Paull v. Halferty

• Decision Date: 03 January 1870
• Citation: 63 Pa. 46
• Parties: Paull <I>versus</I> Halferty.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

63 Pa. 46

Paull versus Halferty.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 29, 1869.

January 3, 1870.

October 29th, 1869.

Before THOMPSON, C. J., READ, AGNEW, SHARSWOOD and WILLIAMS, JJ.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland county: No. 178, to October and November Term 1869.

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E. Cowan (with whom were J. A. Hunter and H. D. Foster), for plaintiff in error.—There is no precedent of an action for such cause, which is evidence that it cannot be maintained: Good v. Mylin, 8 Barr 56. There was no evidence that the defendant's letter was false. If the letter was false, and there was a contract with McLaughlin, he could not have depended upon it; the plaintiff had his remedy against McLaughlin on the contract; if there was no contract, plaintiff lost nothing. The damages would be measured by the consideration: McNair v. Compton, 11 Casey 23 H. P. Laird (with whom was Marchand), for defendant in error.—Wherever there is a right, there is a remedy by action: 1 Chitty's Pl. 96. Where one is prevented from disposing of his land by the impertinent interference of another, he may maintain an action: 1 Starkie on Slander 191; Smead v. Badley, Cro. Jac. 397; Pennyman v. Rabanks, Cro. Eliz. 427; Tasbugh v. Day, Cro. Jac. 484; Gerrard v. Dickenson, Cro. Eliz. 197; Manning v. Avery, Keb. 153; Lowe v. Harewood, Sir W. Jones 196; Cane v. Goulding, Styles' Rep. 169; Malachy v. Soper, 3 Bingham N. C. 371; Pater v. Baker, 3 Man., Gr. & S. 831. An action will lie for breach of contract, and also against the slanderer: Moody v. Baker, 5 Cowen 351. It was not on the plaintiff to prove that the allegations of the letter were not true: Watson v. Reynolds, 1 Moody & Malkin 1; Sutton v. Johnstone, 1 T. R. 493; Bendish v. Lindsey, 11 Modern 194.

The opinion of the court was delivered, January 3d 1870, by THOMPSON, C. J.

This was an action in the nature of an action of slander for defamation of title. The narr. charges the defendant with falsely and maliciously misrepresenting the quality of a certain tract of land supposed to contain a large body of iron ore of which the plaintiff alleges he was about to make an advantageous sale, but was prevented by the malicious conduct of the defendant.

A point was propounded to the court below by the counsel of the defendant, praying a charge that "land is not the subject of defamation, as offices, trades, professions and titles are, because the land itself is a standing refutation of any false statements in regard to it, so that it cannot be injured by them." This the learned judge refused.

The point concedes that an action will lie for defamation of title. The authorities for that are numerous: Cro. Eliz. 196, 427; Cro. Jac. 484; Kel. 153; Styles' Rep. 169; 54 Eng. C. L. 830; to which many others might be added.

It might be true that land cannot be so misrepresented as to be the subject of damages where the reference is to its patent qualities. I fancy that a statement, however malicious, that land is without timber, when notoriously well timbered, could never be the subject of damages. But very different would be the case of those occult qualities or internal values which science and experience may be able to detect. As they never, or very rarely, can be certainly ascertained, and to some extent must rest upon opinion, it seems to me that the case is different. One may know more in regard to the value than others, and if, knowing or believing the condition to be one thing, and representing the facts in a different light and prejudicial to the owner, he does him an injury, he ought to pay the damages his misrepresentation produces, or is the direct cause of.

The representation in this case was, that an experienced iron manufacturer was of opinion that the iron-ore in the land was but a "pocket" or nest, that would suddenly run out, and that he had used ore from the bank with other ores, in order to save it. This was a most successful mode of depreciating the value of the land as mineral land, and if this was false and malicious as well as injurious to the plaintiff, why shall he not be indemnified? The defendant did not pretend to prove that Col. Mathiot ever did say what he imputed to him, or that the fact, independently of him, was true. The witness, the party in treaty for the land, says that in consequence of this communication from the defendant, having confidence in him, he refused to go on with the purchase, and thus the matter ended. As the use of the words in question was not in se actionable, the plaintiff proved their falsity, so far as observation, experience, judgment and the declarations of the defendant could go. This made a case for the jury, and it would, we think, have been manifest error in the judge to have affirmed the defendant's point.

It would...