Paxton v. Commonwealth

• Docket Number: Record No. 0910-22-2
• Decision Date: 12 March 2024
• Citation: Paxton v. Commonwealth, 898 S.E.2d 418, 80 Va.App. 449 (Va. App. 2024)
• Parties: Jamar PAXTON v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

898 S.E.2d 418

80 Va.App. 449

Jamar PAXTON

v.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia

Record No. 0910-22-2

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Richmond.

March 12, 2024

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND, Claire G. Cardwell,¹ Judge

Kelsey M. Bulger, Deputy Appellate Counsel(Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

Tanner M. Russo, Assistant Attorney General(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on briefs), for appellee.

Present: Judges Malveaux, Raphael and Senior Judge Petty Argued at Richmond, Virginia

OPINION BY JUDGE WILLIAM G. PETTY

₄₅₆[1]Jamar Paxton appeals his convictions for second-degree murder and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony.He argues that the trial court erred by not suppressing incriminating statements he made to the police after he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent.We agree with Paxton that the police did not scrupulously honor his right to cut off questioning.The trial court therefore should have suppressed his incriminating statements.Its failure to do so was not harmless.Accordingly, we reverse Paxton’s convictions and remand for further proceedings.²

₄₅₇BACKGROUND

[2, 3]We recite the facts "in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court."Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231, 867 S.E.2d 505(2022)(quotingCommonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329, 863 S.E.2d 858(2021)).Doing so requires us to "discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom."Cady, 300 Va. at 329, 863 S.E.2d 858(quotingCommonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 323-24, 812 S.E.2d 212(2018)).

In May 2020, the police arrested Paxton for robbery and use of a firearm following the death of his girlfriend, Dominique Danzy.Detective James Baynes interrogated Paxton at the police station.Baynes read Paxton his Miranda³ rights from a waiver form before questioning him.Paxton then read the form to himself, stated that he understood his rights, and signed the form.The form indicated that Paxton "wish[ed] to waive [his rights] and make a statement."

Baynes told Paxton that he was investigating Danzy’s homicide and that the evidence pointed to Paxton’s guilt.Baynes conveyed that his investigation established that Paxton and Danzy had purchased a .22 caliber rifle and ammunition on the day of Danzy’s death.Baynes also understood that Danzy’s car was "taken" at some point "after she was killed."The police later found that car near a hotel where Paxton was staying.They also found the rifle, shell casings, and blood in the car.The shell casings matched shell casings found at the scene of Danzy’s homicide, and the police recovered a fingerprint from the rifle.

₄₅₈Paxton claimed that he last saw Danzy around 2:00 p.m. on the day she was killed, she still had her car and the gun at that time, and he later learned about her murder from the news.Baynes challenged Paxton’s story and asked Paxton why he shot Danzy.The following exchange then occurred:

Paxton: Sir I did not shoot her.

Baynes: You did shoot her.

Paxton: I don’t wanna talk no more.

Baynes: Ok, that’s fair enough, absolutely fair enough.I gave you the opportunity to talk, you didn’t want to talk, and that’s fine, so you’re being charged right now with the carjacking of the car, and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and you will be taken to the magistrate and processed.

Paxton: Sir.

Baynes: Yes.

Paxton: What?

Baynes: Mmm-hmm, unless you can come up with a reasonable explanation, …

Paxton: Sir, what else do you wanna know?I’m tellin[g] you everything.

Baynes: I wanna hear the truth.

Paxton maintained his innocence for about 20 more minutes while Baynes continued interrogating him.Baynes suggested that Paxton had acted in self-defense and asked what Danzy had done to make Paxton feel like he had to defend himself.Paxton then told Baynes that he shot Danzy after she tried to kill him; he made many incriminating statements to that effect over the next half an hour.

Paxton moved before trial to suppress his incriminating statements, arguing that Baynes failed to stop the interrogation after Paxton unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent.The trial court agreed that Paxton unequivocally invoked his right but found that he then voluntarily reinitiated the interrogation by asking, "What?"In the trial court’s view, Paxton "thought he[had] talked his way out of it" and wanted ₄₅₉to try again after realizing that he would still be charged.The trial court therefore denied Paxton’s suppression motion.

