Patuxent Oil Co. v. County Com'rs of Anne Arundel County

• Decision Date: 15 March 1957
• Docket Number: No. 131,131
• Citation: 212 Md. 543,129 A.2d 847
• Parties: PATUXENT OIL COMPANY, Inc. v. COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 543

212 Md. 543

129 A.2d 847

PATUXENT OIL COMPANY, Inc. v. COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY.

No. 131.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 15, 1957.

William J. McWilliams, Annapolis (McWilliams, Evans & Melvin, Annapolis, on the brief), for appellant.

Marvin I. Anderson, Annapolis (Malcolm B. Smith, Annapolis, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and COLLINS, HENDERSON, HAMMOND and PRESCOTT, JJ.

PRESCOTT, Judge.

The Patuxent Oil Company, Inc., (Patuxent) filed a bill of complaint in the equity court in which it requested the Court to declare its rights with respect to the use of a pipe line under a public landing or wharf in Anne Arundel County and, as well, the rights and powers of the county with respect thereto. This appeal is from a decree which sustained a demurrer to, and dismissed, the bill, without leave to amend.

The bill of complaint alleged in substance: That in 1924, the Standard Oil Co. (Standard) erected tanks for the storage of liquid petroleum products on its property located in Galesville and installed a pipe line from that property to the end of a public wharf, owned and maintained by the county, which extended into the waters of West River; that for many years thereafter, oil was delivered to its said tanks by marine tankers that tied up to the wharf, the oil then being pumped through the pipe line to the storage tanks; that for the privilege of placing the pipe line under the wharf, Standard paid the county $260 annually; that in 1938, Standard sold its property, including the pipe line, to Patuxent, which continued the same method of operation until some time after World War II, when the deliveries by marine tankers were discontinued and changed to deliveries by motor tankers; that Patuxent decided to reactivate the pipe line and discovered it needed repairs; that it applied to the county commissioners for, and obtained from them, a permit to make the repairs where the pipe line ran over land but not within the State's right of way (In this permit, Patuxent's agent was instructed that under no circumstances 'shall the pipes be continued or connected to the existing pipe or new pipes extended on the County wharf' until after a written agreement relative thereto had been signed by the commissioners and Patuxent); that shortly after the issuance of this permit, Patuxent attempted to negotiate the terms of an agreement with the county for the replacement of the pipe line under the public wharf; that its counsel consulted with 'representatives' of the county and a monthly payment of $50 was agreed upon; that at a meeting of the commissioners held on March 29, 1955, the county's counsel advised them that Ch. 711 of the Acts of 1953 was applicable and no agreement could be entered into unless the advertising requirements were complied with; that at a meeting held two days later Patuxent's counsel requested the commissioners to give further consideration to the matter and he was requested to submit a proposal in writing and the county's counsel was directed to render a written opinion thereon; that Patuxent's counsel submitted the written proposal to the effect that the commissioners authorize Patuxent 'to make use' of the oil pipes under the wharf for a period of five years (with an option to renew for an additional five year period) for $50 per month (this proposal contained other provisions not immediately important and the further statement that the quantity of oil to be unloaded was not certain); that the county's counsel rendered his written opinion which was to the effect that the county had no authority to lease public property unless the commissioners deemed it no longer needed for public use; that the commissioners thereafter again considered the matter and by unanimous action decided to be governed by the advice of their counsel; that shortly thereafter this suit was instituted.

The bill of complaint then prays for the following relief:

'1. That the Plaintiff, in common with other members of the public, may be declared to be entitled to make any reasonable use of the public landing at Galesville which does not unreasonably interfere with the rights of other members of the public who are entitled and have occasion to use the landing for the purposes for which it was designed.

2. That the Plaintiff may be declared to be entitled to use the pipe line under said public landing for the purpose of transferring oil from boats to its plant.

3. That the right vel non of the County to exact payments from the Plaintiff may be determined and if such a right is found to exist, the reasonable limits of said charge.

4. That the Plaintiff may have such other and further relief as its case may require.'

The powers of the Courts in this State to declare 'rights, status, and other legal relations' are contained in Secs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Art. 31A of the Code 1951; and Sec. 12 provides that said Article shall be liberally construed and administered. As a result of several decisions of this Court that held that a proceeding for a declaratory judgment was inappropriate when there existed an immediate cause of action between the parties for which one of the common remedies at law or in equity was adequate and available, the Declaratory Judgments Act was repealed and reenacted in 1945.

Before and after 1945 in this State, it consistently has been held that in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Courts for declaratory relief, there must be a justiciable issue or controversy; and, insofar as we have been informed, it is universally so held. A concise definition of what constitutes a justiciable issue or controversy is given by Anderson in his Actions for Declaratory Judgments, Vol. 1, par 17: 'A controversy is justiciable when there are interested parties asserting adverse claims upon a state of facts which must have accrued wherein a legal decision is sought or demanded.' See also Tanner v. McKeldin, 202 Md. 569, 576, 577, 97 A.2d 449; Kirkwood v. Provident Savings Bank, 205 Md. 48, 53, 54, 106 A.2d 103. As the Chancellor sustained a demurrer to the bill of complaint, we must examine the facts alleged therein together with the exhibits and the decisions of this Court to determine whether any one or more of the prayers for relief should have been granted.

I

We shall consider the prayers, above quoted in full, seriatim as (1), (2), (3) and (4). With reference to (1), this Court has set forth the manner in which the public highways, wharves and sidewalks may be used by individuals. Among the cases dealing with the same are: Brauer v. Baltimore Refrig. & Heating Co., 99 Md. 367, 376, 58 A.2d 21, 66 L.R.A. 403 (streets and sidewalks); Maxa v County Com'rs, 158 Md. 229, 231, 148 A. 214 (wharves); Parlett Co-op v. Tidewater Lines, 164 Md. 405, 416, 165 A. 313 (highways); State v. Potomac Edison Co., 166 Md. 138, 144, 170 A. 568 (highways). It is obvious this prayer simply requests a declaration of an abstract proposition of law. There is no allegation in the bill or exhibits that claims any denial by the defendants of any such rights in the plaintiffs. As a matter of fact, it seems to be conceded in the record and likewise was conceded during argument that no claim is made or has been made that the plaintiff does not have the same rights in common with all other members of the public...