Paulsen v. Coombs, 7880
| Decision Date | 16 February 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 7880,7880 |
| Citation | 123 Utah 49,253 P.2d 621 |
| Parties | PAULSEN et al. v. COOMBS et ux. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Stewart, Cannon & Hanson, Don J. Hanson and Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Salt Lake City, for appellants.
Earl P. Staten and Allen H. Tibbals, Salt Lake City, for respondents.
Appeal from a judgment for a balance due on a written contract for carpenter work. Affirmed, the parties to bear their own costs on appeal.
Plaintiffs pleaded the contract and defendants counterclaimed for damages for non-performance, mal-performance and for certain materials furnished by defendants, which, under the terms of the contract, plaintiffs were to supply. By reply, plaintiffs for the first time sought to avoid the materials clause by asserting it was included by mutual mistake, asking reformation for that reason.
Without detailing the voluminous and mostly conflicting evidence, we conclude that there was sufficient substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion, the writer, however, differing from the opinion of Mr. Justice CROCKETT to the effect that there was a mutual mistake as to a $280.44 item, justifying reformation of the contract pleaded. All other members of the Court agree with Mr. Justice CROCKETT as to that item, hence his opinion that the trial court should be affirmed as to that also is determinative.
The parties read the contract before signing. Its terms were clear and unambiguous. The contract was pleaded and relied on in the complaint in its entirety. By answer, defendants claimed the plaintiffs had not furnished the materials mentioned in the contract, for cabinet work in the kitchen, which cabinet fixtures were to be obtained pre-fabricated. It is significant that the requirement to furnish materials was incorporated in only one of the paragraphs of the contract and was applicable only to milled cabinet work to be milled off the premises. It is not unreasonable to assume that plaintiffs, in contracting for an integrated job, would agree to pay for such materials, even though defendants did not assert a claim for such materials until after an argument was precipitated as to who owed whom what. Nevertheless, the plaintiff who signed the contract, after having filed a complaint claiming payment under the entire contract, when confronted with an offset for the materials which the contract said he was to furnish, asserts that he did not notice the word 'materials' in the agreement and therefore seeks to exclude the word, over the strenuous protest of the defendants,--and succeeds by the equitable route of reformation in a law action for breach of contract. Without discussing the propriety of or authority for such procedure, it is difficult to perceive how one can arrive at the conclusion that three is clear and convincing evidence for the extraordinary relief by way of reformation, considering the law's policy to lend dignity to written instruments and sanctity to the parol evidence rule. 1 The fact that one is ignorant of the contents of the paper he signs necessarily does not relieve him of contractual liability, 2 and should not do so here. The writer believes that reformation in such case is to lend undue credence to one side of a controverted set of facts, and simply ignores the parol evidence rule.
I concur with the prevailing opinion by Mr. Justice HENRIOD in affirming the main portions of the judgment of the trial court. However, I am also inclined to the view that there is 'clear and convincing evidence' that there was a mutual mistake with respect to the item of $280.44 for materials as found by the trial court and that the judgment should be affirmed in toto.
The only way to evaluate the evidence is to briefly review it. Defendant Kenneth E. Coombs was acting as his own contractor in building a home. He let a contract to Paulsen for the carpenter work, which included numerous separate items. One of these related to cabinet work in the kitchen, which was described in paragraph 6 of the written contract. With respect to that paragraph only, the contract provided that Paulsen should furnish 'the labor and materials.' (Emphasis added.) The value of such materials was stipulated to be $280.44.
The trial court concluded that the words 'and materials' were inserted in the contract by inadvertence or mistake and that Paulsen was not obligated to furnish them. A survey of all of the evidence seems to indicate quite clearly that he was right.
As noted in the prevailing opinion, even the defendants themselves claimed nothing for these materials until after dispute had arisen concerning major items in the contract.
The only evidence in the record that the parties knew the words 'and materials' were in paragraph 6 and that the parties intended Paulsen should furnish the material for the cabinet work was the testimony of the defendant Kenneth E. Coombs himself. All of the other evidence and the circumstances shown argue most definitely that the parties did not know of this provision in the contract and that they had no such intention at the time the contract was made.
The foregoing statement is based on the following:
1. The defendants' original answer filed February 20, 1952 in response to Paulsen's complaint seeking compensation for the carpenter work, merely denied that Paulsen had performed the contract; no specific contention was made that Paulsen should have furnished materials or that he had failed to do so; in fact the word 'materials' was not even mentioned.
2. Demand for trial was filed February 20, 1952 and shortly thereafter a pretrial conference was had at which there was considerable discussion of the issues of the case and defendant made no mention that Paulsen either was supposed to or had failed to furnish such materials.
3. It was not until just shortly before the trial commenced (some uncertainty exists) on April 28, 1952 that the defendants filed a notice that they would move the court for...
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...the sufficiency of the evidence in Murillo v. Hernandez, we agreed with the statement of the Supreme Court of Utah in Paulsen v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253 P.2d 621, 624, and we quoted the following: "The question of whether (the) evidence is sufficient to be clear and convincing is primarily......
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...convincing evidence if there is a serious or substantial doubt concerning the correctness of the conclusion sought. Paulsen v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253 P.2d 621 (1953). In reviewing an order of permanent deprivation, it is to be remembered that such an order utilizes a remedy of utmost seve......
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Denise R. v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Sec.
...could reasonably find the evidence to be clear and convincing.'" Murillo, 79 Ariz. at 9, 281 P.2d at 791, quoting Paulsen v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253 P.2d 621, 624 (1953); see also Stevenson v. Stevenson, 132 Ariz. 44, 46, 643 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1982) (same); King v. Uhlmann, 103 Ariz. 136, 1......
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