Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 24 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 2000–241.,2000–241. |
| Citation | 787 A.2d 870,147 N.H. 369 |
| Parties | PAWTUCKET MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. v. HARTFORD INSURANCE CO. & another. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Devine, Millimet & Branch, P.A., of Manchester, (Melinda S. Gehris and James Fox on the brief, and Ms. Gehris orally), for the plaintiff.
Getman, Stacey, Tamposi, Schulthess & Steere, P.A., of Bedford, (Stephen J. Schulthess and Jill A. DeMello on the brief, and Mr. Schulthess orally), for defendant Hartford Insurance Company.
The defendant, Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford), appeals an order of the Superior Court (Brennan , J.) declaring that it provides primary liability insurance coverage under a commercial auto policy for damages caused in a May 1997 automobile accident in Florida. We affirm.
The following facts are not disputed. In May 1997, Donald and Elaine Buckman went to Florida with William Vecchio and his wife. Donald Buckman (Buckman) was employed by New England Newspaper Supply Company (NENSCO) as product manager. Vecchio was vice president of Spencer Press, a client of NENSCO. Buckman and Vecchio had done business for approximately fifteen years and had developed a personal friendship. They socialized approximately once a month and had previously vacationed together with their wives. Neither Buckman nor Vecchio considered the trip to Florida a business trip, and they did not complete any business contracts or agreements while they were away. However, NENSCO, through its owner, had agreed to pay for the couples' rental vehicle as a perquisite to Buckman. Buckman rented the vehicle in his own name and paid for it with a company credit card given to him for business expenses. NENSCO also paid for the Vecchios' airfare and underwrote the cost of one dinner for the couples.
On May 10, 1997, the Buckmans and Vecchios were involved in an accident while Buckman was driving the rental vehicle. Several people were injured, and claims for property damage and personal injury were made against Buckman. At the scene of the accident, Buckman told the investigating officer that Hartford, NENSCO's auto insurer, was the responsible insurance carrier. Buckman immediately reported the accident to NENSCO and later to the plaintiff, Pawtucket Mutual Insurance Company (Pawtucket), his personal automobile insurer.
This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action initiated by Pawtucket, which sought a declaration that NENSCO's commercial auto policy issued by Hartford provided primary liability coverage for the May 1997 accident. See RSA 491:22 (1997). Pawtucket acknowledged its obligation to provide coverage to Buckman, but maintained that its coverage was excess over any other collectible insurance because Buckman did not own the vehicle involved in the accident.
At issue are the Hartford commercial auto policy issued to NENSCO and the Pawtucket personal auto policy issued to Buckman. The Hartford policy provides coverage for "all sums an ‘insured’ legally must pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies, caused by an ‘accident’ and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered ‘auto.’ " The policy lists NENSCO as the named insured and further provides that anyone else is an insured "while using with [NENSCO's] permission a covered ‘auto’ [NENSCO] own[s], hire[s] or borrow[s]."
Both the Hartford and the Pawtucket policies contain "other insurance" clauses. The Hartford policy states, "For any covered ‘auto’ [NENSCO does not] own, the insurance provided by this Coverage Form is excess over any other collectible insurance." The policy further states, however, that "[r]egardless of the provisions of [the above] paragraph ... this Coverage Form's Liability Coverage is primary for any liability assumed under an ‘insured contract.’ " The policy defines "insured contract" as "[t]hat part of any contract or agreement entered into, as part of [NENSCO's] business, pertaining to the rental or lease, by [NENSCO] or any of [NENSCO's] employees, of any ‘auto.’ " The "other insurance" clause in the Pawtucket policy provides that "any insurance we provide for a vehicle [Buckman does] not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance."
Based upon an agreed statement of facts, the trial court ruled that Hartford provided primary liability coverage for the May 1997 accident and that Pawtucket provided excess coverage. Hartford's motion for reconsideration was denied, and this appeal followed.
Hartford argues that the trial court erred in concluding that its policy provided any coverage for the accident and, alternatively, in ruling that its policy affords primary coverage. Where, as in this case, the trial judge decided the case on stipulated facts and all of the exhibits are available for our review, we are in as good a position as the trial court to decide the case. Masse v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. , 136 N.H. 628, 632, 620 A.2d 1041 (1993). Accordingly, the customary deference we accord to a trial court's findings of fact is slackened, and we review the case under a broadened standard of review. Hillside Assocs. of Hollis v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co ., 135 N.H. 325, 331, 605 A.2d 1026 (1992).
The interpretation of an insurance policy is ultimately an issue of law for this court to decide. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Armstrong , 144 N.H. 170, 172, 738 A.2d 1280 (1999). We look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the policy's words in context and construe the terms of the policy as would a reasonable person in the position of the insured based upon more than a casual reading of the policy as a whole. Id . Thus, we will enforce a policy provision that limits an insurer's liability when the policy language is clear and unambiguous. Id . Ambiguity exists where reasonable disagreement between the contracting parties is possible with regard to the meaning or application of the policy's...
To continue reading
Request your trial