Pautz v. State

• Decision Date: 28 June 1974
• Docket Number: No. S,S
• Citation: 219 N.W.2d 327,64 Wis.2d 469
• Parties: Dale PAUTZ, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error. tate 246.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 327

219 N.W.2d 327

64 Wis.2d 469

Dale PAUTZ, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error.

No. State 246.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 28, 1974.

Howard B. Eisenberg, State Public Defender, Garrett N. Kavanagh, Asst. State Public Defender, Madison, for plaintiff in error.

Robert W. Warren, Atty. Gen., Christine M. Wiseman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, for defendant in error.

BEILFUSS, Justice.

The primary issue in this matter is whether the defendant established, by the greater weight of the credible evidence, that he lacked mental responsibility at the time he caused the death of Judith Pautz. The jury and the trial court decided this issue in the negative.

The defendant elected to be tried under the A.L.I. test of insanity as set forth in sec. 971.15, Stats.

'971.15 Mental responsibility of defendant. (1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law.

'(2) As used in this chapter, the terms 'mental disease or defect do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.

'(3) Mental disease or defect excluding responsibility is an affirmative defense which the defendant must establish to a reasonable certainty by the greater weight of the credible evidence.'

The defendant's proof of insanity rests almost entirely on the testimony of the psychiatrist and the psychologist who testified as expert witnesses at the trial.

Dr. Albert Lorenz, who was the court appointed psychiatrist, testified that to a reasonable medical certainty the defendant, Dale Pautz, on March 17, 1972, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. He further testified that to a reasonable medical certainty there was no possibility that the defendant's mental condition with respect to his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law could have changed from the time he first entered the Arlyn Pautz home on the afternoon of March 17, 1972, until he left.

The other expert witness, Dr. Richard Purdy, a clinical psychologist who was called by the defense (the state called no expert witnesses), testified it was his opinion that the defendant was suffering from a mental disease to such an extent that, even though he knew the difference between right and wrong, he was unable to control his behavior or his conduct within the requirements of the law.

Defendant argues that in light of such evidence the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the jury's verdict. This court discussed this type of issue in State v. Bergenthal (1970), 47 Wis.2d 668, 685, 686, 178 N.W.2d 16, 26, saying:

'. . . The defendant here had the burden to prove his insanity by the greater weight of the credible evidence. The state did not have the duty to present evidence as to defendant's sanity. The issue as to sanity remained for resolution by the trier of fact. The issue of credibility of witnesses and of whether the defendant had met his burden of proof in establishing the defense of insanity was for the jury to determine. Even without the right of the jury to have and to consider the testimony of the court-appointed doctors, as above sustained, the weight to be given the testimony adduced by the defendant was for the jury to determine. On the record here, direct and cross-examination included, a reasonable juror could find the defendant sane at the time of the commission of the crimes without reliance upon the testimony of the courtappointed experts. The question of whether the defendant had met his burden of proof was one of fact for the jury, not one of law for the court.' See also: Kemp v. State (1973), 61 Wis.2d 125, 137, 211 N.W.2d 793.

'In Sprague v. State (1971), 52 Wis.2d 89, 99, 187 N.W.2d 784, this court again stated the following rule:

"This court has held that it is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the weight and credibility of medical testimony on the issue of insanity and to determine whether the defendant has met the burden of proving he was insane. State v. Bergenthal (1970), 47 Wis.2d 668, 178 N.W.2d 16. Where there is sufficient credible evidence to support the finding of the jury, it will not be upset on appeal. McCool v. State (1971), 51 Wis.2d 528, 187 N.W.2d 206. . . ." Beavers v. State (1974), Wis., 217 N.W.2d 307.

'The jury could accept or reject the testimony of the experts. . . .' Schwalback v. Antigo Electric & Gas, Inc. (1965), 27 Wis.2d 651, 658, 135 N.W.2d 263, 267.

'As the court observed in Jones v. N. V. Nederlandsch-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart M., 374 F.2d 189, 190 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, Holland American Line v. Philadelphia Ceiling & Stevedoring Co., 388 U.S. 911, 87 S.Ct. 2114, 18 L.Ed.2d 1349 (1967), the opinion of an expert, even if uncontradicted, is not required to be accepted as such testimony must pass through the screen of the fact trier's judgment of credibility.' United States v. Pittman (7th Cir. 1971), 449 F.2d 623, 628.

The record discloses several bases on which the jury could seriously question and reject the testimony of the experts. The most striking piece of evidence in conflict with the experts' testimony and supporting a finding of sanity is the defendant's own handwritten and signed confession given within hours after the murders. The confession, which is quite extensive, indicates in great detail the planning and execution of the murder of Judith Pautz. Thus, this confession, which on its face shows premeditated murder, would in itself support the jury's finding of sanity and the trial court's approval.

In making their diagnoses, both doctors relied almost entirely on information provided to them by the defendant. The bases of their opinion and the credibility of these experts and their diagnoses could be questioned on this ground alone. This becomes even more evident when we note the great disparity between the account of the incidents as told in defendant's confession and the account that he gave the doctors. He told them that he became angry when Judith told him to sweep the floor. The doctors apparently assumed the truth of defendant's story as he told it to them.

Furthermore, the doctors did not examine the defendant until more than four...