legal Guardians for Thomas

Edward Patton, Petitioners-Appellants, v. SECRETARY OF the DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent-Appellee.

Nos. 93-5187, 94-5002.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

June 2, 1994.

Jeffrey D. Swick, Feinstein & Mulligan, Columbus, OH, submitted for petitioners-appellants.

Mark W. Rogers, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. With him on the brief were Frank W. Hunger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Helene M. Goldberg, Director and John Lodge Euler, Deputy Director.

Before NEWMAN, MAYER, and LOURIE, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge.

James M. and Joann Patton, legal guardians for their son, Thomas Edward Patton, appeal from the June 7, 1993 judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims ¹ reinstating its earlier judgment of September 29, 1992 entered in accordance with a special master's decision awarding compensation for vaccine-related injuries under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, but omitting an award for pain and suffering. Patton v. Secretary of Dep't of Health &

                Human Servs., 28 Fed.Cl. 532 (1993) (opinion).  The Pattons also appeal from a separate judgment denying their motion under Rule 60 of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims to amend the September 29, 1992 judgment. 2  Patton v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health and Human Servs., No. 90-1094 V (Ct.Fed.Cl. Aug. 5, 1993).  We affirm-in-part, vacate-in-part, and remand
                

BACKGROUND

On September 20, 1990, a petition was filed by the Pattons under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-660, Sec. 311(a), 100 Stat. 3758 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. Secs. 300aa-1 to 300aa-34 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)) ("the Act" or "Vaccine Act") seeking compensation for injuries allegedly sustained by their son after he received a diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccination on December 24, 1959. The petition also contained claims requesting compensation for loss of earnings and pain and suffering pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-15(a)(3), (4).

The case was assigned to a special master who conducted proceedings to determine whether the Pattons were entitled to an award, and if so, the amount of such award. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-12(d); Vaccine Rule 3. On April 20, 1992, the special master issued her decision, finding in favor of the Pattons on the issue of entitlement and determining the amount of compensation due. Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 10(b), the special master deferred ruling on the claims for pain and suffering and loss of earnings until she issued her decision regarding attorneys' fees and other costs. Both parties declined to seek review of the special master's decision and the Court of Federal Claims entered judgment in accordance with that decision on May 22, 1992. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-12(e)(3); Vaccine Rule 11(a). On June 15, 1992, the Pattons elected to accept the court's judgment. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-21(a); Vaccine R. 12(a).

In an application filed on July 6, 1992, and later amended on July 20, 1992, petitioners requested attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the proceeding before the special master pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-15(e) and Vaccine Rule 13. On August 28, 1992, the special master awarded petitioners $16,157.01 for attorneys' fees and costs. Review of the special master's decision was not sought by either party and judgment was entered by the Court of Federal Claims in accordance with that decision on September 29, 1992. The special master's decision, however, did not address the Pattons' claims for compensation for pain and suffering and loss of earnings.

On November 11, 1992, the Pattons filed a "motion for relief" under Vaccine Rule 1 requesting that the special master amend her August 28, 1992 decision to award an additional $13,842.99 ³ as compensation for pain and suffering and future earnings. The government opposed the Pattons' motion, arguing that the special master lacked jurisdiction under the Act to modify her decision once the Court of Federal Claims entered final judgment in accordance with that decision.

The special master rejected the government's jurisdictional challenge, concluding that jurisdiction does "not shift[ ] away from the Office of the Special Masters" absent a motion for review filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-12(e)(1). In addition, the special master concluded that she possessed "inherent authority" to correct her own mistakes, similar to that of the Court of Federal Claims under Rule 60 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC), ⁴ because "the power of the special On the merits, the special master acknowledged that she had "inadvertently omitted an award for pain and suffering" in her August 28, 1992 decision awarding attorneys' fees and costs and issued an "Order to Amend" correcting that mistake on January 11, 1993. Accordingly, she awarded the Pattons $13,842.99 for pain and suffering and emotional distress.

master to do so can be assumed" and because such power is consistent with the mandate under Vaccine Rule 1 to "decide cases promptly and efficiently."

