Paugh v. Hanks

• Decision Date: 27 July 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-993,82-993
• Parties: , 6 O.B.R. 114 PAUGH et al., Appellants, v. HANKS et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 72

6 Ohio St.3d 72

451 N.E.2d 759, 6 O.B.R. 114

PAUGH et al., Appellants, v. HANKS et al., Appellees.

No. 82-993.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

July 27, 1983.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A cause of action may be stated for the negligent infliction of serious emotional distress. (Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St.3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109, followed.)

2. A cause of action may be stated for the negligent infliction of serious emotional distress without the manifestation of a resulting physical injury. Proof of a resulting physical injury is admissible as evidence of the degree of emotional distress suffered.

3. Where a bystander to an accident states a cause of action for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress, the emotional injuries sustained must be found to be both serious and reasonably foreseeable, in order to allow a recovery.

3a. Serious emotional distress describes emotional injury which is both severe and debilitating. Thus, serious emotional distress may be found where a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the case.

3b. The factors to be considered in order to determine whether a negligently inflicted emotional injury was reasonably foreseeable include: (1) whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident, as contrasted with one who was a distance away; (2) whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence; and (3) whether the plaintiff and victim (if any) were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.

4. A cause of action for the negligent infliction of serious emotional distress may be stated where the plaintiff-bystander reasonably appreciated the peril which took place, whether or not the victim suffered actual physical harm, and, that as a result of this cognizance or fear of peril, the plaintiff suffered serious emotional distress.

Plaintiffs-appellants, Laurie C. and William Paugh, and their two children, Melissa and Christy, reside at 381 West State Street in Barberton, Ohio. Their home is located directly across from an exit ramp off Interstate 76 which terminates on State Street.

On December 28, 1977, Mrs. Paugh put Christy to bed and then retired to her bedroom for sleep. Several hours later, a car driven by defendant-appellee, Judy Hanks, went through the stop sign at the end of the freeway exit ramp, proceeded across State Street, and collided into the Paughs' home. In her deposition, Mrs. Paugh stated that the front window of the home was broken out and that she was very "shook up." At this point in time, Mrs. Paugh did not seek medical attention.

On August 10, 1978, at approximately 2:00 a.m., a car driven by defendant-appellee, Eileen Mekina, collided into a fence on the Paughs' property. Mrs. Paugh stated in her deposition that she feared for the life of Ms. Mekina, but that she also feared for the safety of her children, because the accident took place in an area where her children normally play during the daylight hours.

Early on the morning of August 26, 1978, a car driven by defendant-appellee, Bruce Clem, collided into the Paugh household. In her deposition, Mrs. Paugh stated that she feared for the safety of her children, and that she couldn't stop crying. At that time, she sought medical attention from a Dr. Cleary.

On the following day, August 27, 1978, Mrs. Paugh fainted and was hyperventilating. She was taken to Dunlap Memorial Hospital, and was given oxygen and valium, and was released shortly thereafter.

Several days later, Mrs. Paugh's fainting and hyperventilating continued, and she went to the Portage Path Community Mental Health Center. The record indicates that she had no prior history of fainting.

Thereafter, Mrs. Paugh began seeing a nurse at the mental health center, and she was put on medication. Mrs. Paugh claimed she was experiencing serious nightmares; was afraid to be left alone at her home; was afraid to cross streets; was afraid of traffic in general, or being on a big street; and was afraid to drive the family car.

One day, while at the nurse's office in the mental health center, Mrs. Paugh fainted. She was then admitted into the Akron General Psychiatric Ward for observation for one week in October 1978, where it was diagnosed that she was suffering from an anxiety trauma. During her stay at the hospital, Mrs. Paugh was taught how to deal with the fainting spells. She experienced no more fainting until February 1979, when her daughter went into convulsions.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County, alleging that as a direct and proximate result of the defendants' negligence, Mrs. Paugh suffered emotional distress including an anxiety neurosis with depressive features, and that her property was damaged. Mr. Paugh claimed a loss of his wife's services and a loss of consortium. Plaintiffs prayed for damages against all three defendants, jointly and severally for mental suffering, expenses, care and treatment, loss of services, and damages to property.

