Paule v. Santa Fe County Bd. of County Com'Rs

• Citation: 2005 NMSC 021,117 P.3d 240
• Decision Date: 26 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. 28,038.,28,038.
• Parties: Jack R. PAULE, M. June Paule, James A. Meyer, Marilyn K. Meyer, Paul Chavez, Connie Chavez, Nancy Williams, and Camilia Trujillo, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. SANTA FE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Estevan Gonzales, and Skyhigh Communications, L.L.C., Defendants-Petitioners.
• Court: Supreme Court of New Mexico

Page 240

117 P.3d 240

2005-NMSC-021.

Jack R. PAULE, M. June Paule, James A. Meyer, Marilyn K. Meyer, Paul Chavez, Connie Chavez, Nancy Williams, and Camilia Trujillo, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. SANTA FE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Estevan Gonzales, and Skyhigh Communications, L.L.C., Defendants-Petitioners.

No. 28,038.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

May 26, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Long, Pound & Komer, P.A., Nancy R. Long, Santa Fe, NM, Santa Fe Board of County Commissioners, Steven Kopelman, Monica Ontiveros, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioners.

Roth, VanAmberg, Rogers & Yepa, L.L.P., Ronald J. VanAmberg, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondents.

OPINION

MAES, Justice.

{1} Petitioners SkyHigh Communications, Estevan Gonzales, and the Santa Fe County Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter "Commission") appeal from a decision of the district court reversing a decision by the Commission approving SkyHigh's application for master plan zoning and a height variance. The issue on appeal to this Court only involves the Commission's approval of the variance. Petitioners sought review of the district court's decision in the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari. See NMSA 1978, § 39-3-1.1(E) (1999) (permitting a party to petition the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari to review the district court's decision in an administrative appeal); Rule 12-505(B) NMRA 2005 (same). The Court of Appeals granted the petition, but after briefing by the parties, the court quashed the writ without any explanation. Petitioners then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. See § 39-3-1.1(E) ("A party may seek further review by filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the supreme court."); Rule 12-505(J) (stating that a party may seek further review from a decision of the Court of Appeals or a denial of certiorari by the Court of Appeals with Supreme Court by petitioning the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari).

{2} Petitioners assert the following issues in their certiorari petition: (1) the district court's decision to find that SkyHigh's application was not approved based on the Commission's vote at the public hearing rather than the Commission's final order is contrary to Section 39-3-1.1 and Rule 1-074 NMRA 2005; (2) the district court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the Commission when it concluded that the Commission's decision to approve SkyHigh's application was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the district court judgment violates the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332 (1996). Another issue that we asked the parties to comment on was the Court of Appeals order quashing the writ of certiorari. In addition to these issues, Petitioner Commission argues in its briefs to this Court that the district court should have dismissed Respondents' appeal to the district court because it was untimely. We reverse.

FACTS

{3} SkyHigh filed an application with Santa Fe County officials in which it sought approval for master plan zoning and a height variance so that it could build a 198-foot telecommunications facility in the county. Under the Santa Fe County Land Development Code, a telecommunications facility is a use permitted anywhere within the county. Thus, the land does not have to be re-zoned to allow the construction of such facilities because such facilities are permitted uses under the Code. However, structures are limited to a height of 24 feet under the Code.

{4} A public hearing on SkyHigh's application was held before the Commission on December 12, 2000. The application was heard by four of the five commissioners. The one commissioner who did not participate recused himself because he was related to the applicant. At the hearing, SkyHigh presented evidence as to why its application should be approved. Afterwards, the Commission heard from several concerned citizens, including Respondents, all of whom opposed the application. The Commission voted on the application immediately following public comment. Two commissioners voted in favor of the application; one commissioner voted against the application; and the chairperson did not cast a vote. The meeting was then adjourned.

{5} On December 28, 2000, the Commission issued a written order in which it approved SkyHigh's application, subject to conditions. In the order, the Commission made several factual findings as to why it was approving the application.

{6} Respondents appealed the Commission's decision to the district court on January 26, 2001. The district court reversed the Commission's decision on two grounds. First, the district court found that the Commission had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the application because the vote was not taken in accordance with the Commission's procedural rules. Second, the district court found that the Commission's approval of the height variance was not supported by substantial evidence.

