Pauiey v. Steam-Gauge & Lantern Co.

• Citation: 131 N.Y. 90,29 N.E. 999
• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 02 February 1892
• Parties: PAUIEY v. STEAM-GAUGE & LANTERN CO.

131 N.Y. 90

29 N.E. 999

PAUIEY

v.STEAM-GAUGE & LANTERN CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 2, 1892.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, fifth department.

Action by Jacob Pauley, as administrator, against the Steam-Gauge & Lantern Company, for the death of his intestate. Plaintiff was nonsuited at the trial, but the judgment of nonsuit was reversed by the general term. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

Louis Marshall, for appellant.

Eugene Van Voorhis, for respondent.

FINCH, J.

The plaintiff's intestate lost his life in a fire which consumed the factory of the defendant, and did its work so swiftly, and swept through all parts of the structure with such rapidity, that more than 30 of the men employed in the building were unable to escape. The origin of the fire is unknown. No claim is made that it was occasioned by any act or omission of the defendant company, or was in any manner a product or result of its fault or negligence. The ground upon which the action brought to recover damages for the death of the intestate actually rests is that the defendant was negligent in not providing sufficient and adequate means of escape from the building in the emergency of its taking fire, and that such negligence operated to cause the death of the intestate. The plaintiff was nonsuited at the circuit, but, on exceptions heard at the general term, obtained a reversal of the ruling, and an order for a new trial. The defendant has appealed from that judgment to this court, giving the usual stipulation, and we are now to determine whether, upon any view of the facts, the plaintiff was entitled to recover.

We are satisfied that, if any duty devolved upon the defendant to anticipate the possible burning of its building, and provide modes of escape adequate to that emergency, such duty did not exist at common law, and had its origin and measure in the statute, which for the first time required in particular cases the construction of fir-escapes. Laws 1887, c. 462, § 10. Prior thereto the owner of a building not peculiarly exposed to the danger of fire from the character of the work to be carried on within it was not bound to anticipate what was merely a remote or possible danger, or that its occurrence would put in jeopardy the lives of his workmen. The ordinary means of escape by stairs and halls and doorways and windows might reasonably be deemed sufficient, and the common law did not require, where the building was properly constructed for its intended use and purpose, that extra and unusual precautions should be adopted to protect the occupants against a danger for which the owner should be in no manner responsible, and which he is not reasonably bound to anticipate.That was held in Jones v. Granite Mills, 126 Mass. 84, a case which we cited a authority in Bajus v. Railroad Co., 103 N. Y. 316, 8 N. E. Rep. 529; and the doctrine was repeated in Keith v. Granite Mills, 126 Mass. 90; but with the growth of invention and the spread of the mechanic arts came an increase in the number of factories employed in production, of the workmen gathered in their rooms, and especially in the size and height of the buildings. The attention of the legislature was first drawn to the evils attending the employment of women and children in such factories, (Laws 1886, c. 409,) and the next year to the possible danger to the operatives when employed in buildings three stories or more in height, (Laws 1887, supra, § 10.) The very terms of this statute show that in ordinary buildings the usual modes of egress were deemed sufficient, and that there was no negligence in the common and usual reliance upon them; but that factories of greater height, in which were gathered operatives in considerable numbers upon upper floors, were not so easy to safely leave in case of fire, and required additional protection. The act, therefore, as amended in 1887, contained a section which reads thus: ‘Fire-escapes shall be provided on the outside of all factories three or more stories in height, connecting with each floor above the first, well fastened, and secure, and of sufficient strength. Stationary stairs or ladders shall be provided on the inside from the upper story to the roof as a means of escape in case of fire.’ The act imposed penalties for any disobedience of its provisions, and provided for the appointment of factory inspectors, whose duty it should be to examine such buildings, and enforce the requirements of the law.

I am unable to agree with the contention of the appellant that the sole remedy under the statute was the public remedy, which consisted of an enforcement of the penalties provided. The requirement of fire-escapes was for the direct and special benefit of the operatives in such factories, and intended for their protection; and the rule applies that when a statute commands or probibits a thing for the benefit of a person he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for a wrong done to him contrary to its terms. We so held in Willy v. Mulledy, 78 N. Y. 310, and sustained an action in behalf of the persons injured for the omission to provide fireescapes in accordance with thestatute applicable to that case. We must hold, therefore, that the law of 1887 imposed a duty upon the owners or occupants of the prescribed class of factories, for an omission to perform which the operatives injured by the omission might recover damages. But the duty so imposed is both created and measured by the statute. It is a new duty, having no other origin and no other measure, and cannot be made to outrun or exceed the terms of the act. The defendants performed that duty. They placed two fire-escapes upon their factory, which connected with each floor above the first, and were well fastened, perfectly secure, and of sufficient strength. Their number, character, and location were examined and approved by the public officer appointed under the law, with whom the subject was fully discussed, and who, after the work was done, and he had carefully inspected it, expressed his approval, and reported to his superiors that this factory had in all respects obeyed the law. It is true that this building, which was five stories high on the side to wards the court, and...