Payes v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd.

Decision Date30 October 2013
PartiesPhilip PAYES, Appellant v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (Commonwealth PA STATE POLICE), Appellee.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

79 A.3d 543

Philip PAYES, Appellant
v.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (Commonwealth PA STATE POLICE), Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued April 11, 2012.
Decided Oct. 30, 2013.


[79 A.3d 545]


Quintes D. Taglioli, Esq., Markowitz & Richman, Allentown, for Philip Payes.

Amber Marie Kenger, Esq., Richard C. Lengler, Esq., Workers Compensation Appeal Board, for Workers Compensation Appeal Board.


James A. Mazzotta, Esq., Fried, Kane, Walters, Zuschlag & Grochmal, Pittsburgh, for State Police.

BEFORE: CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, ORIE MELVIN, JJ.

OPINION

Justice McCAFFERY.

Allowance of appeal was granted so that this Court could determine whether the Commonwealth Court erred by affirming the reversal by the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (“WCAB”) of the decision of a workers' compensation judge (“WCJ”) that granted the claim petition of Appellant, Philip Payes. The WCJ had determined that Appellant was entitled to workers' compensation disability benefits based on factual findings that Appellant established the existence of a mental disability that had been caused by abnormal working conditions. We now conclude that it was error to reverse the WCJ's decision, and we accordingly reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court.

The factual background is largely undisputed. Appellant was a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police (“State Police”) and had worked for the State Police for approximately twelve years prior to the incident in question, which occurred on November 29, 2006. At approximately 5:45 a.m. on that date, while it was dark, Appellant was driving his patrol car on Interstate 81 en route to his barracks.1 A woman dressed all in black, including a black hat or cap, suddenly ran in front of, and was struck by, Appellant's patrol car. The woman flipped over the vehicle and landed on the highway. Appellant immediately pulled his car around into the traffic lane and rushed to attend to the woman. Appellant began giving her mouth-to-mouth resuscitation as she bled from the mouth. At the same time as he was attempting to revive the injured woman, Appellant had to divert oncoming traffic from hitting him and the woman. The incident was caught on film by a camera mounted in Appellant's patrol car, and, in accordance with State Police procedure, a DVD

[79 A.3d 546]

was made of the incident, which DVD was later admitted into evidence by the WCJ.

Following Appellant's request for assistance, other troopers arrived at the incident site. The woman could not be revived and was pronounced dead at the scene. It was later discovered that she suffered from mental illness and had been seen by several drivers walking up and down the area adjacent to Interstate 81 prior to the incident. Appellant was transported from the scene to a hospital for testing and treatment connected to his exposure to the deceased woman's blood.

Appellant was permitted to be off work until January 2, 2007. On that date, he returned to work but performed office work rather than his normal patrol duties. After working four days, however, Appellant's recurring feelings of anxiousness and stress led him to believe that he could not continue to perform his duties as a state trooper. Appellant has not returned to work since January 5, 2007.

Appellant sought workers' compensation benefits, but the State Police filed two notices of Workers' Compensation Denial (“NCD”), the first on December 8, 2006, and the second, as amended, on February 6, 2007. The first NCD asserted that although an injury had occurred, Appellant was not disabled as a result of it. However, it did provide that expenses for medical treatment reasonably related to Appellant's exposure to the deceased's woman's blood would be paid. The second NCD asserted that Appellant had not been injured while in the scope of his employment and specifically rejected any claim for post-traumatic stress. However, and somewhat contradictorily, this NCD also continued to accept responsibility for medical treatment related to Appellant's exposure to blood.

On August 6, 2007, Appellant filed a claim petition alleging that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of the November 29, 2006, incident, and he sought full disability benefits, medical expenses, and counsel fees. The State Police filed an answer denying Appellant's material allegations, and a hearing was scheduled before a WCJ.