The government moved for review of the Order by the Court of Federal Claims. The government reasserted its contention that the special master was without jurisdiction under the Vaccine Act to modify her decision after it was reduced to a final judgment, notwithstanding that she had mistakenly omitted an award for pain and suffering. The Court of Federal Claims agreed, holding as a matter of law that a special master lacks authority to amend her decision once judgment is entered thereon by the court. Patton, 28 Fed.Cl. at 535-37. The court further rejected the special master's conclusion that she possessed inherent authority to grant Rule 60-type relief to correct her decision. The court found that Rule 60 is not incorporated into the Vaccine Rules and that those rules are devoid of any provision upon which such inherent authority can be based. Id. at 537-39.

Accordingly, on June 7, 1993, judgment was entered by the court vacating the special master's Order to Amend and reinstating the court's original judgment of September 29, 1992. On July 20, 1993, the Pattons moved for relief under Rule 60 from the court's judgment, requesting that the court amend the judgment to award damages for pain and suffering and emotional distress in the amount of $13,842.99. The motion was denied.

The Pattons now appeal from both the court's judgment reinstating the terms of the special master's original decision and the court's denial of their motion for relief under Rule 60.

DISCUSSION

I. Special Master's Authority to Amend

"[I]n a case arising under the 1989 amendments to the Vaccine Act, ⁵ we review de novo the [Court of Federal Claims'] determination as to whether or not the special master's decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. In effect, then, we review the underlying decision of the special master under the ... standard[s] of Sec. 300aa-12(e)(2)(B)." Hines v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 940 F.2d 1518, 1524 (Fed.Cir.1991). See also Edgar v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 989 F.2d 473, 475 (Fed.Cir.1993); Bradley v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 991 F.2d 1570, 1574 (Fed.Cir.1993); Grant v. Secretary of the Dep't Health & Human Servs., 956 F.2d 1144, 1146 (Fed.Cir.1992). Whether the special master has jurisdiction to amend her decision after the Court of Federal Claims has entered judgment thereon is a legal question which we review de novo. See Widdoss v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 989 F.2d 1170, 1174 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 381, 126 L.Ed.2d 331 (1993); Whitecotton v. Secretary of the Dep't Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 374, 376 (Fed.Cir.1994).

In granting the government's motion to vacate the special master's Order to Amend, the trial court found that there was no legal basis to support the special master's conclusion that she retained jurisdiction to correct her decision after a judgment was entered by the court. The court identified two events by which the special master is divested of jurisdiction under the Vaccine Act. First, if a motion for review is filed by either party within 30 days of the issuance of a special The Pattons maintain that the trial court erred in concluding that the special master did not retain jurisdiction to amend her decision after the court entered final judgment in accordance with that decision. The Pattons assert that authority for the special master's continuing jurisdiction can be found in Rule 60 of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims, the Vaccine Rules, and the "inherent" powers of the special master. We will consider each of these alleged bases of authority in turn.

                master's decision, the Court of Federal Claims assumes exclusive jurisdiction over the case. 6  See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-12(e)(2).  Once such a motion is properly filed, jurisdiction passes to the court and the special master's jurisdiction reattaches only if the case is subsequently remanded for further action.  See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-12(e)(2)(C).  Second, if the parties fail to seek review of the special master's decision within the 30-day period, then jurisdiction is lost once the clerk of the Court of Federal Claims enters judgment in accordance with that decision.  See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300aa-12(e)(3).  It is the latter situation that exists here
                

First, the Pattons argue that a special master possesses authority equivalent to that of the Court of Federal Claims under Rule 60 to amend or correct her decision after a judgment has been entered. The Pattons argue that although their failure to file a timely motion for review under section 300aa-12(e)(1) prohibits the court from reviewing the merits of the special master's decision, the special...