Paull v. Park County

• Decision Date: 29 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. DA 07-0751.,DA 07-0751.
• Citation: 218 P.3d 1198,352 Mont. 465,2009 MT 321
• Parties: Jaydon PAULL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PARK COUNTY, Montana, and State of Montana, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

218 P.3d 1198

2009 MT 321

352 Mont. 465

Jaydon PAULL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PARK COUNTY, Montana, and State of Montana, Defendants and Appellees.

No. DA 07-0751.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Argued January 14, 2009.

Submitted March 24, 2009.

Decided September 29, 2009.

Rehearing Denied November 3, 2009.

For Appellant: Courtney Jo Lawellin (argued), Walter Madden, Attorneys at Law, Livingston, Montana.

For Appellees: Thomas G. Bowe (argued), Assistant Attorney General; Agency Legal Services Bureau, Helena, Montana (for State of Montana) Steven R. Milch (argued), Matthew S. Brahana (argued); Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, P.L.L.P., Billings, Montana (for Park County, Montana).

Chief Justice MIKE McGRATH delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 This is an appeal by Jaydon Paull from the November 26, 2007, order of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Park County, granting summary judgment to Park County and the State of Montana. We reverse.

¶ 2 Paull presents issues for review that we restate as follows:

¶ 3 Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in holding that the County did not have a duty to Paull concerning his transport as a prisoner from Florida to Montana to respond to a probation revocation.

¶ 4 Issue Two: Whether the District Court erred in holding that the State did not have a duty to Paull concerning his transport as a prisoner from Florida to Montana to respond to a probation revocation.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Paull received a deferred sentence for burglary and theft in 2000 from the Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County, and was placed on probation. He failed to report to his probation officer and traveled to Florida without permission. In 2001 the State commenced probation revocation proceedings and transported Paull from Florida to Montana using a private prisoner transportation service called Extraditions International. When Paull arrived in Park County he complained to the Sheriff that the trip from Florida had been "torture" and that he had been poorly treated.

¶ 6 The result of the 2001 probation revocation proceeding was that Paull was sentenced to the Montana Department of Corrections for six years, all suspended, and was placed on probation under the supervision of the Adult Probation and Parole Division of the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC). Paull obtained permission from Montana Adult Probation and Parole to move to Florida, where he was subject to supervision by probation officials of the State of Florida pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, § 46-23-1115, MCA.

¶ 7 In December 2002, Paull's Florida probation officer informed Montana Adult Probation and Parole that Paull had violated the conditions of his probation. Based upon this report, the Montana DOC prepared a report of violation, a recommendation that Paull's probation be revoked, and a request that a warrant issue for his arrest. The DOC report was sent to the Park County Attorney, who prepared and filed a petition in the District Court to revoke Paull's probation. The District Court issued a warrant for Paull's arrest, and it was executed by authorities in Florida in February, 2003. Paull was held in custody without bond "for Montana" by Florida authorities.

¶ 8 The Park County Sheriff's office then became involved in arranging to transport Paull to Montana. The Sheriff's office contacted a private prisoner transportation service called American Extraditions (AEI), a successor to Extraditions International that had transported Paull to Montana in 2001. After receiving a price quote for the trip, the Sheriff's office followed required State procedure and contacted the Montana Governor's office to obtain approval of the expenditure.

¶ 9 The State of Montana maintains a Prisoner Transportation Fund to reimburse counties for the costs of transporting prisoners. Beginning in 1993, Gov. Marc Racicot, as a cost-cutting measure, required that counties obtain prior approval for the use of state prisoner transportation funds. A letter from the Governor announcing this policy cautioned that only prisoners charged with more serious offenses and with higher bonds should be considered for interstate transportation. The policy encouraged the use of private prisoner transportation services for long-distance interstate transport.

¶ 10 AEI employees picked up Paull from Florida authorities in February, 2003. He was shackled at the wrists and ankles and placed in a large passenger van with other prisoners. The van had two uniformed drivers employed by AEI, who were in charge of the prisoners during the nine-day trip from Florida to Montana. The van was equipped with a divider between the prisoners and the drivers that allowed the drivers to observe the prisoners. The prisoners were shackled but the van did not have seatbelts and did not have toilet facilities for their use.

