Paul Gabrilis, Inc. v. Dahl
Decision Date | 10 June 1998 |
Citation | 961 P.2d 865,154 Or.App. 388 |
Parties | PAUL GABRILIS, INC., dba Rock Creek Country Club, Inc., an Oregon corporation, Appellant, and Loren and Donna Bosshard, husband and wife; Sam and Hope Campagna, husband and wife; Donald and Naomi Davidson, husband and wife; and Donna Bodtker, Intervenors-Respondents, v. Joe DAHL; Peggy Dahl; Scott Osborn and David Bodtker, Respondents, and Paul Gabrilis, Inc., dba Rock Creek Country Club, an Oregon corporation, Intervenor-Appellant. D950915CV; CA A94285. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Glen McClendon, Portland, argued the cause for appellant--intervenor-appellant. With him on the briefs were Gilion C. Ellis and Lindsay, Hart, Neil & Weigler.
Michael A. Cox, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents--intervenors-respondents.
Before WARREN, P.J., and EDMONDS and ARMSTRONG, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment in a dispute over plaintiff's unilateral termination of defendants' memberships in a country club owned and operated by plaintiff. 1 We review in accordance with ORCP 47 C and affirm. 2
Plaintiff purchased the Rock Creek Country Club in 1991. At that time, defendants all held membership agreements with the club that they had entered into with the club's previous owner, the Moschetti Corporation. Defendants had entered into those membership agreements with the understanding that the initiation fee of $1,000 for each membership would be used as start-up capital by the corporation to purchase and renovate property that, before that time, had been a public golf course. As a condition of the sale of the country club to plaintiff, plaintiff agreed to assume Moschetti's obligations under the membership agreements. Although the agreements are not all identical, the provisions pertinent to this appeal are the same. They provide:
(Emphasis supplied.)
In early 1995, plaintiff notified defendants that it had terminated their membership privileges. Along with the notice of termination, plaintiff refunded defendants' initiation fees and unused dues. Plaintiff did not give a reason for the decision to terminate the memberships. Defendants returned the refunded fees and dues to plaintiff and expressed their intention to continue to use the club facilities. Plaintiff then brought this action for trespass against defendants, who moved for summary judgment on the ground that their membership agreements were still in effect, because plaintiff did not have the right unilaterally to terminate them. Plaintiff argued that, because the agreements had no definite term on their duration, the agreements were terminable at will by either party. The trial court concluded that the language of the agreements was inconsistent with plaintiff's interpretation and, accordingly, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. 4
Plaintiff assigns error to the trial court's conclusion that it could terminate defendants' memberships for cause only. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the agreements are mere licenses, revocable at any time, because they do not contain language designating them as perpetual. 5 In response, defendants contend that the language of the contract indicates that the parties intended the memberships to last for as long as membership dues were paid. Defendants point to the provisions that permit the transfer and assignment of the memberships as well as to the provisions setting forth grounds for suspension or termination. We agree with defendants.
ORS 42.230 (emphasis supplied).
Plaintiff argues that, because the membership agreements are silent as to duration they are terminable at will. To support that argument, plaintiff relies on statements in Lund v. Arbonne International, Inc., 132 Or.App. 87, 90, 887 P.2d 817 (1994), and Fleming v. Kids and Kin Head Start, 71 Or.App. 718, 722-23 n. 1, 693 P.2d 1363 (1985), reciting the general proposition that contracts that are for an indefinite period may be terminated at will with reasonable notice. Plaintiff's reliance on that general rule is misplaced. It is true that if there is nothing in the nature or language of a contract to indicate that the contract is perpetual, courts will interpret the contract to be terminable at will on reasonable notice. Nevertheless, where provided for, perpetual agreements will be enforced according to their terms. Council of Jewish Women v. Sisters of Charity, 266 Or. 448, 456, 513 P.2d 1183 (1973). All the circumstances of each case must be considered in...
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