Payne v. Salazar

• Decision Date: 07 September 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-5291.,09-5291.
• Citation: 619 F.3d 56
• Parties: Cassandra M. PAYNE, Appellant v. Kenneth Lee SALAZAR, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

619 F.3d 56

Cassandra M. PAYNE, Appellant

v.Kenneth Lee SALAZAR, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Appellee.

No. 09-5291.

United States Court of Appeals,District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued May 10, 2010.

Decided Sept. 7, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:08-cv-00164).

David A. Branch argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Christian A. Natiello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge:

This case raises an important and largely undecided issue under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The government contends that a federal employee who wins one Title VII claim before her agency, but loses another, must put the first at risk in order to seek relief on the second in federal court. Finding no basis for the government's interpretation of the statute, we reject that contention.

I

In Scott v. Johanns, 409 F.3d 466, 468-470 (D.C.Cir.2005), we explained the relevant statutory and regulatory framework. Before filing suit, a federal employee who believes that her agency has discriminated against her in violation of Title VII must first seek administrative adjudication of her claim. Id. at 468; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Under regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) pursuant to Title VII, the employee must do so by filing a complaint with her agency. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(a). The employing agency then conducts an investigation and, if the employee so requests, refers the matter to an EEOC administrative judge for a hearing. Id. §§ 1614.106(e)(2), 1614.108-09. After the employing agency investigates, or the administrative judge issues a decision, the employing agency must take “final action.” Id. § 1614.110. If the employee never requests a hearing, the agency's final action must “consist of findings ... on the merits of each issue ... and, when discrimination is found, appropriate remedies and relief.” Id. § 1614.110(b). If the employee requests a hearing, the employing agency's “final order shall notify the complainant whether or not the agency will fully implement the administrative judge's decision.” Id. § 1614.110(a). An employee who is aggrieved by the agency's final disposition of her complaint may then either appeal to the EEOC or file suit in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Id. § 1614.110.

Cassandra Payne has been employed by the Department of the Interior since 1978. From April 1984 until June 2000, she worked as a tractor operator at Rock Creek Park in Washington, D.C. During that period, she worked Monday through Friday and was able to attend church and Bible study on the weekends. In June 2000, Payne suffered a nearly-fatal allergic reaction to a bee sting. When she recovered, the Department reassigned her to work indoors Wednesday through Sunday at the Rock Creek Nature Center. From June 2000 through May 2004, Payne repeatedly asked her supervisor for weekends off so she could attend church and Bible study. All of her requests were denied.

In September 2004, Payne filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint with the Interior Department alleging religious discrimination. Later in September, Payne alleges, her supervisor retaliated against her for filing the EEO complaint by giving her a minute-by-minute work schedule, forbidding her to have breakfast with co-workers, and denying her leave. Based on that allegation, Payne filed a retaliation complaint, which the Department consolidated with her discrimination complaint.

On September 18, 2007, an EEOC administrative judge found that the Interior Department had discriminated against Payne on account of her religion. The administrative judge also found, however, that the Department had not retaliated against her for filing a complaint. In October 2007, the judge entered an order for monetary damages on the discrimination charge, which the Department paid in December 2007.

In January 2008, Payne filed suit in district court alleging a single claim of retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), based on the same retaliatory conduct initially alleged in her 2004 EEO complaint. In July 2008, Payne amended her suit to add a second retaliation claim based on the Interior Department's refusal in January 2008 to assign her light-duty work after she returned from an extended medical leave for a bad back. On June 22, 2009, the district court granted the Department's motion to dismiss Payne's suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Payne v. Salazar, 628 F.Supp.2d 42, 52 (D.D.C.2009).

The court dismissed Payne's first retaliation claim on the ground that she did not also sue on the discrimination claim she had won before the EEOC administrative judge. According to the court, “a federal employee who obtains a final administrative disposition that finds discrimination ... as to a portion of the allegations in the EEO Complaint, may [not] challenge in federal court just those liability findings by the EEOC that are unfavorable to the employee ... while preserving those liability findings that are favorable to her.” Id. at 45-46. Because Payne sought review only of the claim she lost before the administrative judge, the court dismissed her suit for “failure to state a claim.” Id. at 52.

The district court also dismissed Payne's second retaliation claim-which was based on the Interior Department's January 2008 refusal to assign her light-duty work-for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. Payne conceded that she had not filed this claim with the Department, but contended it was unnecessary to do so because the claim was “like or related to [her September 2004] administrative complaint.” Id. at 51. The district court rejected that contention, holding that a “ ‘Title VII plaintiff is required to exhaust his or her administrative remedies with respect to each discrete allegedly discriminatory or retaliatory act.’ ” Id. (quoting Wada v. Tomlinson, 517 F.Supp.2d 148, 183 (D.D.C.2007)). Payne timely appealed the dismissal of both claims.

II

This court reviews de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Muir v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 529 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C.Cir.2008). We consider Payne's first claim in Part II.A and her second in Part II.B.

A

The district court dismissed Payne's first retaliation claim because she did not also sue on her successful discrimination claim. The government contends that this result is dictated by “the plain language” of Title VII, which assertedly makes clear that federal court review of a final agency decision regarding an employee's EEO complaint “is an all-or-nothing proposition.” Appellee's Br. 7. We fail to discern such a proposition in the statutory text.

1. The provision of Title VII that provides federal employees with a cause of action states: “[A]n employee ... aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint ... may file a civil action.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). As the government concedes, an employee like Payne, who did not win all of the claims raised in her EEO complaint, is aggrieved by that disposition. Oral Arg. Recording 9:50-9:55. At the same time, Payne is in no sense “aggrieved by” the claim she won before her agency, and there is nothing in the text of section 2000e-16(c) that requires her to include that claim in a case she files in court. This circuit, for example, routinely hears cases brought under statutes authorizing suit by persons “aggrieved by” agency action. ¹ Petitioners in such cases challenge only the parts of agency orders that continue to aggrieve them, and we have never required such petitioners to also bring before us the parts of agency orders that they do not dispute. ²

The government is correct that “the language in the statute explicitly states that it is the final disposition of the complaint that is actionable; not of the individual claims therein.” Appellee's Br. 7. But this only means that the employee cannot sue until the agency takes final action on all of the claims contained in her administrative complaint. Cf. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (authorizing judicial review of “final agency action”); 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (authorizing appellate review of “final decisions of the district courts”). Section 2000e-16(c) does not say that, once the agency has finally disposed of the complaint, the employee must then file that same “complaint” in court. Instead, it says that she may then file a “civil action.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “govern the procedure in all civil actions” in federal district courts. Fed R. Civ. P. 1. Federal Rule 2 states that there is only “one form of action-the civil action,” and Rule 3 provides that a “civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Rule 8-which governs the content of such a complaint-requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Nothing in the Federal Rules suggests that the “complaint” filed in federal court must include all the claims the plaintiff previously raised in a complaint she filed with her agency-let alone those that were satisfactorily resolved in her favor. Indeed, a complaint filed in federal court cannot include the latter because “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press,” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006), and standing requires that the plaintiff “suffered an ‘injury in fact,’ ” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

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