PAYNE v. GOODMAN Mfg. Co.

Citation726 F.Supp.2d 891
Decision Date06 July 2010
Docket NumberNo. 4:08-cv-92.,4:08-cv-92.
PartiesConnie PAYNE, Plaintiff, v. GOODMAN MANUFACTURING COMPANY, L.P., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Kerry Knox, Castelli & Knox, LLP, Murfreesboro, TN, for Plaintiff.

Edwin Sullivan, Kate L. Birenbaum, Seyfarth & Shaw, LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HARRY S. MATTICE, JR., District Judge.

Defendant Goodman Manufacturing Company, L.P.'s (hereinafter Defendant) Motion for Summary Judgment (Court Doc. 16) is presently before the Court. Plaintiff Connie Payne (hereinafter Plaintiff) initiated the instant action against Defendant, which asserts the following claims: (1) interference and retaliation claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. ; (2) violation of the Tennessee maternity leave statute in the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-21-101, et seq. ; (3) discrimination and retaliation claims in violation of the THRA; and (4) a claim arising under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (hereinafter “the EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (Court Doc. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 31-79). The Court's jurisdiction over this matter arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and is not in dispute.

For the reasons explained below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Court Doc. 16) will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir.2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material facts exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party may meet this burden either by producing evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or by simply ‘showing’-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To refute such a showing, the nonmoving party may not simply rest on its pleadings. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996); see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmoving party must present some significant, probative evidence indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material factual dispute. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir.2000). The Court's role is limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Nat'l Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907. If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the Court concludes that a fair-minded jury could not return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented, it may enter a summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir.1994).

II. FACTS

The facts, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows.

The Defendant, a manufacturer of commercial and residential heating and air conditioning units, employed Plaintiff for 17 years. (Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 2.) At the time of her termination, Plaintiff was employed in the Information Technology department of Defendant's Fayetteville, Tennessee's plant as a desktop support specialist. ( Id. ¶ 4.) During Plaintiff's tenure with Defendant, she had worked in the same or similar capacity for a period of 17 years without incident or reprimand. (Hunter Dep. at 12.)

Sometime between February 18, 2004 and February 13, 2006, Plaintiff's official job title was changed from “Computer Operator” to “Desktop Support Specialist.” (Pl.'s Att. ¶ 7.) This title change reflected Plaintiff's current job duties, namely computer and telecommunications support. ( Id. ¶ 8; Court Doc. 17-1, Pl.'s Dep. at 12-13.) Karen Stubblefield, Defendant's IT Director, explained that Plaintiff's title was changed “to offer her the opportunity to become a desktop support person and to expand her capabilities to improve her position and her job.” (Court Doc. 17-3, Stubblefield Dep. at 8.) Stubblefield testified that despite the change in title, however, Plaintiff continued to primarily work on telecommunications tasks. ( Id. at 31.) Wanda Ford, Defendant's Human Resources Director, testified that she was not even aware that Plaintiff's title changed to include desktop support duties. (Court Doc. 17-4, Ford Dep. at 12.)

In late December 2007, Plaintiff informed her immediate supervisor, Floyd Hunter, that she was pregnant. (Pl.'s Dep. at 68-69.) In late February 2008, Plaintiff informed Defendant's Benefits Administrator that she needed information regarding maternity leave. ( Id. at 73.) On March 26, 2008, Plaintiff met with the Benefits Administrator and was given the necessary maternity leave paperwork, which was to be returned no later than April 10, 2008. ( Id. at 73-74.) Plaintiff's physician prepared the maternity leave paperwork and returned it to Defendant on April 9, 2008. ( Id. at 75.) One week later, Plaintiff informed Hunter of her need for FMLA leave. ( Id. ¶ 13.)

During the week of April 11, 2008, Plaintiff received her annual performance review from Hunter. During this review, Hunter informed Plaintiff that she was originally given a score of 3.5 out of 4.0. Upon review by Karen Stubblefield, however, Plaintiff's score was lowered to approximately 3.1 out of 4. ( Id. at 86.)