At the hearing, Appellant testified and presented the supporting medical expert testimony of a psychiatrist and a psychologist, both of whom diagnosed Appellant as being temporarily totally disabled because of PTSD, which disorder had arisen directly from the November 29, 2006, incident. The State Police presented the testimony of Major Steven McDaniel, the Commander of Area 1, who testified about police cadet training regarding stress management, standards for State Police response to automobile accidents, and State Police practice of rendering first aid at a crash site. Major McDaniel also testified regarding an incident of which he was aware where another State Trooper had struck and killed an individual who had dashed in front of his patrol vehicle. Major McDaniel testified that he had given the name of this State Trooper to Appellant in case Appellant desired to contact him. The State Police also presented the testimony of their own psychiatric expert, who opined that Appellant had fully recovered from any PTSD related to the incident, and presently suffered only from mental conditions that pre-existed the November 29, 2006, incident. Two other troopers testified regarding Appellant's job duties and his failed attempt to return to his work duties after the incident.

The WCJ found Appellant's and Major McDaniel's respective testimonies to be credible and further found the testimony of Appellant's psychiatric expert witnesses to be more credible than that of the psychiatric expert witness presented by the

[79 A.3d 547]

State Police. Based on these credibility findings, the WCJ determined that Appellant had proven a mental injury arising from a work-related mental stimulus. The WCJ further found that, although state troopers may expect to encounter or be involved with violent situations, the particular work-related mental stimulus here was not one normally encountered by or expected of state troopers, as illustrated by the following relevant findings of fact:

12. State Troopers such as [Appellant] are exposed to vehicle accidents, mayhem, bodily injuries, death, murder, and violent acts in the normal course of their duties.

13. State Troopers are not in the normal course of their duties exposed to the circumstances that occurred in this case; to wit[,] a mentally disturbed individual running in front of a Trooper's vehicle while he is operating the vehicle, for no apparent reason. Further, what occurred at the point of impact and immediately thereafter are not working conditions which normally occur for State Troopers[: Appellant's] attempted but failed resuscitation of the woman he killed on Interstate 81 while vehicular traffic [was] oncoming, waiting for assistance from other troopers.

WCJ Decision, dated 10/24/08, at 3–4, Findings of Fact Nos. 12–13 (emphasis added).


Based on his relevant factual findings, the WCJ determined that Appellant's mental injury was caused by an abnormal working condition, making the mental injury and resultant disability compensable under the Act.2 The WCJ reasoned:

[W]hile state troopers such as [Appellant] are exposed to death, murder, severe personal injury, crimes, and other violent activities, the circumstances of the present case which occurred directly to [Appellant] when the victim darted in front of his vehicle, and the events which occurred immediately when he attempted to save her life, were not normal for a state trooper but instead were extraordinary and unusual events.
WCJ Decision at 8, Conclusion of Law No. 5.

Following appeal by the State Police, the WCAB reversed the WCJ's grant of Appellant's claim petition, stating: “[W]hile being involved in a fatal accident may be traumatic and not routine for a state trooper, we cannot agree that this incident constitutes an abnormal working condition given the nature of [Appellant's] stressful and perilous profession.” WCAB Decision, dated 2/22/10, at 11. The WCAB further stated:

[Appellant] agreed that being exposed to traumatic and dangerous situations and to death and trauma was a normal part of his job as a state trooper. Although he testified that he never thought he would be involved in someone's death, he did admit he was trained at the academy in the use of deadly force [,] among other things. While he stated he never heard of this kind of event happening to anyone else on the job, Major McDaniel credibly testified that a member of the department had a similar situation years ago where someone ran in front of a patrol car and was struck and killed, and he provided [Appellant] with that person's contact information. Thus, encounters involving fatalities were a foreseeable part of the job and not an unheard of occurrence.

Id. at 12–13.


In a published opinion, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the WCAB's decision, holding as a matter of law that Appellant's

[79 A.3d 548]

injury did not result from an abnormal working condition. Payes v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Commonwealth of PA/State Police), 5 A.3d 855 (Pa.Cmwlth.2010). Specifically, the court held:

[Appellant], who works “in the line of employment” of a police officer, can be expected to be witness to horrible tragedy. This includes, as acknowledged by [Appellant], responding to motor vehicle accidents in an emergency capacity. Undoubtedly, in so doing, he may be subjected to traumatic visuals such as injured children, maimed adults, and, unfortunately, death. These events will not be deemed “extraordinary” or “abnormal.” Indeed, it is not beyond the realm of possibility for an officer to have to...

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