Payne v. Dekalb County
| Decision Date | 25 March 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 1:02-CV-2754.,CIV.A. 1:02-CV-2754. |
| Citation | Payne v. Dekalb County, 414 F.Supp.2d 1158 (N.D. Ga. 2004) |
| Parties | Panesa C. PAYNE, Plaintiff, v. DEKALB COUNTY; Eddie J. Moody, individually and in his official capacity as Police Chief of the DeKalb County Police Department; Albirdia J. Earls, individually and in her official capacity as an employee of the DeKalb County Police Department; and John A. Medina, individually and in his official capacity as an employee of the DeKalb County Police Department, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Clarence Cuthpert, Jr., Clarence Cuthpert, Jr. & Associates, Eric E. Wyatt, George William McGriff, George W. McGriff & Associates, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.
Charles George Hicks, Elizabeth B. Taylor, Michelle Lynn Thomas, Stephen E. Whitted, William J. Linkous, III, Office of DeKalb County Attorney, Decatur, GA, James Edward Dearing, Jr., Office of James Edward Dearing, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.
This case is presently before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment[28] and Defendant DeKalb County Et Al.'s Motion for Order Permitting Supplementation of Their Motion for Summary Judgment[31].The Court has reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties and, for the reasons set out below, concludes that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment[28] should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and Defendant DeKalb County Et AL's Motion for Order Permitting Supplementation of Their Motion for Summary Judgment[31] should be GRANTED.
This case stems from an incident that occurred on the afternoon of November 3, 2000.PlaintiffPanesa Payne exchanged words with a young girl named Makia Clarke to the effect that Clarke should not ride her bicycle on plaintiff's property.Clarke's parents, defendantAlbirdia J. Earls and her husband, Earnest Earls, subsequently went to plaintiff's home to confront her about the incident, and the conversation became heated.The Earls returned to their own home, where defendantAlbirdia Earls, a DeKalb County police officer, phoned a magistrate judge who apparently informed her that plaintiff had committed simple assault upon her and her daughter.Defendant Earls then phoned 911, after which defendantJohn Medina, a DeKalb County police officer, was dispatched to the scene.Defendants Earls and Medina proceeded to plaintiff's home, where they arrested her for simple assault.The two charges of simple assault against plaintiff were subsequently nolle prossed, however.
Plaintiff now brings suit against these individual officers and DeKalb County,1 alleging a variety of claims under both federal and state law, including malicious prosecution and false arrest.Plaintiff originally filed her complaint in the Superior Court of DeKalb County, and the defendants removed the case to this Court on October 8, 2002.(Notice of Removal [1]at 1.)This Court has original jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims made under federal law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Unless otherwise indicated, the Court draws the undisputed facts from "Defendants' DeKalb County, Moody, Earls, and Medina's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts to Which There is No Genuine Issue to be Tried"("DSMF")[28].Plaintiff Payne has violated Local Rule 56.1B(2) by failing to attach to her response to defendants' summary judgment motion"a separate and concise statement of material facts, numbered separately, to which the respondent contends there exists a genuine issue to be tried."Plaintiff also failed to file a response to DSMF, again in violation of Local Rule 56.1B(2)."All material facts contained in the moving party's statement which are not specifically controverted by the respondent in respondent's statement shall be deemed to have been admitted."LR56.1B(2), NDGa.As plaintiff failed to specifically controvert any of the facts contained in defendants' statement filed with their motion for summary judgment, she is deemed to have admitted all of them.Id.See alsoCong. Fin. Corp. (Southern) v. Commercial Tech., Inc.,910 F.Supp. 637, 645(N.D.Ga.1995)(Carnes, J.).Nonetheless, if the Court could discern that the plaintiff has disputed a specific fact and pointed to evidence in the record supporting her version of events, the Court has viewed all evidence and factual inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as required on defendants' motion for summary judgment.SeeMatsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538(1986);McCabe v. Sharrett,12 F.3d 1558, 1560(11th Cir.1994);Reynolds v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,989 F.2d 465, 469(11th Cir.1993).
