Pavlock v. Holcomb

Decision Date31 March 2021
Docket NumberCase No. 2:19-CV-00466 JD
Parties Randall PAVLOCK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Eric J. HOLCOMB, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

Christopher M. Kieser, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, CA, Kathryn D. Valois, Mark Miller, Pacific Legal Foundation, Palm Beach Gardens, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Amanda J. Terrell, Andrea E. Rahman, Jefferson S. Garn, Meredith B. McCutcheon, Courtney Lyn Abshire, Indiana Attorney General's Office, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JON E. DEGUILIO, CHIEF JUDGE

This case arises from Plaintiffs Raymond Cahnman, Randall Pavlock, and Kimberley Pavlock's claim that the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Gunderson v. State , 90 N.E.3d 1171 (Ind. 2018), resulted in a taking of private property in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. The Amended Complaint asserts numerous claims against the Defendants Eric Holcomb, Governor of the State of Indiana; Curtis Hill, Attorney General of the State of Indiana; Cameron Clark, Director of the State of Indiana Department of Natural Resources ("DNR"); and Tom Laycock, Acting Director of the State of Indiana Land Office. [DE 37]. The Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss in which they argue that the Plaintiffs are precluded from asserting these claims against them due to sovereign immunity and due to the Amended Complaint failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [DE 40].

I. Factual Background

The Plaintiffs are owners of beachfront property on the shores of Lake Michigan in the Town of Porter, Indiana. In 2018, the Indiana Supreme Court held in Gunderson v. State , 90 N.E.3d 1171 (Ind. 2018), that the State of Indiana has held exclusive title to the shore of Lake Michigan up to the ordinary high water mark ("OHWM") since it became a state in 1816. The Plaintiffs were not parties to the Gunderson case, but they hold deeds describing property that includes beachfront property below the OHWM down to the water's edge.1 The Plaintiffs maintain that they own the property described in their deeds. Since the Indiana Supreme Court held that Indiana has always held absolute title to the land below the OHWM, the plaintiffs assert that the decision in Gunderson was a judicial taking of private property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

In 2020, the Indiana General Assembly codified the Gunderson decision with the passage of House Enrolled Act ("HEA") 1385. The Act states:

(a) Absent any authorized legislative conveyance before February 14, 2018, the state of Indiana owns all of Lake Michigan within the boundaries of Indiana in trust for the use and enjoyment of all citizens of Indiana.
(b) An owner of land that borders Lake Michigan does not have the exclusive right to use the water or land below the ordinary high water mark of Lake Michigan.

Ind. Code Ann. § 14-26-2.1-3 (West). The plaintiffs also assert that HEA 1385 broadens the scope of public use of the property below the OHWM. The Gunderson decision only recognized the "traditional triad" of commerce, navigation, and fishing in addition to transitory walking along the shore below the OHWM. 90 N.E.3d at 1183. HEA 1385 expanded the public use to also allow for boating, swimming, and "[a]ny other recreational purpose for which Lake Michigan is ordinarily used, as recognized by the commission for the purposes of this section." Ind. Code Ann. § 14-26-2.1-4(b) (West).

The Plaintiffs are now seeking declaratory judgments against the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Gunderson and HEA 1385 as well as permanent injunctions prohibiting the Defendants from enforcing the decision and HEA 1385's provisions. More specifically, the Plaintiffs are alleging the uncompensated taking of land below the OHWM via the Gunderson decision and the uncompensated taking of an easement via an expansion of the previous easement below the OHWM via HEA 1385. The Plaintiffs state that their second cause of action, based on the expanded easement established by HEA 1385, is conditional upon the success of its first cause of action—the takings claim. [DE 45 at 29]. The Defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. For the following reasons, the Court grants the defendants’ motion under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

II. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes the dismissal of claims over which this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction. In analyzing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp. , 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). The burden of establishing proper federal subject matter jurisdiction rests on the party asserting it, which in this case are the plaintiffs. Muscarello v. Ogle Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs , 610 F.3d 416, 425 (7th Cir. 2010). The Court may look beyond the pleadings and consider any evidence submitted to determine whether jurisdiction exists. Long , 182 F.3d at 554.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts the factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc. , 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). A complaint must contain only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That statement must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face, Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), and raise a right to relief above the speculative level, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). However, a plaintiff's claim need only be plausible, not probable. Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp. , 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). Evaluating whether a plaintiff's claim is sufficiently plausible to survive a motion to dismiss is " ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’ " McCauley v. City of Chi. , 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).2

III. The Court does not have jurisdiction under Ex parte Young

First, the Court must determine whether it has jurisdiction over this case keeping in mind the relevant abstention doctrines and recognizing state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution states that "the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. Eleventh Amendment immunity was also extended to protect states from suits brought by their own citizens. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13–15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). A state's Eleventh Amendment immunity also normally bars suits against the state and state agencies for equitable relief. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Moreover, Courts commonly consider state officials in their official capacities to be acting on behalf of the state, and, therefore, the Eleventh Amendment shields them from lawsuits. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) ; Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101–02, 104 S.Ct. 900.

Here, the Plaintiffs allege that the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Gunderson and its subsequent codification by the Indiana legislature were, in effect, a taking of their private property without just compensation.3 "The Takings Clause—nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation, U.S. Const., Amdt. 5—applies as fully to the taking of a landowner's riparian rights as it does to the taking of an estate in land." Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. , 560 U.S. 702, 713, 130 S.Ct. 2592, 177 L.Ed.2d 184 (2010) (citing Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. 497, 10 Wall. 497, 504, 19 L.Ed. 984 (1871) ). Plaintiffs seek to prohibit Indiana State officials from enforcing the boundary determined by the Gunderson court and the alleged expansion of the easement established by HEA 1385. In reality, by asking the Indiana State officials to not enforce the boundary determined by the Gunderson decision, the Plaintiffs are asking this Court for exclusive title to the property below the OHWM. Traditionally, if the state officials are acting within the authority of state law and are not violating federal law, then their actions are protected by the Eleventh Amendment. Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc. , 458 U.S. 670, 696–97, 102 S.Ct. 3304, 73 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1982).

But the analysis changes if state officials are violating federal law. Under the narrow exception created by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young , any action on the part of state officials that violates federal law cannot be attributed to the state. 209 U.S. 123, 159–60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). "The Young doctrine recognizes that if a state official violates federal law, he is stripped of his official or representative character and may be personally liable for his conduct; the State cannot cloak the officer in its sovereign immunity." Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho , 521 U.S. 261, 288, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurrence) (citing Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. at 159–160, 28 S.Ct. 441 ). Thus, under the Ex parte...

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