Patton v. United States, 47661.

• Decision Date: 02 February 1948
• Docket Number: No. 47661.,47661.
• Citation: 75 F. Supp. 470
• Parties: PATTON v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

75 F. Supp. 470

PATTON v. UNITED STATES.

No. 47661.

Court of Claims.

February 2, 1948.

Ross Cummings Patton, pro se.

Carl D. McManamy, of Washington, D. C., and John F. Sonnett, Asst. Atty. Gen., (J. F. Mothershead, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for defendant.

Before JONES, Chief Justice, and LITTLETON, WHITAKER, MADDEN, and HOWELL, Judges.

LITTLETON, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff filed his petition herein to recover reimbursement of pioneering, development and labor expenses over a fourteen-year period from 1928 to 1942, relating to a combination "Fire Fighting Apparatus and System — to combat air raids," and in connection with the preparation, filing and prosecution of Application No. 230,760 for U. S. Letters Patent on the fire fighting apparatus and system for combating air raids as therein described. Plaintiff also claims compensation for the value of his said invention which he alleges was manufactured for and used by the United States subsequent to September 20, 1938, the filing date of the application for a patent.

The U. S. Patent Office declined to grant Letters Patent upon said Application No. 230,760.

The defendant has filed a demurrer to the petition on the ground that it does not set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the United States or any cause of action of which this court has jurisdiction.

The facts material to the issue of law presented as alleged in the petition are in substance as follows:

Plaintiff is a resident and citizen of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. During a period of about ten years prior to September 20, 1938, plaintiff engaged in "pioneering development labor," and incurred considerable expense, relative to and in connection with the preparation and filing in the U. S. Patent Office of Specifications and Claims with Application No. 230,760 for U. S. Letters Patent for a "Fire Fighting Apparatus and System — to combat air raids." The petition describes this apparatus and system as comprising "a combination self-propelled and trailer fire pump articulated and extra trailer fire pumps towed by any method, and submounted 50 calibre automatic Colt-Vickers antiaircraft machine gun, of claimant's modified design, adapted to fire up to 90° in a 360° radius over the heads of the drivers of the leading self-propelled vehicle on which it is mounted."

On October 6, 1938, plaintiff offered the defendant's Secretary of War the free use of the apparatus and system, as set forth and described in plaintiff's application No. 230,760, in the District of Columbia to test out a pilot model and system. The Secretary did accept this offer of free use of the invention in the District by manufacturing and testing of a pilot model and system. Plaintiff was financially unable to manufacture and test such a pilot model. Plaintiff furnished to the Secretary of War all the engineering information and data compiled by him and the detailed specifications on the construction, installation and operation of the complete "fire fighting apparatus and system to combat air raids" covered by said Patent Application No. 230,760, but no contract existed between plaintiff and defendant whereby defendant agreed to pay plaintiff for his apparatus and system. On May 1, 1941, after plaintiff had claimed that the United States had manufactured or procured and was using plaintiff's apparatus and system, Maj. General E. S. Adams, Adjutant General, wrote plaintiff as follows:

"With reference to the combination machine gun and fire truck which you submitted to the War Department in 1938 attention is invited to the letter addressed to you on November 7, 1938, in which you were advised that after careful examination your motorized combination fire truck and machine gun was found to possess insufficient value for military purposes to warrant further consideration. You may rest assured that the War Department has not utilized your proposal nor does it contemplate such action, and you, are therefore, not entitled to any remuneration."

The petition alleges, however, that the apparatus and system, as disclosed by the information and data furnished to the Secretary of War by plaintiff and as described in his Patent Application No. 230,760, was manufactured by or for the United States and used by it in the Coast Guard and Ordnance Department. Plaintiff alleges that his "trailer fire pump invention" was manufactured for defendant by the Chrysler Corporation, the Ford Motor Company, the Hale Fire Pump Company and the American LaFrance Fire Engine Company, subsequent to September 20, 1938.

On August 14, 1941, plaintiff mailed to the War Department, Holabird Quartermaster Depot, Maryland, % Major General E. S. Adams, War Department, Washington, D. C., an invoice as follows:

"Royalty for initial installation and exclusive use at Fort Dix, Airport, New Jersey, of mechanical reeling device, steel cable and grapple hook, in combination with fire-fighting vehicle (or crash truck) as covered by U. S. Patent Pending No. 230,760, Filed Sept. 20, 1938, for `fire-fighting apparatus to combat air raid.'

"Amount $750.00" This invoice was accompanied by a letter of the same date from plaintiff as follows:

"War Department "Washington, D. C "Reference: AG 070 (7-24-41) MB "Attention: Major General E. S. Adams "The Adjutant General.

"Dear Sir:

"In reference to my letters July 18, July 24th, and August 6, 1941, relative to device for removing bombed or flaming wreckage, covered by U. S. Patent Pending No. 230,760, filed September 20, 1938, for `fire-fighting apparatus to combat air raid,' which has been adapted to a self contained fire-fighting vehicle constructed at Holabird Quartermaster Depot and now in use at Fort Dix, New Jersey, Airport, I am enclosing invoice in Quadruplicate to cover royalty for initial installation, amount $750.00 which I presume you will find in order."

The invoice was not returned and no reply was made to plaintiff's letter.

Plaintiff's application No. 230,760, for U. S. Letters Patent, was considered in due course by the Patent Office and was denied on the ground that the apparatus and system as described in the specifications, and claimed in the Claims of the Application, was not patentable over the prior art and was anticipated by certain prior patents which were cited by the Patent Office, one of which was U. S. Patent No. 1,357,982, to House, November 9, 1920. The decision of the Patent Office denying plaintiff's application for Letters Patent was affirmed by the Board of Patent Appeals on April 14, 1941. Plaintiff prosecuted an appeal to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and that court in an opinion rendered April 27, 1942, affirmed the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals. Plaintiff was unsuccessful in his efforts to have the decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.

The question presented for decision by the allegations of fact set forth in plaintiff's petition is, whether this court has jurisdiction of plaintiff's claim for reimbursement for development expenses incurred and compensation for labor performed in connection with his application for a patent covering a "fire fighting apparatus and system to combat air raids," and, in addition, compensation for the alleged use by defendant of such device as designed by him.

The jurisdiction of this court is limited by law to those claims on which the Congress has specifically authorized suits to be brought against the Government and unless the facts alleged in a petition filed clearly bring the claim made within the jurisdiction so conferred, we cannot consider and adjudicate such claim on its merits.

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we are unable to find authority in law for holding that this court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of plaintiff's claim for reimbursement of his expenses and for compensation for the alleged use by defendant of his design for a fire-fighting device. The claim for compensation made by plaintiff for the unauthorized use by defendant of his design or device is not one based upon and supported by a contract between plaintiff and the Government or a right granted by an act of Congress, but is one based upon moral or broad equitable considerations which do not come within our jurisdiction. In Bonner v. United States,...