Paul v. Paul

• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Before SNEAD; HARMAN
• Citation: Paul v. Paul, 214 Va. 651, 203 S.E.2d 123 (1974)
• Decision Date: 04 March 1974
• Parties: Averill B. PAUL v. Oscar T. PAUL.

Page 123

203 S.E.2d 123

214 Va. 651

Averill B. PAUL v. Oscar T. PAUL.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

March 4, 1974.

James R. Sharp, Washington D.C., (Verne L. Hosta; Sharp & Bennett, Washington, D.C., on brief), for appellant.

No argument or brief filed on behalf of appellee.

Before SNEAD, C.J. and I'ANSON, CARRICO, HARRISON, COCHRAN, HARMAN and POFF, JJ.

HARMAN, Justice.

This appeal arises from the trial court's interpretation of a property settlement and support agreement between Averill B. Paul (complaint or wife) and Oscar T. Paul (respondent or husband) which was executed in November, 1969.

The parties, who were married in 1948, became estranged and in July, 1969, respondent deserted complainant and moved to a separate residence. In November, 1969, the parties entered into an agreement which recites that its purpose is to settle 'all property and other rights and obligations arising out of the marital relationship.' In addition to establishing the respective property rights of the parties in their separate and jointly owned property, the agreement makes provision for monthly payments to wife for her support and for the support of the three children of the parties. The child support provision of the agreement provides that husband shall pay wife $175.00 per month for the support of each child 'until said children are 21, shall marry, enter or be inducted into the armed forces of the United States, become fulltime gainfully employed or otherwise emancipated.'

The wife subsequently instituted a divorce suit alleging desertion. The trial court, in decreeing a divorce from bed and board in June 1970, and in its subsequent decree A vinculo in September, 1970, approved, ratified and confirmed the agreement and ordered the parties to fully comply with its terms and conditions.

Code § 1--13.42, which lowered the age of majority from 21 to 18, was enacted by the 1972 General Assembly, Acts 1972, cc. 824, 825.

In November, 1972, husband filed a petition with the trial court reciting that two of the three children of the parties had attained age 18 and thus were 'otherwise emancipated' and asking the court to relieve him of further support payments to the wife for the two older children under the November, 1969, agreement.

The trial court interpreted the contract and found, as a matter of law, that the two older children had become 'otherwise emancipated' by virtue of Code § 1--13.42 and decreed that the respondent was relieved of making further child support payments to the wife for the two older children.

We granted an appeal to review this holding of the trial court. The dispositive question is whether the words 'otherwise emancipated' used in the contract include emancipation by a change of law.

As the result of legislative action reducing the age of majority from 21 to 18, the courts of a number of our sister states have been confronted with problems similar to the one presented here. The results reached and the reasons therefor have not been consistent. ¹ But we need not seek outside authority for we find this case to be controlled by the existing law of the Commonwealth.

The complainant's rights are grounded in the contract between the parties which was ratified by the decrees in the divorce proceeding and made enforceable therein.

One of the basic rules of construction of contracts is that the law in force at the date of making a contract determines the rights of the parties under the contract. Citizens Mut. Bldg. Assoc. v. Edwards, 167 Va. 399, 189 S.E. 453 (1937). The law effective when the contract is made is as much a part of the contract as if incorporated therein. See Maxey v. American Casualty Co., 180 Va. 285, 290, 23 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1942).

Another rule of construction that is pertinent here is that new laws, except as to matters of remedy which may be applied retrospectively, are usually presumed to be prospective and not retrospective in their operation. Duffy v. Hartsock, 187 Va. 406, 417, 46 S.E.2d 570, 576 (1948). This principle of law is recognized in Code § 1--16 which provides that no new law shall affect 'any right accrued or claim arising' before the effective date of the new law.

But, as we observed in Hall v. MacLeod, 191 Va. 665, 62 S.E.2d 42 (1950):

'Ascertainment of the intent of the contracting parties is the cardinal rule in the construction of agreements. To do that the court will put itself in the situation occupied by the parties and look to the language employed, the subject matter and purpose of the parties, and all other pertinent circumstances. Occupying that statutes, it will apply the language used to the subject matter and object sought to be accomplished and so judge and determine its meaning. (citations omitted).' Id. at 671, 62 S.E.2d at 44.

The agreement at issue was executed in November,...