Payne v. Knutson

Decision Date28 September 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-784,03-784
PartiesDARLENE PAYNE, individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of RAYMOND A. NAUMER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JIM KNUTSON and DUTCH KNUTSON, Defendants and Respondents.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

For Appellant: Howard F. Strause and Michael G. Barer, Attorneys at Law, Great Falls, Montana

For Respondents: Dennis Clarke and Robert Vermillion, Smith, Walsh, Clarke & Gregoire, Great Falls, Montana

Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Darlene Payne appeals from denials of her motions for a new trial and to amend the judgment. We affirm.

¶2 We restate the issues on appeal as:

3 Whether the District Court erred in instructing the jury that it need not apportion percentages of negligence to the Knutsons.

4 Whether the District Court improperly admitted evidence that painted the Knutsons in a sympathetic light.

¶5 Whether there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.

¶6 Whether Payne preserved the issue of "sudden emergency" for appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶7 This action arises out of the tragic death of Raymond Naumer. Naumer's mother, Darlene Payne, brings this suit on behalf of his estate. On October 25, 1998, Naumer's friend, David Sall, purchased an antique Minneapolis Moline tractor from Jim and Dutch Knutson. Sall and Naumer collected the tractor at the Knutsons' ranch near Geyser, Montana. Sall and Naumer's plan was to load the tractor into the trailer attached to Sall's truck, but, because the model was too wide, the two decided to drive both the truck and the tractor back to Great Falls.

¶8 The Knutsons told Sall that the tractor was "field ready" and that nothing was wrong with it apart from the water pump. On a previous occasion, Sall inspected the tractor and took it for a test drive. At that time he determined that the gears were in working order, and he used the transmission to slow the tractor down. In his deposition he stated that he did use the brakes, but very briefly. The tractor had an unusual braking system, with right and left brake pedals for the respective wheels, and a master pedal that engages each wheel.

¶9 In their drive to Great Falls, Sall drove the tractor for some time, and during this time uneventfully negotiated some hills. After stopping for a break, he and Naumer agreed to switch vehicles. This was because Naumer lacked a driver's license and so could not legally drive the truck. However, under Montana law, he could drive farm machinery, such as the tractor. Naumer then led the way and began driving the tractor up a hill of about a 7 percent grade. The hill was not as steep as some that Sall had driven over earlier. Naumer attempted to switch gears and Sall saw him drop a snuff can. The tractor then began rolling backwards. Naumer frantically tried to use the various brake pedals or put the machine into gear, but to no avail. Sall began running beside the tractor telling Naumer to either steer into the hill or jump out. After approximately nine seconds, Sall could no longer keep up with the machine. With the vehicle careening out of control, Naumer finally jumped out. At this moment the tractor swerved and crushed him.

¶10 Darlene Payne subsequently brought this negligence action against the Knutsons. At trial, Payne argued that the Knutsons either did not sufficiently inspect the tractor's brakes, or did not tell Sall and Naumer that the brakes were deficient. The parties made a joint inspection of the tractor's remains and discovered that the right brake pad was almost completely worn down. Importantly, they also found that the dust cover for the right brake was blackened. In his deposition, Sall stated that the dust cover was not blackened when they switched vehicles. The Knutsons argue that this may have been because Naumer drove with the right brake engaged. This may have overheated the brake, causing the blackening of the dust cover and a quick deterioration of the right brake pad. With this deterioration Naumer would have been unable to stop the tractor by engaging the right brake pedal or even the master pedal. The left pedal may have been sufficient, but expert testimony stated that he would have had to engage it for a couple seconds, perhaps longer than he did in his panicked state.

¶11 In their testimony, both of the Knutsons gave certain introductory remarks concerning their life histories and hobbies. Dutch Knuston also testified regarding his disabled hips. Payne objected to this testimony on the grounds that it was irrelevant and was designed to elicit sympathy for the Knutsons.

¶12 The court instructed the jury to complete a special verdict form. The form separately asked if Jim Knutson, Dutch Knutson, and Naumer were negligent and were a cause of Naumer's death. Then, it asked the jury to apportion percentages of negligence among the three. At first the jury was deadlocked over whether the Knutsons were negligent at all. After further deliberation, the jury told the court that eight jurors (the threshold number) agreed that the Knutsons were negligent, four did not, and of the eight, six agreed that Naumer was more than 51 percent at fault. Through their instructions, the jury knew that the Knutsons would not be liable if Naumer was more than 51 percent at fault, so the jury asked if it needed to go forward and apportion the negligence percentages for each of the Knutsons. The court answered "no" and the jury subsequently rendered its verdict, finding Naumer more than 51 percent at fault. Before the verdict, Payne objected to the court's "no" answer, requested a new trial and argued that the law requires the jury to apportion negligence to all parties. After the jury delivered its verdict, Payne moved for a new trial and to amend the judgment. Payne now appeals, asking this Court to conclude that Naumer was not negligent as a matter of law, reverse the District Court's refusal to amend the judgment, and remand for a new trial on the issue of damages. In the alternative, Payne asks us to grant her a new trial on all issues. We first address her arguments regarding her request for a new trial.

DISCUSSION
ISSUE ONE

¶13 Whether the District Court erred when it instructed the jury that it need not apportion percentages of negligence to the Knutsons.

¶14 We give great leeway to the district courts in instructing the jury, and therefore will only overturn a jury instruction in the case of an abuse of discretion. Dale v. Three Rivers Tels. Coops., Inc., 2004 MT 74, ¶ 10, 320 Mont. 401, ¶ 10, 87 P.3d 489, ¶ 10 (citing Hall v. Big Sky Lumber, Inc. (1993), 261 Mont. 328, 332, 863 P.2d 389, 392). Furthermore, in an instruction context, we will only overturn a district court's denial of a motion to grant a new trial in the case of a manifest abuse of discretion. Dale, ¶ 11 (citing Satterfield v. Medlin, 2002 MT 260, ¶ 14, 312 Mont. 234, ¶ 14, 59 P.3d 33, ¶ 14). However, in reviewing a district court's interpretation of a statute our standard of review is to ask whether the conclusions of the district court are correct. Hidden Hollow Ranch v. Fields, 2004 MT 153, ¶ 21, 321 Mont. 505, ¶ 21, 92 P.3d 1185, ¶ 21 (citing Habel v. James, 2003 MT 99, ¶ 12, 315 Mont. 249, ¶ 12, 68 P.3d 743, ¶ 12).

¶15 Payne appeals from a denial of her motion for a new trial. Her appeal is predicated on the argument that the court's advising the jury that it did not have to apportion negligence to the Knutsons was an incorrect conclusion of law because § 27-1-703(4), MCA, states that in a case such as this "[t]he trier of fact shall apportion the percentage of negligence of all persons listed in this subsection." (Emphasis added.) The only relevant "persons" here are Naumer and the Knutsons.

¶16 Payne contends that a special verdict form, such as that used here, is designed to force the jury to avoid generalities and pay close attention to the relative fault of the parties. In arguing this, Payne misses the larger rationale behind special verdict forms. In our system of comparative negligence, special verdict forms exist so that the jury can apportion percentages of negligence to the parties. Without apportionment, whether it helps jurors "focus their minds" or not, comparing negligence is impossible. In this case, the purpose of apportionment—determining the degree of fault—was fulfilled when the jury determined that Naumer's negligence exceeded 50 percent and thus he was precluded from recovering against the defendants whose negligence would, of necessity, be less than 50 percent.

¶17 More so, however, whether or not the District Court's conclusions of law regarding § 27-1-703(4), MCA, were correct, Payne's argument has no force if she was not prejudiced. This Court has recognized that in appeals concerning the trial court's instructions to the jury, the appellant must establish prejudice from the erroneous instruction. Geiger v. Sherrodd, Inc. (1993), 262 Mont. 505, 509-10, 866 P.2d 1106, 1108 (determining no prejudice when the trial court gave conflicting statements of law); Drilcon, Inc. v. Roil Energy Corp., Inc. (1988), 230 Mont. 166, 173, 749 P.2d 1058, 1062 (concluding the presence of extra parties on the special verdict form was not prejudicial because the jury did not apportion any negligence to them); Fordyce v. Hansen (1982), 198 Mont. 344, 347, 646 P.2d 519, 521 (stating that there was harmless error in instructing the jury through the bailiff, instead of in open court, on the requirements of the special verdict form).

¶18 Under § 27-1-702, MCA, a plaintiff cannot recover if his contributory negligence exceeds the combined negligence of the defendants. Here, using the special verdict form, ten of the twelve jurors agreed to attribute "greater than 51 percent" negligence to Naumer. At this point, six of those ten jurors would have had to change their minds and ascribe "50...

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