The parties dispute the reason why Plaintiff's evaluation was lowered by Stubblefield. Plaintiff contends that her review was lowered because Stubblefield took issue with her speaking ability. (Pl.'s Dep. at 91-92.) Hunter, who worked closely with Plaintiff, never informed Plaintiff that there were issues or problems with her speaking ability. (Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 13.) Hunter, however, testified that he agreed with Stubblefield's changes and that he would have given Plaintiff a worse review but being new “I didn't want to just come in and ruffle feathers.” (Hunter Dep. at 79-80.) Stubblefield testified that Plaintiff “needed to improve in areas of communication,” including being “assertive.” (Stubblefield Dep. at 20-21.) Plaintiff's peers also received downgrades on their reviews due to communication and interpersonal issues. ( Id.) Stubblefield, however, also testified that Plaintiff needed to “improve her skill set from a desktop perspective.” ( Id.) The other desktop support specialists did not receive this criticism.

The parties agree that Stubblefield's interactions with Plaintiff were limited. Over the course of Plaintiff's career with Defendant, Stubblefield stated that she had roughly seven conversations with Plaintiff. (Stubblefield Dep. at 12-13.) Stubblefield contended that she made adjustments to Plaintiff's review because “I knew more and had more interaction over a longer period of time with [Plaintiff] than Hunter. ( Id. at 19-20.)

After Plaintiff received her review, Hunter inquired into whether she would be returning to work following her maternity leave and indicated that Stubblefield needed to know this information. (Pl.'s Dep. at 70.) Hunter testified that he needed this information because he “was trying to figure out who we were going to train ... any time she would be out due to labor and pregnancy, because we didn't know anything about the phone system.” (Hunter Dep. at 28-29.)

After receiving her review, Plaintiff expressed dissatisfaction with the amount of her raise. (Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 27.) In response to Plaintiff's concerns, Hunter told Plaintiff she could earn a higher salary by performing more desktop work. (Pl.'s Dep. at 86.) Plaintiff took this statement to imply that she only performed telecommunications work. ( Id.) In response to Hunter's suggestion, Plaintiff reminded him that she was already tasked with performing desktop work. ( Id.)

Defendant, however, disagrees that Plaintiff had performed an adequate amount of desktop support work. Although Plaintiff was encouraged to increase her computer knowledge and take on more desktop support duties, her reviews were consistently in the “meets expectations” range and contain repeated requests to improve software and hardware computer skills by obtaining certain technical certifications. (Court Doc. 17, Def.'s Br. at 5.) For example, Plaintiff's 2004 review contained a recommendation that she increase her knowledge of computer hardware and software as well as obtain certain computer certifications. Id. Plaintiff's 2006 and 2007 reviews contained similar requests. Id. Plaintiff, however, admits that she did not obtain any specific software or hardware computer certifications. Id. at 5-6.

During Plaintiff's final...

To continue reading

Request your trial
21 cases
  • Allen v. SUMNER County Bd. of Educ.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
    • July 6, 2010
  • Berry v. Maker's Mark Distillery, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky
    • April 30, 2014
    ...has a 'serious health condition' that renders the employee unable to perform the functions of his job." Payne v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., 726 F.Supp.2d 891, 898 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C)-(D)). A "serioushealth condition" is a condition that requires inpatient care o......
  • Foster v. Roadtec, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee
    • May 12, 2021
    ...to raise the inference that her protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action.'" Payne v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., 726 F. Supp. 2d 891, 900 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (quoting Zanders v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 898 F.2d 1127, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990)). Plaintiff's theory as to his i......
  • Battle v. Haywood Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee
    • October 12, 2011
    ...look to decisions of federal courts construing Title VII when analyzing claims under" the state statute. Payne v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., 726 F. Supp. 2d 891, 903 (E.D. Tenn. 2010). As is the case here, "[i]n the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, Title VII claims are subject to ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT