Payne v. Foley
| Decision Date | 21 January 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 13460,13460 |
| Citation | 102 Idaho 760,639 P.2d 1126 |
| Parties | Martha Alice PAYNE and Lawrence W. Payne, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Timothy FOLEY, Stewart K. Brown and Deirdre Sampson, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Kevin F. Trainor and John A. Doerr, Doerr & Trainor, Twin Falls, for defendants-appellants.
John T. Lezamiz, Hepworth, Nungester & Felton, Twin Falls, for plaintiffs-respondents.
The sole issue in this appeal is an award to plaintiffs-respondents, Paynes, of $15,889 for attorney's fees on the grounds that defendant-appellant, Sampson, unreasonably defended a personal injury action which resulted in a judgment for the Paynes of $18,821. We reverse.
Martha Payne was a passenger in a Travelall vehicle and sustained injuries when that vehicle was involved in a three-car accident. During a snow storm, the Travelall was stopped preparatory to making a left turn. The Travelall was struck a blow in the right rear fender by the vehicle owned and driven by Sampson, which proceeded on past the Travelall and came to rest in a ditch. Only seconds later a pickup truck driven by Foley struck the Travelall squarely in the rear. Because of their close proximity in time, Martha Payne was unable to state which of the two collisions had caused her injuries.
The Paynes filed an action for personal injuries and loss of consortium against Sampson, Brown, the owner of the pickup, and Foley, its driver. Foley did not appear and was defaulted. Brown settled with the Paynes and was dismissed from the action. Thus at the time of trial Sampson was the only defendant. Prior to trial the trial court contacted counsel for the Paynes and requested that an inquiry of settlement be initiated. Counsel for the Paynes in a letter to counsel for Sampson inquired concerning the possibility of settlement. No offer in response thereto was received until the second day of trial at which time counsel for Sampson communicated an offer of $7,500. That offer was declined by counsel for the Paynes. On the third day of trial, in response to an inquiry by counsel for Sampson, an offer of settlement for $55,000 was received from counsel for the Paynes. Sampson declined that offer of settlement. Following a four-day trial, a jury verdict awarded the Paynes $18,821.95 for Martha Payne's personal injuries, but denied any recovery on the loss of consortium claim.
The Paynes then moved for an award of costs and attorney's fees and the trial court awarded the Paynes $15,889 for attorney's fees as part of their costs, pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. The trial court found that liability had never been seriously contested by Sampson, that the only significant issue had been the amount of damages, that Sampson's offer of $7,500 was neither a reasonable nor a good faith offer of settlement, and that Sampson had failed at any time to enter into good faith negotiations towards settlement. The court held that the matter thus had been unreasonably defended and pursued.
As aforesaid, the sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to the Paynes. Here it is clear that the trial court purported to penalize Sampson for failing to submit a good faith offer of settlement or refusing to enter into good faith settlement negotiations. We are directed to no legal authority which supports such discretion in the trial court. Even assuming that a trial court is vested with such discretion, the facts here do not support such a finding. If defense counsel is to be faulted for not making an offer of settlement until the second day of trial, what then are we to make of plaintiffs' counsel's first offer of settlement on the third day of trial? If defense counsel's valuation of the case is to be faulted because it was less than one-half of the ultimate jury verdict, what then are we to make of plaintiffs' counsel's offer of $55,000 as contrasted with the ultimate jury verdict of approximately.$19,000.
Again, even assuming the authority of trial court to make an award of attorney's fees based on the failure to either enter into good faith negotiations toward settlement, or make a reasonable good faith offer of settlement, it should be as incumbent upon one party as the other to enter into good faith negotiations or make a good faith offer of settlement. The record before us does not appear to indicate any more fault in that regard on the part of the defendant than on the part of the plaintiffs.
DB1[2 3) The trial court held the matter had been unreasonably defended and pursued on the part of Sampson. I.C. § 12-121 provides:
"In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties, provided this section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees."
That statute was enacted in 1976 and after some divergence among the trial courts as to its interpretation this Court enacted I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1), stating:
It is clear, therefore, that a trial court may, in its discretion, and upon proper findings, 1 award attorney's fees in an action of the present type when the matter has been defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. It is axiomatic that those findings of the trial court must be supported by the record, or any such award of attorney's fees will constitute an abuse of discretion. Here we hold that the findings of the trial court are not supported by the record and hence the award of attorney's fees constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
Insofar as the record indicates, the trial court's finding of an unreasonable defense by Sampson appears to be predicated on its finding that liability on Sampson's part was not "seriously contested". Nevertheless the record indicates that the amount of damages sustained by Martha and Lawrence Payne was clearly at issue as was the apportionment of liability and fault between Sampson and Foley. Special interrogatories were submitted to the jury as to the percentage of negligence attributable to Sampson, Foley and the driver of the Travelall. The jury found 49% of the negligence was attributable to Sampson, 51% to Foley, and that no other party's negligence contributed to Payne's injuries. The jury was unable to determine what portion of Payne's injuries were attributable to each defendant, but it did find that Sampson's...
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Smith v. Angell, 18674
...§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1)." 116 Idaho at 366. See also, Ross v. Coleman, 114 Idaho 817, 761 P.2d 1169 (1988); Payne v. Foley, 102 Idaho 760, 639 P.2d 1126 (1982). Furthermore, this Court has held that if a case includes any triable issues, an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 ......
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Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc.
...conduct settlement negotiations is not a basis for awarding attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). Payne v. Foley, 102 Idaho 760, 639 P.2d 1126 (1982). Today, we again make explicit that which we held in Payne v. Foley, supra, that "there is no authority in a trial court t......
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...on a default judgment. (Emphasis added).3 The Court of Appeals in Sigdestad briefly discussed this Court's opinion in Payne v. Foley, 102 Idaho 760, 639 P.2d 1126 (1982), saying of it, "... the court said that the parties had cited no legal authority allowing award of attorney fees for fail......
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...of a negotiated settlement. This has long been an acceptable procedure, and in my opinion a commendable one." Payne v. Foley, 102 Idaho at 763, 639 P.2d at 1129. With there having been three votes in Ross v. Coleman accepting my Payne v. Foley views, thus making that a majority position, pe......