Payne v. Fraternal Acc. Ass'n of Am.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1903
• Citation: 93 N.W. 361,119 Iowa 342
• Parties: PAYNE v. FRATERNAL ACC. ASS'N OF AMERICA.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

119 Iowa 342

93 N.W. 361

PAYNE

v.FRATERNAL ACC. ASS'N OF AMERICA.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 31, 1903.

Appeal from district court, Dallas county; J. H. Applegate, Judge.

Plaintiff is the widow of Joe D. Payne, and the beneficiary named in an “accident certificate,” so called, issued by the defendant association to said Joe D. Payne during his lifetime. One of the provisions of such certificate is that in case of the death of the holder by accidental cause the association will pay to the beneficiary named the sum of $2,000. This action is brought upon said certificate to recover said sum, it being alleged that said Payne came to his death by accidental cause, within the meaning thereof. There was trial to a jury, and verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.Sullivan & Sullivan, for appellant.

White & Clarke, for appellee.

BISHOP, C. J.

1. The certificate holder resided in Dallas county, this state. It seems that in February, 1900, he had gone for a visit to Fenton, La., and while there he was killed by being struck and run over by a freight car moving upon a railroad track. One of the defenses relied upon to defeat a recovery is that the death of Payne was not accidental, as defined by the contract in suit. It is the language of the certificate that the injury must occur “through external, violent, and accidental means.” It is conceded that the burden was on the plaintiff to show that the death of Payne was the result of an accident within the meaning of the certificate. As we have stated, he was killed by being struck and run over by a railroad freight car. Necessarily, he must have been on or near the track over which such car was moving at the time he was so struck. Now, under such circumstances it seems to us to be conclusive that death was either the result of an accident, or it was premeditated, and therefore suicidal. Counsel for appellant do not suggest that the facts disclosed by the record indicate in any degree a case of suicide, or that the jury would have been warranted in finding such to be the fact. Their contention seems to be that, because the deceased placed himself in a position to receive the injury resulting in his death, it was not, therefore, an accident. We are unable to grasp the force of the contention. An accident, in the sense we are here called upon to consider the expression, means a result the inducing cause for which was not put in motion by the voluntary and intentional act of the person injured. It does not matter in this connection that negligence even may be made to appear. If involuntary and unintentional, the result cannot be characterized otherwise than as an accident. Follis v. Association, 94 Iowa, 439, 62 N. W. 807, 28 L. R. A. 78, 58 Am. St. Rep. 408;Matthes v. Association, 110 Iowa, 224, 81 N. W. 484;Marx v. Insurance Co. (C. C.) 39 Fed. 321. The case of Carnes v. Association, 106 Iowa, 281, 76 N. W. 683, 68 Am. St. Rep. 306, relied upon by counsel, does not sustain their contention. In that case death was the result of an overdose of morphine, self-administered, and the question was whether the death could be regarded as an accident, it appearing not only that the taking of the drug was voluntary, but that the amount taken was intentional. It is manifest that to such a case must be applied a principle altogether different from that governing the one before us. Here the contact with the car which killed him was an involuntary and unintentional act on the part of Payne. It may be as asserted by counsel that the killing was the logical result of the position in which the deceased had negligently placed himself, but, nevertheless, design or purpose being wanting, it was accidental, and, as we think, clearly within the meaning of the certificate.

2. It is a provision of the certificate that “this insurance does not cover * * * accident nor death or disability resulting wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, from * * * voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger.” By motion to direct a verdict at the close of the evidence for plaintiff, and again in the motion for new trial, the defendant urged that there could be no recovery, in that the undisputed facts make it appear that the injury complained of was wholly and directly the result of a voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger. The fact of accident having been established, the burden of proof was upon the defendant to show that Payne came to his death because of his voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger. Follis v. Association, 94 Iowa, 439, 62 N. W. 807, 28 L. R. A. 78, 58 Am. St. Rep. 408. It may be conceded that the facts are not seriously involved in dispute; still if, from such facts, reasonable minds might reach different conclusions as to the ultimate fact, the question was one for the jury. Whitsett v. Railway Co., 67 Iowa, 159, 25 N. W. 104;Winelander v. Jones, 77 Iowa, 401, 42 N. W. 333. And in such cases it follows as a matter of course that the party having the burden of proof cannot be heard on appeal to complain of an adverse verdict, it appearing that the question was fairly submitted for the consideration of the jury. Now, the principle of law under which an exception, such as found in the certificate in the case at bar, must be construed, is clearly stated in the opinion of this court in Follis v. Association, supra. Deemer, J., speaking for the court, says: “It evidently means something more than contributory negligence or the want of ordinary care on the part of the assured. The policy was no doubt intended to cover accidents, although the assured may have been guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to his injury. To render one guilty of a voluntary exposure to danger, he must have in tentionally done some act which reasonable and ordinary prudence would pronounce dangerous.” See, also, the following cases: Jones v. Association, 92 Iowa, 654, 61 N. W. 485;Sutherland v. Insurance Co., 87 Iowa, 505, 54 N. W. 453;Smith v. Insurance Co., 88 N. W. 370;Insurance Co. v. Osborn, 90 Ala. 201, 9 South. 869, 13 L. R. A. 267. In the case last cited it is said: “The approach to an unknown and unexpected danger does not make the act a voluntary exposure thereto. The result of the act does not necessarily determine the motive which prompted the action. The act may be voluntary, yet the exposure involuntary.” The same thought finds expression in Carnes v. Association, supra. In the case before us the trial court submitted the question of fact to the jury under instructions which, as we think, correctly embody the principles of law applicable to such question as above referred to and set forth. Such being true, there remains for our consideration but one proposition, and that is whether the proven facts disclosed by the record are such as that the ultimate fact should have been submitted for a finding of the jury; or, on the other hand, determined by the court as a matter of law. The facts, in brief, are as follows: Fenton is a small town of less than a dozen buildings. The railroad runs through the town north and south, with a side track on the west, and about 40 feet distant from the main track. Two streets cross the tracks at right angles, and are about 300 feet distant from each other. The depot is between the tracks, and abuts upon the street at the south. Also between the tracks, about 40 feet north of the depot, is a large water tank. To the north of the tank is a pump house, and still further north a privy. At the time in question a large pile of wood was situated along the east line of the side track, and between the pump house and privy. The Hawkeye...