¶ 11 Paull's complaint alleged that he and the other prisoners were mistreated during the trip primarily by being denied sufficient toilet stops. He alleges that the drivers would stop to relieve themselves, but would not allow the prisoners to do so, and that this resulted in the prisoners defecating and urinating on themselves and in the van during the trip.

¶ 12 On March 5, 2003, the van was on the interstate highway near Dillon, Montana. Paull's complaint alleges that the prisoners had not been provided a bathroom break in many hours, and that the drivers had told them to urinate into plastic cups or water bottles. Paull alleges that as the prisoners were urinating into plastic containers the AEI driver was watching them and laughing, while swerving the van trying to cause them to spill urine on themselves. In so doing, the driver lost control of the van and it rolled several times, coming to rest on its top. The other AEI driver was killed in the accident and Paull alleges that he was injured.

¶ 13 AEI had no insurance and dissolved after the accident, leaving persons with claims with no practical recourse against AEI for loss or injury. Taking at face value the defendants' assertions that they had no knowledge of AEI's practices, it is clear that neither undertook to ascertain whether AEI had a safe operation, whether AEI was bonded or insured, or whether AEI adhered to minimum standards for the care and custody of prisoners. Both the State and the County adamantly disclaim any control, oversight, or even knowledge of the practices and procedures of AEI. AEI was therefore left entirely to its own devices, at least as far as the State and County were concerned.

¶ 14 Paull brought suit against Park County and the State, alleging that they were responsible for his injuries. The County and State answered and moved for summary judgment. After allowing Paull a period in which to conduct discovery and after briefing and oral argument, the District Court granted summary judgment to the County and State. Paull appeals.

¶ 15 The County and the State each argued below that they owed no actionable duty to Paull because his injuries were inflicted by AEI or its employees. The State contended that it had no connection to AEI and that neither AEI nor the County was its agent in transporting Paull. The County made similar arguments, and further contended that it owed no duty to Paull because it was not foreseeable that injury to him might result from hiring AEI and seeking approval of the transportation costs.

¶ 16 The District Court held that the State owed no duty to Paull because it did not have any contractual or agency relationship with AEI. As to the County, the District Court held that a contractor-independent contractor relationship existed between the County and AEI, and therefore the County had no duty either.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 17 We review a district court's rulings on summary judgment de novo, applying the same criteria as the district court under M.R. Civ. P. 56. Beckman v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 2000 MT 112, ¶ 11, 299 Mont. 389, 1 P.3d 348.

DISCUSSION

¶ 18 Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in holding that the County did not have a duty to Paull concerning his transport from Florida to Montana to respond to a probation revocation.

¶ 19 In Beckman the plaintiff was employed by a company that was excavating and constructing a water pipe line for Butte-Silver Bow County. Beckman was injured when the trench where he was working collapsed. Beckman sued the County, which contended that it was not liable for Beckman's injuries under the general rule that contractors are not liable for torts of their independent contractors. This Court noted that there are exceptions to the general rule, which include (1) where there is a nondelegable duty based on a contract; (2) where the activity is inherently or intrinsically dangerous; and (3) where the general contractor negligently exercises a reserved right of control over a subcontractor's work. Beckman, ¶ 12.

¶ 20 The primary issue in Beckman was whether the work was inherently dangerous so as to come within the second exception to the general rule, applying §§ 416 and 427 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Those sections allow a general contractor to be liable for the acts or omissions of an independent contractor when the work involves a "peculiar risk of harm" or a "special danger to others." This Court held that contractors are not liable for every tort by an independent subcontractor engaged in such inherently dangerous work, but only those "torts which arise from the unreasonable risks caused by engaging in that activity." Beckman, ¶ 22 We abandoned distinctions made in earlier cases based upon whether dangers could be avoided by standard precautions or required special precautions. Instead, we adopted a rule that a contractor "is vicariously liable for injuries to others caused by a subcontractor's failure to take precautions to reduce the unreasonable risks associated with engaging in an...