The defendants filed motions for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56, for all damages except the damages to personal property. The trial court granted these motions, resting its decision on Miller v. Baltimore & Ohio S.W. R.R. Co. (1908), 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499, stating that "[l]egal liability for fright or nervous shock must rest upon a contemporaneous physical injury or an act of a wilfull or malicious nature."

Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of all defendants, for all damages except those damages incurred to the Paughs' property.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Laybourne, Smith, Gore & Shapiro Co., L.P.A., and A. Russell Smith, Akron, for appellants.

Roderick, Myers & Linton, Robert F. Orth and Kurt R. Weitendorf, Akron, for appellee Hanks.

Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs Co., L.P.A., Charles E. Pierson and Stephen M. Hammersmith, Akron, for appellee Clem.

Olds, Olds & Lynett Co., L.P.A., and James Olds, Jr., Akron, for appellee Mekina.

SWEENEY, Justice.

Based on our recent pronouncement in Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109, we hold that summary judgments in the instant cause were improper and that, therefore, the cause must be reversed and remanded to the court of common pleas, since the plaintiffs here have stated a cause of action for the negligent infliction of serious emotional distress. Upon remand, we wish to guide the trial court, as well as the bench and bar, as to the limitations and scope of Ohio's recognition of the tort of negligent infliction of serious emotional distress.

Today, this court has the unique opportunity to establish standards in this ever evolving area of tort law. To our credit, we need not experience the slow, cynical recognition of an individual's right to emotional tranquillity; other jurisdictions have both the experiences and illustrations which aid us in adopting a course which brings our law securely in step with the modern advances made in medical and psychiatric science. While some may view our decision today as an unsettling quantum leap into this difficult area of the law, the situation is one of paramount necessity in fitting the law to the dynamics and nuances of modern twentieth century society. We view our decision today as a bold and promising step in ensuring an individual's right to emotional tranquillity which is redressable in an action against a blameworthy defendant for the negligent infliction of serious emotional distress.

I

Historically, this court, as well as others, has been reluctant to grant compensation to victims of mental suffering for a myriad of reasons. As Dean Prosser pointed out, "[a]ll these objections have been demolished many times, and it is threshing old straw to deal with them." Prosser, Law of Torts (4 Ed.1971) 327, Section 54. Needless to say, our decision in Schultz, supra, explored the traditional arguments against allowing recovery for the negligent infliction of mental harm, and we have found these arguments to be without merit.

The first step that courts took in this evolutionary cycle of defining the boundaries of liability for emotional distress in negligence actions was to allow recovery for mental distress as only "parasitic" or "pain and suffering" damages which were grounded in a traditional tort cause of action. Unless there existed a primary cause of action in a recognized area of tort liability, there would be no allowance for the recovery of mental harm damages. Thus, mental suffering was deemed genuine and compensable if and only if it was "parasitic" to a provable physical injury connected with an accepted tort cause of action.

Closely allied to this development, there evolved the "contemporaneous physical injury" or "impact" rule which this court rejected in Schultz, supra. The inventiveness of courts to find a contemporaneous injury or impact in many tenuous fact situations exemplified the absurdity inherent within the rule. ¹

The majority of courts which then rejected the "impact" rule replaced it with a theory of recovery known as the "zone of danger" rule. Under the "zone of danger" rule, a plaintiff-bystander to an accident need not have been physically injured or impacted, however, in order to recover; a plaintiff was required to be in close enough proximity to an accident to have been placed in actual physical danger, and, that as a result of being within the "zone of danger," a plaintiff-bystander's emotional suffering was deemed genuine because of the fear of that physical danger. Thus, the analysis implemented by...