Payea v. Howard Bank, 94-414

• Decision Date: 14 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-414,94-414
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: , 11 IER Cases 151 Wendy PAYEA v. The HOWARD BANK and Banknorth Group.

Page 937

663 A.2d 937

164 Vt. 106, 11 IER Cases 151

Wendy PAYEA v. The HOWARD BANK and Banknorth Group.

No. 94-414.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

July 14, 1995.

Motion for Reargument Denied Aug. 11, 1995.

William M. Dorsch and Beth A. Danon of Mickenberg, Dunn, Sirotkin & Dorsch, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant.

Christopher D. Roy, Heather Briggs and Patricia M. Sabalis of Downs Rachlin & Martin, Burlington, for defendants-appellees.

Before ALLEN, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.

DOOLEY, Justice.

Plaintiff appeals the Chittenden Superior Court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment. Following a work-related injury, plaintiff sought damages and other relief after defendants refused to reinstate her in accordance with § 643b(b) of Vermont's workers' compensation statute ("Act"). 21 V.S.A. § 643b(b). On appeal plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that an exception to the reinstatement obligation, as provided in § 643b(d)(2) of the Act, applied in plaintiff's circumstances. We agree, and therefore, reverse.

In 1986, plaintiff was hired as a data processor for defendant Howard Bank, which later merged with defendant Banknorth Group (BNG). BNG initially assumed responsibility over data processing, but beginning in September of 1990 it contracted its data processing functions to Systematics, Inc. Plaintiff's work injury occurred in October 1990, and temporarily disabled her from continuing to work. While she was recuperating, her position was eliminated because it came within the scope of Systematic's contract. In March of 1991, plaintiff informed defendants that she was available to return to work, but defendants refused to place her in a job.

Plaintiff argues that defendants have a duty to reinstate her, pursuant to § 643b(b) of the Act. The section provides:

The employer of a worker disabled by an injury compensable under this chapter shall reinstate the worker when his or her inability to work ceases provided recovery occurs within two years of the onset of the disability. A worker who recovers within two years of the onset of the disability shall be reinstated in the first available position suitable for the worker given the position the worker held at the time of the injury.

There is no dispute that plaintiff fell within this section. The sole issue on appeal is whether plaintiff's rights are barred by an exception to this provision, which states the reinstatement right does not apply if "employment would have terminated of its own terms prior to any reinstatement the worker would otherwise be entitled to." 21 V.S.A. § 643b(d)(2).

The trial court concluded that the exception to the reinstatement right applied because plaintiff was an at-will employee and her position was eliminated in a general downsizing of BNG. Plaintiff argues that these elements are insufficient to trigger the statutory exception.

When construing a statute, we presume that language is inserted advisedly. Trombley v. Bellows Falls Union H.S., 160 Vt. 101, 104, 624 A.2d 857, 860 (1993). We will not construe a statute "in a way that renders a significant part of it pure surplusage." State v. Beattie, 157 Vt. 162, 165, 596 A.2d 919, 921 (1991) (reading one statutory provision containing "sheriff" to encompass "deputy sheriff" would render another section applicable to deputy sheriffs surplusage); see also State v. Kreth, 150 Vt. 406, 409-10, 553 A.2d 554, 556-57 (1988) (error to omit "licensed" from information because it renders that word an inoperative and superfluous element of criminal trespass statute).

The court interpreted § 643b(d)(2) to apply whenever the employer eliminates the employee's position, an action the employer is free to take because the employment is at-will. The weakness in this interpretation is that it renders the statutory phrase "of its own terms" superfluous. Under the trial court's interpretation, we can think of no case where the outcome would be different because of the presence of this language. Certainly, this is not such a case.

Defendants appear to explain this weakness, first and foremost, as a necessary consequence of plaintiff's at-will employment, and the parties have briefed at length whether the at-will nature of plaintiff's employment was altered by the statutory reinstatement right. Except as it bears on the interpretation of the statute before us, we view the characterization of plaintiff's employment status as irrelevant to the issues before us.

The only possible bearing involves treating the at-will status as a "term" of employment so that the discharge of an at-will employee can be said to be a termination of employment "of its own terms." At best, this construction is forced because plaintiff's at-will status allows, but does not require, the discharge. Moreover, it addresses only marginally the weakness in the trial court's construction of the statute. Under this theory, the only instance where employment is not terminated "of its own terms" is where the termination is otherwise unlawful because the employee is discharged before the contracted employment term has expired. If the termination is otherwise unlawful, the statutory protection is unnecessary.

A stronger argument is the trial court's rationale that any right to reinstatement grants plaintiff " 'greater job protection than that which is available to her uninjured colleagues in BNG's data processing department.' " We ackowledge this consequence of plaintiff's position. If plaintiff prevails here, she is in a better position than if she had never been...