Defendants Earls and Medina are both employed as DeKalb County police officers.(DSMF at¶para; 1, 2.)Defendant Moody is the Chief of Police for DeKalb County.(Id.at ¶ 3.)Prior to November 3, 2000, plaintiff had not known or had any contact with defendant Medina and defendant Moody.(Id.at ¶¶ 4, 5.)Plaintiff and defendant Earls did know each other prior to this date, however, because they were neighbors in the Oak Tree Estates subdivision located in Lithonia, Georgia.(Id.at ¶ 6.)The homes of plaintiff and defendant Earls were located on streets that run parallel to each other.(Id.at ¶ 7.)A small wooded area separated the houses, and the distance from plaintiff's property line to that of Earls was approximately 100 yards.(Id.)Plaintiff and Earls had met each other when Earls had gone to plaintiff's door to advise her of a prior community meeting, and they had also spoken to each other at one or two such community meetings.(Earls Dep. [34]at 16.)
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as set out in her deposition, on the afternoon of November 3, 2000, plaintiff first saw defendant Earls' nine-year-old daughter, Makia Clarke, at around 3:00 p.m.(Payne Dep. [30]at 14.)Plaintiff was aroused from a nap by the girl, who was walking through plaintiff's yard as a shortcut to get to her house after she had gotten off the school bus.(Id.)Plaintiff saw Makia again at around 4:00, as Makia was riding her bicycle in plaintiff's yard.(Id.)Makia had a can or some other object dragging on her bike that made a noise and that thereby alerted plaintiff that the girl was riding her bike in plaintiff's driveway.(Id. at 19-20.)According to plaintiff, she then raised her bedroom window and told Makia not to ride her bike in her yard.(Id. at 20-22.)Plaintiff said, "You know what I'm going to say, don't you?"(Id. at 20-21.)Makia said something in reply to plaintiff, but plaintiff could not understand what she said, so plaintiff then said, "Do not ride your bike in my yard."(Id. at 21-22.)Makia just looked at plaintiff, who then asked, "You were over here earlier today, weren't you?"(Id. at 22.)Makia answered yes, that she and her friends had been there.(Id.)At that point Makia at first continued to ride through plaintiff's yard, so plaintiff pointed to the street and told her to "[t]urn around and go that way."(Id.)Makia then turned around and left plaintiff's yard.(Id. at 22-23.)The entire incident lasted only about one minute.(Id. at 23.)According to plaintiff, she had previously mentioned to the parents present at a homeowners' meeting that she had a problem with the neighborhood children playing in her yard and using it as a shortcut to get to and from the bus stop.(Id. at 25.)Plaintiff also frequently instructed children that she saw her yard, including Makia, not to use her yard to ride their bikes or to walk through.2(Id. at 27.)
After Makia had left, plaintiff got back into bed and began reading a book.(Id. at 28.)Approximately ten to fifteen minutes later, plaintiff heard another noise and again looked out the window.(Id. at 29.)She then saw Makia's brother, who appeared to be about seven or eight years old, in the street on some roller blades.(Id. at 29-30.)The boy was skating directly toward her yard, so she tapped on the window and shook her head from left to right, "as to say don't come over here ..."(Id. at 29.)The boy, who appeared startled, acknowledged plaintiff looking at him and left.(Id.)Plaintiff then went back to try to read her book.(Id. at
About fifteen minutes later, plaintiff heard a knock on her door.(Id. at 31.)After looking out the window and seeing defendant Earls and her husband standing outside, plaintiff got dressed and answered the door.(Id.)Defendant Earls introduced herself, and plaintiff said that she knew who she was.(Id.)Though defendant and her husband are both police officers, neither of them wore their uniforms that day, nor did they identify themselves as officers during their conversation with plaintiff.(DSMF at ¶ 12.)According to plaintiff, at the beginning of the conversation, defendant Earls asked her if her daughter had been there earlier that day, "and just from that point on, we just had attitudes, both of us."(Payne Dep.[30] at Plaintiff told defendant that she had asked defendant's son and daughter not to ride their bikes in her yard and had seen defendant stand on her back porch and look on as her daughter used plaintiff's yard as a shortcut to get to the school bus in the mornings.(Id. at 31-32.)According to plaintiff, defendant"did not like that statement," and defendant's husband told her to go out to the street.(Id. at 32.)Defendant then went and stood in the street while plaintiff and defendant's husband continued to discuss the situation.(Id.)Plaintiff asserts, though, that defendant did not remain in the street but instead engaged plaintiff in a heated conversation and came back into her yard, ...
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