Payne v. Fontenot
| Citation | 925 F. Supp. 414 |
| Decision Date | 16 August 1995 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 95-308-B. |
| Parties | Albert R. PAYNE, Frank Payne v. Paul FONTENOT, individually and as Superintendent of the State Police for the State of Louisiana, Lieutenant Kendall Fellon, individually and as Head of the Video Gaming Division, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, State Police for the State of Louisiana. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
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Alexander A. Lambert, Jr., Metairie, LA, for Albert R. Payne, plaintiff, Frank Payne, plaintiff.
Brett Alan Sulzer, Department of Public Safety & Corrections, Office of State Police, Baton Rouge, LA, Tammy L. Pruet, Baton Rouge, LA, for Paul W. Fontenot.
Brett Alan Sulzer, Dept. of Public Safety & Corrections, Office of State Police, Baton Rouge, LA, for Kendall Fellon, defendant.
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
This case requires the Court to determine whether the defendants violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights when they denied the plaintiffs a video poker license. Finding that no constitutional right has either been violated or is even at issue, defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.
On December 14, 1988, Albert Payne was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1955 and § 1511 for operating an illegal gambling business. Six years after Albert's conviction, his son, Frank Payne, applied to the Louisiana State Police, Video Gaming Division ("Division"), for a license to operate video poker devices at his business known as "Frank's Place." It is clear that Albert and Frank work together at Frank's Place.1 On June 2, 1994, the Division refused to issue a license to Frank, citing his father's conviction and certain language of Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:4862.10 as reasons. Section 4862.10(D) provides:
D. Every person who has or controls directly or indirectly more than a five percent ownership, income, or profit interest in an entity which has or applies for a license in accordance with the provisions of this Part, ... or who has the ability, in the opinion of the division, to exercise a significant influence over the activities of a licensee authorized or to be authorized by this Part, shall meet all suitability requirements and qualifications for licensees.2
Specifically, because the Division believed Albert had the "ability ... to exert significant influence over the activities" of his son, it found that Albert also had to meet the suitability requirements for obtaining a license. The Division further found that because of Albert's past conviction, he did not meet the suitability requirements, and therefore the license was denied. After being denied a license to operate video gaming devices, Frank and Albert filed this suit claiming that the state police violated (1) their first amendment right to free association, (2) their fourteenth amendment right to due process, and (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3
This matter is before the Court on defendants' joint motion to dismiss. If the plaintiffs are unable to establish facts in support of their claims entitling them to relief, dismissal is proper.4 In making this determination, the Court must "accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the Complaint and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them."5
Accepting as true the pleaded factual allegations of the Complaint and any reasonable inferences to be drawn, the Court concludes that defendant's motion to dismiss should be granted. In reaching this decision, the Court finds this suit is totally frivolous and has no place in the federal courts. Because of the number of video poker machines and licenses which currently exist in Louisiana, and because the defendants are involved on a daily basis in determining whether to grant, deny or revoke video poker licenses, the Court has decided to write a detailed opinion on the issues raised in this case so others who wish to file similar suits in this Court will know in advance the Court's position on these issues.6
It is difficult to tell from their opposition memorandum what constitutional right the plaintiffs contend was violated. It appears the plaintiffs argue that somehow their first amendment right to free association was violated when the Division denied Frank Payne's video gambling device license on the basis of his father's influence over him in his business and his father's failure to meet the suitability requirements for licensure. However, the plaintiffs provide absolutely no authority to support their argument that this criteria is constitutionally defective. The plaintiffs contend that the father/son relationship is a type of relationship protected by the first amendment,7 and then ask: "can it not be said that the defendants are encroaching upon Albert Payne's right of free association and his ability to earn a living ...?" The plaintiffs' "question" fails to establish a constitutional violation.8
There are three aspects to the constitutional right of association.9 First, the constitution protects association for the purpose of engaging in types of activity expressly protected by the first amendment. Laws regulating this type of noncommercial10 and expressive or political association must pass the court's strict scrutiny.11
Second, individuals may seek to associate for economic or other reasons unrelated to any fundamental constitutional right. When this type of association is regulated, the law need only rationally promote an arguably legitimate government goal.12
The third category of association is protected by the concept of liberty in the due process clause and as an implicit part of the Bill of Rights guarantees. This right is connected to the fundamental right of privacy.13 Freedom of association in this sense includes the freedom to choose one's spouse14 and to maintain a relationship with members of one's family. Essentially, this type of private association is protected not by the First Amendment, but by the fundamental right of privacy emanating from the fourteenth amendment.15 There are two standards that may apply to this category of associational right, and it is presently unclear which should be applied.
The traditional test for analyzing laws that interfere with this right of private association is "strict scrutiny."16 Under this standard, the law must further a compelling state interest via narrowly tailored means — that is, the least burdensome method to achieve that end. The recent case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,17 however, may have changed this standard.
In Casey, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court adopted the "undue burden" test as the standard to be applied in determining whether a law unconstitutionally violates a woman's right to privacy with respect to her choice to have an abortion. In order to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of a statute under Casey, the plaintiffs must show that the statute constituted an "undue burden" on their alleged privacy right to associate as father and son.18 In other words, Casey may prohibit a regulation based on a legitimate and important state interest from placing a "substantial obstacle" to the exercise of the right to privacy. Although it is currently unclear whether Casey applies to non-abortion cases,19 under the facts of this case, dismissal is nonetheless proper. Because only economic association is at issue, rational basis is the appropriate standard. Furthermore, as discussed below, the Division's application of the regulation in question passes the strict scrutiny standard as well as the undue burden test.20 Therefore, this Court need not decide whether the undue burden test announced in Casey is the new test with regard to the right to private association.
The Court agrees with the plaintiffs that a father/son relationship may be constitutionally protected under certain conditions. However, those facts are not present in this case. The Division is not regulating the father/son relationships of all families in Louisiana. Furthermore, the Division did not seek to interfere with Frank and Albert's private relationship.21 It is clear that the plaintiffs may live together, pray together, dine together, play together, work together, and do all those things fathers and sons traditionally do together.22 In fact, the two may engage in any legal activity, provided they meet the required standards. If neither Albert nor Frank qualified for a driver's license, they could hardly complain that their father/son relationship is impaired because they cannot legally ride alone in an automobile together.23 Likewise, their private relationship is not effected merely because they do not meet the licensure requirements for a video poker license. Thus, Louisiana has not impaired Albert and Frank's private relationship and has not regulated Frank and Albert's alleged privacy right to associate as father and son.24
The plaintiffs have, as they may, voluntarily chosen to work together at Frank's Place. But, because of that choice, they do not qualify under the video gaming device licensing statute to operate video poker machines at that bar. Therefore, there is only one freedom of association involved in this case — economic association. Consequently, Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:4862.10, the Division's application of it, and the Division's regulations need only meet the rational basis/legitimate governmental goal standard of review.
Even if the strict scrutiny or undue burden standard applied to this case, the regulation and the Division's application of it clearly pass both. Therefore, the regulation and the Division's application also pass the rational basis standard of review.
For the reasons stated above regarding the negligible degree to which the state has burdened the...
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