Patton v. Southern Ry. Co.

• Citation: 82 F. 979
• Decision Date: 03 November 1897
• Docket Number: 200.
• Parties: PATTON v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

82 F. 979

PATTON v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.

No. 200.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

November 3, 1897

F. A Sondley and Theodore F. Davidson, for plaintiff in error.

George F. Bason and Charles Price, for defendant in error.

Before Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, GOFF, Circuit Judge, and BRAWLEY District Judge.

BRAWLEY District Judge.

It is difficult to mark with precision the exact line which separates the functions of the judge from the functions of the jury in actions of negligence; for this being a mixed question of law and fact, and the terms by which it is usually defined having a relative significance, the rule requiring judges to decide questions of law, and juries to decide questions of fact, is perplexed with subtleties when applied to the special circumstances of each particular case. When the facts are undisputed, and such that all reasonable minds must draw the same conclusion from them, it is clearly the duty of the judge to say, as matter of law, whether or not they make a case of actionable negligence; but such is the infirmity of the human mind, and such its idiosyncrasies, that minds equally honest may sometimes draw different conclusions from the same facts. In all such cases, and wherever the facts are in dispute, it is as clearly the duty of the judge to submit them to the jury; for the law holds that 12 impartial men applying their separate and varied observations and experiences of everyday life to the decision of questions of fact, are more likely to reach a correct conclusion than a single judge; and this must be so, if the jury system is worthy to be preserved. The courts have long since abrogated the doctrine that a mere scintilla of evidence from which there might be a surmise of negligence is sufficient to carry a case to a jury, and have adopted the more reasonable rule that in all cases there is a preliminary question, which the judge must decide,-- whether, granting to the testimony all the probative force to which it is entitled, a jury can properly and justifiably infer negligence from the facts proved; for, while negligence is usually an inference from facts, it must be proved, and competent and sufficient evidence is as much required to prove it as to prove any other fact. The simplest definition of 'negligence' is, absence of due care under the circumstances. This seems easy of comprehension, but when one attempts to apply it to a particular case the inherent vagueness of the terms 'due care' and 'reasonable prudence' becomes apparent; for there is no fixed and immutable standard by which to measure duty in the varying and diverse transactions and happenings of life, and what may be due care in one condition and relation is the want of it in another. A process of ratiocination, therefore, becomes necessary,-- comparison and deduction. When this comes into play, new difficulties arise, from the distinctive individualities, peculiarities, and anfractuosities of the human mind. Of all the reported cases wherein judges have granted nonsuits or directed verdicts in actions of negligence, there are few where other judges, equally conscientious, might not have discovered some fact which would be considered rightly capable of producing a different impression on other minds, and therefore properly cognizable by a jury. One clear thread seems to run through them all, and that is that in all actions founded on negligence, whenever the facts are in dispute or conflicting, or the credibility of witnesses is involved, or the preponderance of testimony, and wherever the facts admitted or not denied are such that fair-minded men might draw different inferences from the, it is a case for a jury, and a case should not be withdrawn from the jury unless the inferences from the facts are so plain as to be a legal conclusion. In the case now under review the essential facts are few and undisputed. It is in attempting to draw inferences from those facts that we are plunged into a sea of uncertainty, where there is no chart directing to an infallible conclusion. A learned and conscientious judge, in dismissing the complaint, has, in effect, decided that no inference of negligence could rightly be deducted from these facts. It was his duty to so decide if the case was so plain that he would have been impelled to set aside the verdict as one rendered through prejudice, passion, or caprice. It is equally our duty to review the correctness of his conclusion.

The accident out of which the action grew occurred near Melrose on the Asheville & Spartanburg Railroad, between 3 and 4 o'clock in the morning of October 10, 1894. The plaintiff was the conductor of a freight train, and left Asheville a little after midnight with a train of 16 loaded cars, arriving at Saluda about half past 2 o'clock. The rules of the company required the conductor to go over his train with the engineer at Saluda, and to inspect the brakes and appliances. A helper engine is kept at Saluda to help trains up and down the grade. It was usually employed in helping trains up the grade, but could be used in going down, if required. It was not manned or fired that morning, and the conductor, not deeming it necessary, did not ask for it. Between Saluda and Melrose, the first station 3 miles to the east, there is a very steep grade,-- about 240 to 260 feet to the mile. For a half mile after leaving Saluda the train was kept under control. After that the brakes failed to hold, the train got beyond control and rushed down the mountain side at a terrific speed past Melrose, the foot of the steep grade, and was wrecked at a point one-half mile below where there is a sharp curve, and the plaintiff received injuries which necessitated the amputation of his leg. It is impossible for any fair-minded man to say with certainty what caused the train to get beyond control. There was evidence that some of the brakes were found defective on the arrival at Saluda, but they were repaired, and the conductor evidently concluded that his train was in a safe and suitable condition to make the descent; for, having the right to demand the assistance of the helper, he did not ask for it. In the opinion of the presiding judge, he 'was a man of intelligence, of good habits, of experience in the management and movement of trains, perfectly familiar with this steep grade on which the wreck occurred, and its dangers. ' The cause which led to the train getting beyond control may therefore be said to be inscrutable. We do not find any proof of such negligence on the part of the company in not providing safe machinery and appliances as would sustain a verdict against it. Nor is there any proof of such contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff as would prevent his recovery if negligence on the part of the company had been established. The best machinery that can be provided will sometimes fail to respond to the demands upon it, as the most careful of human beings will sometimes omit due precautions. Inattention and accident are incident to human affairs. This being the obvious conclusion of all human experience, it is a duty to provide against such contingencies, and the omission to make such provision may be justly regarded as negligence. Whether there was such omission of duty in this case is the only question to be considered, for there is no sufficient evidence of negligence as to the cars and brakes and other appliances. In view of the testimony that accidents of this nature had frequently occurred at this very place, and in the very manner detailed here; that it was an extremely steep grade,-- a dangerous place, where accidents were likely to occur,-- we hold that it was an obvious duty of the defendant company, not only to take every precaution to prevent such accidents, but also to provide against the consequences thereof, and to minimize the dangers likely to flow therefrom, if they could not, in the nature of things, be altogether prevented. As to whether that could be effectually accomplished, we express no opinion. That seems to us peculiarly a question of fact, to which a jury should respond under such instructions as the court would properly give. The testimony in this case showed that about one-half mile from the foot of the steep grade there was a sharp curve, where the train was derailed, and that there was no guard rail at that curve. A witness who claimed to have had 20 or 25 years of experience as a railroad constructer, and one who had been a section boss for 16 years, testified that a guard rail upon such a curve would be a great safeguard; that guard rails are used upon a great many railroads; that they have a tendency to hold the flange of the wheels on, and to prevent...