Paul v. Chi. Transit Auth.
| Decision Date | 30 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-cv-03259,14-cv-03259 |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER PAUL, Plaintiff, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Christopher Paul, a bus driver fired by Defendant Chicago Transit Authority, brought this three-count action against Defendant for failure to accommodate his qualifying disability, retaliation, and interference with his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq.1 Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. 132) of the Court's earlier order dismissing with prejudice his failure to accommodate claim (Dkt. 106) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's remaining claims for retaliation and interference (Dkt. 147). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is denied, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
At the summary-judgment stage, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). That said, nonmoving parties offering factual assertions in defense of their claim must support those assertions with evidence and may not rely on allegations in their complaint. Estate of Perry v. Wenzel, 872 F.3d 439, 461 (7th Cir. 2017). The following recitation of facts reflects these principles.2
Plaintiff worked as a CTA bus driver from January 15, 2007 to December 11, 2012. (DSOF ¶ 3; Pltf. Resp. DSOF ¶ 3.) Plaintiff worked part-time and without a set schedule for most of his tenure. (DSOF ¶ 6, 9; Pltf. Resp. DSOF ¶ 6, 9.) On his assigned workdays, he reported to the Kedzie Garage in the East Garfield Park neighborhood of Chicago, where he was dispatched to a route by the managers on duty. (DSOF ¶ 10; Pltf. Resp. DSOF ¶ 10.)
As a union employee, Plaintiff was subject to Defendant's Corrective Action Guidelines.3 (DSOF ¶¶ 3, 12, Ex. F; Pltf. Resp. DSOF ¶¶ 3, 12.) These guidelinesstate that a driver who "fails to report at his or her starting time will be charged with a MISS." (DSOF ¶ 16; Pltf. Resp. DSOF ¶ 16.) They further provide that misses result in the following disciplinary progression:
(Id.) At the "Corrective Case Interview/Probation" stage, a manager prepares an action plan that applies for the duration of a six to twelve-month probationary period. (DSOF ¶ 17; Pltf. Resp. DSOF ¶ 17.) The guidelines state that misses during the probationary period may result in termination. (Id.; DSOF Ex. F.)
In 2011 and 2012, Plaintiff missed multiple assignments for which he was disciplined (though not precisely in accordance with the progression set forth in the guidelines):
On November 23, 2012, during the probationary period, Defendant's electronic "Time Tap" time-entry system indicated Plaintiff had arrived twelve minutes late to work. (DSOF ¶ 68; Pltf. Resp. DSOF ¶ 68.) Lachowicz referred Plaintiff to the General Manager of the garage, Joseph Fitzgerald, with a recommendation for discharge. (DSOF ¶ 70; Pltf. Resp. DSOF ¶ 70.) On December 11, 2012, Fitzgerald discharged Plaintiff, citing his repeated misses and the November 23, 2012 probation violation. (DSOF ¶ 71; Pltf. Resp. DSOF ¶ 71.)
If Defendant were telling it, this would be the whole story. And although Plaintiff admits every word of that story is true, he says it is nothing more than a Potemkin village. (Dkt. 158 at 1-2.) According to Plaintiff, his termination was not the culmination of repeated missed assignments; it was the culmination of a prolonged campaign to deny him his legal rights under the ADA. (Id.)
Plaintiff is a qualified individual under the ADA because he suffers from bi-polar disorder. (PSOAF ¶ 32, Ex. 18.)4 Part of the treatment for bi-polar disorder is a consistent sleep schedule. (PSOAF ¶¶ 9, 11, Exs. 2-3.) Plaintiff wanted his work schedule to accommodate this need. But, according to Plaintiff, Defendant dideverything it could to deny him this accommodation, then fired him for having the temerity to ask for it. (Dkt. 158 at 1-2.)
Plaintiff first notified Defendant of his need for consistent sleep on February 8, 2010. (PSOAF ¶ 9, Ex. 2; Def. Resp. PSOAF ¶ 9.) On that day, Plaintiff sent a letter from his physician, Dr. David Schilling, to Paula Wright, an employee in Defendant's human resources department. (Id.) The letter explained that Plaintiff was afflicted with an "illness" part of the treatment for which was "consistent sleep"; specifically, Dr. Schilling wrote that it would be "better for him to be able to go to bed at the about [sic] same time each night and to be able to get 7-8 hours of sleep each night." (Id.) More than a year later, on May 16, 2011, Plaintiff sent Wright another letter from Dr. Schilling. (PSOAF ¶ 11, Ex. 3; Def. Resp. PSOAF ¶ 11.) The second letter was similar to the first, but it, unlike the first letter, included a specific request that Plaintiff's work schedule be adjusted to accommodate his needs. (Id.)