Paxton later filed a second motion to suppress the statements, this time arguing that his statements were involuntary, independent of whether Baynes violated Miranda.The court denied that motion as well after a hearing.

During its case-in-chief at trial, the Commonwealth introduced a recording and transcript of the interrogation.Paxton testified in his own defense that he last saw Danzy around 2:00 p.m. on the day she was killed and did not learn about her murder until the next day.During his testimony his attorney asked him about his previous confession to the police.According to Paxton, he tried to tell Baynes that he was innocent and "didn’t know anything" but Baynes "didn’t want to take that as an answer,""kept telling [Paxton] that [he] did something that [he] did not do," and would not let him end the questioning.After Paxton’s attorney asked him, "you watched the entire interrogation with these jurors; why would you confess to a crime you didn’t commit?," Paxton explained that he felt like it was the only way to stop the questioning.He also acknowledged "admitting things to the detective" that he testified were untrue.

The jury convicted Paxton of second-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of murder.The trial court sentenced Paxton to 33 years’ imprisonment with 16 years suspended.

ANALYSIS

I.The trial court erred by not suppressing Paxton’s incriminating statements.

[4–6]"No person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."U.S. Const, amend. V.Thus, the prosecution may not "us[e] statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against ₄₆₀self-incrimination."Keepers v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 17, 34, 840 S.E.2d 575(2020)(quotingMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694(1966)).At a minimum, the police must warn a suspect in their custody that he possesses certain rights, such as the right to remain silent.Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1330-31.The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that the suspect waived his right to remain silent "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily."Knox v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 366, 372, 663 S.E.2d 525(2008)(quotingGreen v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 646, 652, 500 S.E.2d 835(1998)).

[7–9] A suspect may invoke his right to remain silent "at any point prior to or during questioning."Thomas v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 560, 574, 850 S.E.2d 400(2020)(citingEdwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883-84, 68 L.Ed.2d 378(1981)).He must do so "unambiguously."Id.(citingBerghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2259-60, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098(2010)).We review de novo "[w]hether a statement sufficiently invokes … the right to silence" while "consider[ing] the substance of the statement as well as the context in which it was made."Id.(citingCommonwealth v. Redmond, 264 Va. 321, 327, 568 S.E.2d 695(2002);Midkiff v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 262, 267, 462 S.E.2d 112(1995)).What a defendant actually said is a factual question we review for clear error.Id. at 573-74, 850 S.E.2d 400.

[10]We agree with the trial court that Paxton unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent.Our Supreme Court has repeatedly used the statement, "I do not want to answer any more questions" as the exemplar of an unambiguous invocation.Akers v.Commonwealth, 216 Va. 40, 46, 216 S.E.2d 28(1975);Midkiff, 250 Va. at 268, 462 S.E.2d 112.Paxton’s statement, "I don’t wanna talk no more," is similarly unambiguous.That statement clearly and unequivocally conveyed that Paxton did not want to answer any more of Baynes’s questions, and the Commonwealth does not argue otherwise on appeal.

₄₆₁[11, 12]"[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends … on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’ "Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed.2d 313(1975).Once the suspect "indicates that he wishes to remain silent … ‘the interrogation must cease.’ "Thomas, 72 Va. App. at 574, 850 S.E.2d 400(quotingEdwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. at 1883-84).Our Supreme Court has adapted the facts of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mosley into a five-factor test for determining whether the police scrupulously honored the suspect’s right when they resume questioning on their own initiative, one factor of which is whether they did so "only after the passage of a significant period of time."Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460, 471, 450 S.E.2d 379(1994)(quotingMosley, 423 U.S. at 106, 96 S.Ct. at 327-28).We sometimes refer to these factors as the Weeksfactors.

The United States Supreme Court has also held, however, that the police may resume questioning if "the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police" and that reinitiation constitutes a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary Miranda waiver.Oregon v. Brad shaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834, 77 L.Ed.2d 405(1983)(quotingEdwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885).Virginia courts...