Payne v. Payne

• Decision Date: 02 July 1903
• Citation: 55 A. 368,97 Md. 678
• Parties: PAYNE v. PAYNE et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

55 A. 368

97 Md. 678

PAYNE v. PAYNE et al.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

July 2, 1903

Appeal from Circuit Court of Baltimore City; Henry Stockbridge Judge.

Bill by R. Kemp Payne against Margaret J. Payne and others. From a decree for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before BRISCOE, BOYD, PAGE, PEARCE, and SCHMUCKER, JJ.

Thomas Hughes, for appellant.

George M. Upshur and Alfred Niles, for appellees.

SCHMUCKER, J.

The bill of complaint in this case was filed by the appellant in the circuit court of Baltimore City on the 10th of January 1903, to set aside for fraud a final decree which had been passed by that court in another case on the 28th of February 1896. The appellees demurred to the bill for want of equity in its allegations and for laches in filing it, and the present appeal is from the decree of the circuit court sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill.

The decree passed in 1896, which the appellant now asks to have set aside, ratified a sale to his brother and partner, E. Scott Payne, of the interest of the appellant, who was at that time a lunatic in charge of a committee, in the assets, real and personal, of the late hardware firm of E. Scott Payne & Bro., at a valuation that had been fixed by an appraisement. In December, 1897--nearly two years after the date of the decree complained of--the appellant, having been restored to sanity, was by an appropriate order of court discharged from the custody of his committee, and again placed in control of his own estate. In January, 1902--more than four years after the appellant had been restored to the control of his own estate--E. Scott Payne, the brother to whom the sale of the partnership property had been made, died intestate, leaving a widow, who became his administratrix, and one child. One year later the present suit was brought against his widow in her own right and as administratrix and his child, and they are the appellees now before us.

The substantial allegations made in the bill in the present case as the grounds of the application to have the decree of 1896 set aside for fraud are as follows: (1) That in ascertaining the value of certain of the partnership real and leasehold property on Gay street, in Baltimore City, for the purpose of the sale to E. Scott Payne, it was appraised "on the erroneous assumption" that the ordinance for the widening of Gay street would be repealed (it being then generally believed that such would be the case), whereby not only was the value of the property lessened, but the appellant lost his share of the damages which had been theretofore allowed, and were afterwards paid by the city to the purchaser when the street was in fact opened. (2) That the appraisement of the stock of merchandise was made by the appraisers upon statements rendered to them by E. Scott Payne, which "were so different from the true character and quality of the goods so appraised" as to cause the appraisal to be for less than one-half their true value. (3) That "no valuation was ascertained for the good will of the partnership," although it was in fact very valuable, and that it was thereby obtained by E. Scott Payne without compensation. (4) That certain property owned by the two brothers was ascertained by the decree of 1896 to be partnership property, "in pursuance of testimony that said property had been treated by the partners as if it was partnership property," ignoring an existing understanding and arrangement between them that it was to be treated as property held by them individually as joint tenants (5) That all of the proceedings in the case of E. Scott Payne v. R. Kemp Payne, in which the decree of 1896 was passed, had been conducted in such a way "through the influence which the said E. Scott Payne had over his brother, Wm. James Payne, who was the committee of the appellant," that the decree was arrived at and executed to the serious injury of the appellant, and in violation and fraud of his rights.

In explanation of the delay in bringing his suit, the appellant avers in the bill that he had such unbounded confidence in his brother E. Scott Payne's integrity, and in his interest in him, that it never occurred to him to question the rectitude of his brother's conduct relative to the purchase of the partnership property until a few weeks prior to filing the bill, when he was informed that a certain gentleman (not naming him) had been requested by E. Scott Payne to act as an appraiser of the partnership merchandise but that he, upon observing the method of the appraisement, had said that "the method was unfair and unjust in that the cost was estimated in such large job lots as to render it impossible to arrive at their correct value," and he had therefore declined to act as an appraiser; that the appellant, having thus had his suspicions aroused, employed counsel to examine the former case, and by that means discovered the matters hereinbefore stated. The present bill asks that the record in the case of E. Scott Payne v. R. Kemp Payne, a lunatic, in which the decree of 1896 was passed, be taken and considered as part of it; and a synopsis of the proceedings in that case, containing copies of portions thereof, appears in the present record. We must, therefore, take into consideration the contents of those proceedings in determining whether or not the present bill is demurrable. From an inspection of them it becomes apparent that the former case was an amicable suit to procure the court's ratification of the sale to E. Scott Payne of the lunatic's interest in the partnership estate on the ground that it would be for his interest and advantage. The bill in the former case averred the previous existence of the partnership, the adjudication of the lunacy of R. Kemp Payne, and the appointment and qualification of his brother, Wm. James Payne, as his committee. It contained a detailed statement of all the real and leasehold estate in question, and a reference to the record of the conveyance by which the title to each lot had been acquired, and also an allegation that all of the real and personal property had been purchased with partnership funds, and used and enjoyed as partnership property,...