Later that month, Plaintiff met with a benefits coordinator for Defendant, which resulted in Plaintiff's first accommodation request (the "FAR"). (PSOAF ¶ 12; Def. Resp. PSOAF ¶ 12.) On August 17, 2011, Defendant granted the FAR and agreed that Plaintiff would "not be required to work more than two pieces of work per day" and his shifts would be scheduled "a minimum of thirteen hours" apart. 5 The term of the agreement was one year. (PSOAF ¶ 15; Ex. 5; DSOF Ex. Q.) Over the course of that year, however, Defendantscheduled Plaintiff's shifts less than thirteen hours apart on approximately ten occasions. (PSOAF ¶ 17; Def. Resp. PSOAF ¶ 17.)
On August 3, 2012, Plaintiff transferred from part-time to full-time, pending medical clearance. (DSOF ¶ 6; Pltf. Resp. DSOF ¶ 6.) Though Defendant did not initially suggest Plaintiff was unfit for duty, he was soon referred for medical examination, during which time he was held out of work as unfit for a period of three workdays. (PSOAF ¶¶ 18-20.)
It then came time to renew the FAR agreement. On August 9, 2012, Dr. Schilling sent a letter to Anna Cobb, Defendant's Manager of Benefits Compliance, requesting that Defendant accommodate Plaintiff's need for a consistent sleep schedule. (PSOAF ¶¶ 4, 21; Def. Resp. PSOAF ¶¶ 4, 21.) Around the same time, Plaintiff submitted his second accommodation request (the "SAR"), citing Dr. Schilling's letter as support. (PSOAF ¶ 22; Def. Resp. PSOAF ¶ 22.) On August 22, 2012, a three-person committee—Kim Morris (Manager of Administration for the Office of the Vice President), Larry Wall (General Manager, Benefit Services), and Cara Levinson (Manager, ADA Compliance Program)—met to review the SAR, but the committee did not reach a determination at that time. (PSOAF ¶¶ 27-28; Def. Resp. PSOAF ¶¶ 27-28.) The review meeting was eventually rescheduled for September 19, 2012. (PSOAF ¶ 34; Def. Resp. PSOAF ¶ 34.)
The committee did not meet on September 19, 2012. (Id.) Instead, on September 20, 2012, Cobb requested that Plaintiff submit to a medical review. (PSOAF ¶ 35, Ex. 20; Def. Resp. PSOAF ¶ 35.) The same day, Defendant foundPlaintiff unfit for duty because he was taking Lithium, which causes drowsiness. (PSOAF ¶ 36, Ex. 21; Def. Resp. PSOAF ¶ 36.) Plaintiff was instructed that he "[m]ust obtain clearance and documentation from [a] private physician" before returning to work. (PSOAF ¶ 36, Ex. 22; Def. Resp. PSOAF ¶ 37.) Dr. Schilling exchanged correspondence with Defendant, including a September 24, 2012 letter attesting to Plaintiff's fitness for duty and reiterating his need for a schedule that would allow him to have a consistent sleep routine. (PSOAF ¶ 47, Ex. 28; Def. Resp. PSOAF ¶ 47.) On September 28, 2012, Plaintiff was reinstated. (PSOAF ¶ 46, Ex. 27; Def. Resp. PSOAF ¶ 46.)
On the same day Defendant reinstated Plaintiff, the committee met and decided to deny the SAR. (PSOAF ¶ 47; Def. Resp. PSOAF ¶ 47.) CTA provided Plaintiff with a letter explaining the committee's decision, which reads, in its entirety:
The Accommodation Committee has evaluated your request received on or about August 12, 2012 for a "consistent" schedule due to your medical condition. Based on the facts presented to the Committee, your request is denied because the information the Committee has received does not support your accommodation request. If you have any questions, please contact Anna Cobb. . . .
(PSOAF ¶ 48, Ex. 29; Def. Resp. PSOAF ¶ 48.)
In addition to deliberations among the three voting committee members (Morris, Wall, and Levinson), Defendant's internal communications show Morris discussed Plaintiff's accommodation request with her direct supervisor, Bernard Jackson (Defendant's Vice President of Bus Operations). .) These communications suggest Jackson was inclined to deny the SAR from the...
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