Pauley v. State
| Decision Date | 27 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22A-CR-1039 |
| Parties | Jeremy Pauley, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Appeal from the Cass Circuit Court The Honorable Stephen R. Kitts II, Judge Trial Court Cause Nos. 09C01-2001-F6-27 09C01-2001-F2-4 09C01-1912-F4-13
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Mark K. Leeman Leeman Law Office Logansport, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Nicole D. Wiggins Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
[¶1] Following three separate arrests, Jeremy Pauley was charged with multiple crimes under three separate cause numbers. He subsequently pled guilty, under two of the cause numbers, to Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine, two counts of Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and two counts of Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. In exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges, including all of the charges listed in the third cause number. After accepting Pauley's guilty plea, the trial court sentenced Pauley to an aggregate twenty-five and one-half-year sentence. Pauley challenges an eight-year portion of his overall sentence on appeal, arguing both that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him and that the eightyear portion of his sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.
[¶2] On December 11, 2019, Pauley was observed to have committed a traffic infraction and was stopped by police. At the time, he was found to be in possession of over thirteen grams of methamphetamine, a marijuana cigarette, and a smoking device. Two days later, on December 13, 2019, Pauley was charged under cause number 09C01-1912-F4-13 ("Cause No. F4-13") with Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.
[¶3] On January 24, 2020, Pauley was again stopped by police after police observed him commit another traffic infraction. He was found to be in possession of both methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. On January 27, 2020, Pauley was charged under cause number 09D01-2001-F6-27 ("Cause No. F6-27") with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.
[¶4] On January 29, 2020, Pauley was again stopped by police, this time for speeding. Pauley was found to be in possession of over thirty-four grams of methamphetamine, approximately eighteen grams of marijuana, and a glass smoking device. The next day, Pauley was charged under cause number 09C01-2001-F2-4 ("Cause No. F2-4") with Level 2 felony dealing methamphetamine, Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.
[¶5] On February 17, 2022, Pauley pled guilty to Level 2 felony dealing methamphetamine, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia in Cause No. F2-4 and Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia in Cause No. F4-13. In exchange for Pauley's guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges in both Cause Nos. F2-4 and F4-13 and all of the charges in Cause No. F6-27. On April 7, 2022, the trial court sentenced Pauley to seventeen and one-half years for the Level 2 felony conviction in Cause No. F2-4 and eight years for the Level 4 felony conviction in Cause No. F4-13.[1] The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total aggregate sentence of twenty-five and one-half years.
[¶6] "A person who commits a Level 2 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between ten (10) and thirty (30) years, with the advisory sentence being seventeen and one-half (17%) years." Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. "A person who commits a Level 4 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term between two (2) and twelve (12) years, with the advisory sentence being six (6) years." Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. On appeal, Pauley challenges the eight-year sentence imposed by the trial court in Cause No. F4-13, arguing both that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him and that the eight-year sentence is inappropriate.[2] Specifically, Pauley contends that Appellant's Br. p. 11 A. Abuse of Discretion
[¶7] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). "An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom." Id. (quotation omitted).
We review for an abuse of discretion the court's finding of aggravators and mitigators to justify a sentence, but we cannot review the relative weight assigned to those factors. When reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified by the trial court in its sentencing statement, we will remand only if the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record, and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law.
Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 416 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
A single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to enhance a sentence. When a trial court improperly applies an aggravator but other valid aggravating circumstances exist, a sentence enhancement may still be upheld. The question we must decide is whether we are confident the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even if it had not found the improper aggravator.
Id. at 417 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
[¶8] Pauley claims that "the trial court's [sentencing] decision is against the logic and effect of the circumstances for three reasons." Appellant's Br. p. 12. First, he claims that the "decision to enter an advisory sentence in [Cause No.] F2-4 but an aggravated sentence in [Cause No.] F4-13 is against the logic of the mitigating circumstances because each mitigating circumstance carried greater weight in [Cause No.] F4-13." Appellant's Br. p. 12 (emphasis in original). The trial court, however, did not find any mitigating circumstances when sentencing Pauley. While Pauley listed several potential mitigating circumstances, most notably his drug addiction, in his Appellant's Brief, he did not argue that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find that the proffered circumstances warranted mitigating weight.
[¶9] Second, Pauley claims that "the trial court's decision to enter an advisory sentence in [Cause No.] F2-4 but an aggravated sentence in [Cause No.] F4-13 is against the logic of the aggravating circumstances because any aggravating circumstance carried less wight in [Cause No.] F4-13." Appellant's Br. p. 13 (emphasis in original). The trial court found Pauley's "prior conviction for meth, the amount's [sic] we're dealing with, the timeframe for which we're dealing with them[,] and his apparent notoriety with law enforcement in the community" to be aggravating circumstances. Tr. Vol. II p. 35. We agree with the State that "[t]he fact that the trial court chose to apply the aggravators to enhance [Cause No.] F4-13, but not [Cause No.] F2-4, is of no consequence contrary to [Pauley's] suggestions." Appellee's Br. p. 9.
[¶10] The trial court "has broad discretion to determine the sentence imposed on a defendant" and that discretion "includes the ability to increase or decrease the sentence" from the advisory based on aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Rose v. State, 810 N.E.2d 361, 365 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004). Pauley does not argue that the trial court considered any improper aggravating circumstances, only that the aggravators should have applied with greater force to Cause No. F2-4 than to Cause No. F4-13. In this case, Pauley pled guilty, and the trial court sentenced Pauley, to crimes brought under two separate cause numbers. While the trial court could arguably have chosen to impose enhanced sentences in relation to both of these cause numbers, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the aggravators should only be applied to enhance the portion of Pauley's sentence relating to one of the cause numbers. To the extent that Pauley is arguing that any aggravating weight should have been applied to Cause No. F2-4, i.e., the cause number containing the more serious charges, or not at all, we will not second guess the trial court's decision as to which...
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