Paul v. Colvin, CASE NO. 13cv3128-LAB (JMA)
| Decision Date | 16 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 13cv3128-LAB (JMA) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | MARIE PAUL, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN COLVIN, Director of the Social Security Administration, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiff Marie Paul, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint challenging a decision or action by the Social Security Administration (SSA) concerning her social security number. The Court conducted the mandatory screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), and dismissed the complaint with leave to amend, giving a detailed explanation of its reasons for doing so. (Docket no. 3.) Paul then filed an amended complaint. The Court screened that as well, and dismissed it with leave to amend, again providing detailed reasons. (Docket no. 7.) Paul filed a Second Amended Complaint (the "SAC"), which the Court again screened. This time, only some of Paul's claims were dismissed. The remainder, though shaky, survived screening. The Court deemed the SAC amended to reflect the dismissals, and ordered the U.S. Marshals to serve it.
After an extension of time to reply, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss (the "Motion"), both for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). That motion is now fully briefed and ready for decision.
The Court is presumed to lack subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The party invoking the Court's jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that it exists. Id.; KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269, 278 (1936).
The standards the Court must apply when ruling on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion vary according to the nature of the jurisdictional challenge. Here, the jurisdictional challenge is a facial attack; Defendants contend that the allegations of jurisdiction contained in the complaint are insufficient on their face to demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). When jurisdiction is facially attacked, a plaintiff is entitled to safeguards similar to those applicable when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is made. See Sea Vessel Inc. v. Reyes, 23 F.3d 345, 347 (11th Cir. 1994); Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). The factual allegations of the complaint are presumed to be true, and the motion is granted only if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2003); Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d 1156, 1157 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001).
A Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The allegations must state a claim to relief that is "plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The Court rejects Paul's suggestion that it should apply the old pleading standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957). See Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 561-62 (disapproving the Conley standard).
When determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court accepts all allegations of material fact in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat'l League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). But the Court is "not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint," and does "not . . . necessarily assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations." Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Because Paul is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her pleadings liberally and affords her the benefit of any doubt. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). That said, the Court's construction may not "supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
Because Rule 12(b)(6) review is confined to the complaint, the Court generally does not consider material outside the pleadings. In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Securities Litig., 102 F.3d 1524, 1537 (9th Cir. 1996). But the Court may properly consider exhibits attached to the complaint and documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint but not attached, if their authenticity is not questioned. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. See Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 669 F.3d 1005, 1016 n.9 (9th Cir. 2012).
Ordinarily if a complaint is dismissed, a plaintiff will be given leave to amend. But leave may properly be denied where a plaintiff's proposed amendments would fail to cure pleading defects and amendment would be futile. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). In determining whether leave should be granted, the Court may properly consider the fact that Paul has had multiple opportunities to amend See, e.g., Karboau v. Clark, 577 Fed. Appx. 678, 679 (9th Cir. 2014) (); Pfau v. Mortenson, 542 Fed. Appx. 557, 558 (9th Cir. 2013). See also Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) ().
The fact that a complaint has survived screening does not necessarily mean it has merit or lacks defects, or that it cannot be dismissed later on a motion. See Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007) () Adversarial motion practice may uncover defects that were previously not apparent. That is particularly true in a case like this, where the type of claim is unusual, and where defense counsel have both special expertise and also access to documents, records, and information that can help shed light on the case.
The Court is required to address jurisdiction first, before proceeding to the merits. Baker v. Microsoft, 785 F.3d 315, 319 (9th Cir. 2015). Defendants' briefing put Paul on notice that jurisdiction had to be addressed, and that she bore the burden of proving it. (Mot. at 5:16-23.) The Court also raised the issue of sovereign immunity, cautioning Paul that federal agencies are immune from suit absent a waiver of their immunity. (See Docket no. 3 (First Screening Order), 2:23-26 (citing F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).)
Paul has alleged that she was assigned a particular social security number (the "Number") in 1978. (SAC, ¶ 7.) Her stepfather, she alleges, traveled with her from Puerto Rico to New York, where he filled out a form in the Social Security office claiming her as his stepdaughter. (Id.) After they returned to Puerto Rico, Paul alleges she received a social security card in the mail, and has been using the Number ever since. (Id., ¶ 8.) In November of 2011, she received a notice from the SSA telling her not to use the Number and that it was assigned to someone else. (Id., ¶¶ 8, 9.) Her requests to have the SSA either reinstateher right to use the Number, or else to assign her a new number, were unsuccessful. (Id., ¶ 10.)
Paul has attached several documents to the SAC, and they tell a somewhat different story. That is not to say the SAC's factual allegations are deliberately wrong, but the exhibits show Paul has misconstrued some of what she read or was told. (SAC, Ex. 2; see also id., Ex. 3 ().)
The SSA's letter dated November 14, 2011 was sent to her tax and immigration attorney, Robert Blasi, informing him that Paul had, in the past, been told to stop using the Number. (Id., Ex. 2.) The same letter informs him that the SSA had tried to verify Paul's age and citizenship, but was unable to do so, and that there was no record of her birth in the places she had said it might be found (i.e., Indianapolis, Indiana, or San Juan, Puerto Rico). (Id., Exs. 2, 3.) The letter says there are earnings posted for Paul in a suspense file dating back to 1999. It offers to assign her a social security number, and then credit those earnings to her account once she provides the SSA with proof of age and citizenship. (Id., Ex. 2.) With regard to a claim for refund of social security withholdings by Paul's employers, the letter directs Blasi to contact the IRS.
Particularly telling is a letter from Blasi dated February 20, 2013, concerning a FOIA request. (SAC, Ex. 5 (Docket no. 10 at 25-26).) That letter says Blasi was "currently in the process of filing with [USCIS] a Petition for Naturalization (Form - N400) for Paul."1 It goes on to say that a birth certificate for her son, who was born in Puerto Rico, shows that she was born in the British Virgin Islands, although no record of her birth there was found. The rest of the letter recounts Paul's early family history, saying she was abandoned at age five while in Puerto Rico, and thereafter became a "resident of the United States." This letter, in short, represents that Paul was...
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