{7} Petitioners then petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari to review the district court's decision. The Court of Appeals initially granted the petition, but following briefing, the court quashed the writ. Petitioners then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.

DISCUSSION

{8} The first issue we address is Petitioner Commission's claim that Respondents' appeal to the district court was untimely under Section 39-3-1.1 and therefore should have been dismissed by the district court. This issue was not raised in the certiorari petition, see Rule 12-502(C)(2) NMRA 2004 (providing that "only the questions set forth in the petition will be considered by the Court"), but we address the issue because if Respondents' appeal to the district court had been untimely, we would not have granted the petition.

{9} Section 39-3-1.1 sets forth the time frame for administrative appeals to the district court. See also Rule 1-074. Section 39-3-1.1(C) provides that "a person aggrieved by a final decision may appeal the decision to district court by filing in district court a notice of appeal within thirty days of the date of filing of the final decision." See Rule 1-074(E) ("Unless a specific time is provided by law or local ordinance, an appeal from an agency shall be filed in the district court within thirty (30) days after the date of the final decision or order of the agency."). "Final decision" is defined in Section 39-3-1.1(H)(2) as "an agency ruling that as a practical matter resolves all issues arising from a dispute within the jurisdiction of the agency, once all administrative remedies available within the agency have been exhausted." Subsection (H)(2) further provides that "[t]he determination of whether there is a final decision by an agency shall be governed by the law regarding the finality of decisions by district courts." "The general rule in New Mexico for determining the finality of a judgment is that `an order or judgment is not considered final unless all issues of law and fact have been determined and the case disposed of by the trial court to the fullest extent possible.'" Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 113 N.M. 231, 236, 824 P.2d 1033, 1038 (1992) (quoting B.L. Goldberg & Assocs. v. Uptown, Inc., 103 N.M. 277, 278, 705 P.2d 683, 684 (1985)).

{10} Petitioner Commission asserts that Respondents' appeal to the district court was untimely because it was not filed within thirty days of a "final decision" as specified in Section 39-3-1.1. Respondents counter by asserting that the appeal was timely filed because it was filed within thirty days of the Commission's written order, which Respondents claim was a final decision. Disagreeing with Respondents' assertion, Petitioner Commission asserts that Section 39-3-1.1 explicitly distinguishes between "final decision" and "written decision," and specifically states that the time for filing an appeal to the district court commences upon the issuance of a "final decision," not a "written decision." Petitioner Commission asserts that the legislature's decision to use the term "final decision" rather than "written decision" indicates that the legislature intended that the time for filing the appeal to begin upon the issuance of the final decision and not a written decision. Consequently, Petitioner Commission contends that the December 12 vote was a "final decision" for purposes of Section 39-3-1.1. Thus, Petitioner Commission asserts that Respondents had thirty days to file their appeal from this date and not the date that its written order was filed.

{11} We do not interpret the time limit provision in Section 39-3-1.1 as rigidly as Petitioner Commission. Subsection B details the procedure that an agency must follow when it issues a final decision. A "final decision" for purposes of Section 39-3-1.1 is "an agency ruling that as a practical matter resolves all issues arising from a dispute within the jurisdiction of the agency, once all administrative remedies available within the agency have been exhausted." Section 39-3-1.1(H)(2). When an agency issues a final decision, subsection B requires it to promptly prepare and file a written decision that includes "an order granting or denying relief and a statement of the factual and legal basis for the order." The agency must then promptly "serve a document that includes a copy of the written decision and the requirements for filing an appeal of the final decision" on all parties to the administrative proceeding and any person who filed "a written request for notice of the final decision in that particular proceeding." Section 39-3-1.1(B)(3), -(a), -(b). It appears that this document serves the important purpose of informing the aggrieved parties of the requirements for appealing the administrative decision. See Village of Angel Fire v. Wheeler, 2003-NMCA-041, ¶ 33, 133 N.M. 421, 63 P.3d 524, cert. denied, No. 27,882, 133 N.M. 413, 63 P.3d 516 (Feb. 10, 2003). Subsection C of...