Payne v. State
| Decision Date | 18 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 1649,1649 |
| Parties | KOREY VAUGH HAMILTON PAYNE v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - MOTION TO SUPPRESS - MIRANDA PROTECTIONS - VOLUNTARINESS OF POLICE INTERVIEW - CUSTODY
When asserting a violation of one's rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and its progeny, it is an appellant's burden to prove that he or she was in custody when engaging in an interview with police.
In this appeal, Payne failed to satisfy his burden of proving a custodial interrogation. He agreed to speak with police in a bedroom inside his home; he was not forced or coerced to speak with police; he was told that he was not under arrest; he was not restrained or prevented from leaving the bedroom, the interview lasted 45 minutes with only two police officers; the officers used conversational tones; and, after the conclusion of the interview and the search of the home, police left Payne's home without arresting him.
This Court agreed with the suppression court's ruling that Payne was not in custody during his interview with police, and thus, he was not subject to a custodial interrogation. Therefore, Miranda protections were inapplicable.
EVIDENCE - OTHER BAD ACTS - ADMISSIBILITY - IDENTITY EXCEPTION
In addition to evidence relating to the five charged child pornography images found on a data storage device that was in a box with three other data storage devices, the State offered brief testimony that one of the data storage devices, containing child pornography, also contained a video of Payne setting up a video recorder and masturbating next to a sleeping woman.
The admissibility of other bad acts evidence requires special relevancy and is subject to the Faulkner standard, a three-step analysis to: (1) determine if the evidence falls into a recognized exception; (2) determine whether appellant was involved in the other bad act; and (3) balance whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger of any unfair prejudice. State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634-35 (1989).
Payne's defense, asserted during opening statements and in the motion's argument, was that the storage devices were not his but were the property of another resident of the home. The State argued in satisfaction of the first prong that the testimony of the uncharged images and private video went to the identity exception, to show the jury Payne's identity and ownership of the data storage devices containing both child pornography and his personal non-child pornography images. Payne conceded that the existence of the video would satisfy the second prong.
This Court found the trial court's ruling concerning relevance and the identity exception sufficient when it permitted the brief testimony of the video's existence, but prohibited the State from displaying to the jury the video or image captured from the video.
CRIMINAL LAW - STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - LEGISLATIVE INTENT - UNIT OF PROSECUTION
When determining the Legislature's intended unit of prosecution for violations of a criminal statute, we review the plain language of the statute and explore the statutory structure and legislative history.
The plain language of Criminal Law Article § 11-208(a)(2) (2012) proscribes that "[a] person may not knowingly possess and intentionally retain a ... visual representation showing an actual child under the age of 16 years: ... engaged in sexual conduct[.]" This Court determined that the statute was clear and unambiguous in proscribing each instance of possession. Nonetheless, this Court found support from the statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law from this State and other jurisdictions.
This Court found significant the Legislature's use of the term "a" throughout the statute, qualifying each reference to a proscribed item in the singular, and its use of the phrase "actual child," denoting the importance of each singular child victim. As a result, this Court concluded that each instance of possession of an image of child pornography, as proscribed by CR § 11-208, is a discrete and independent offense and, therefore, subject to separate punishment.
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - UNIT OF PROSECUTION - RULE OF LENITY
When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply. Because Criminal Law Article § 11-208(a)(2) (2012) was clear and unambiguous as to the Legislature's intended unit of prosecution for violations of the statute, each of Payne's five convictions and sentences for possession of the five charged child pornography images of different child victims were affirmed.
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
REPORTED
Graeff, Arthur, Sharer, J., Frederick (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Sharer, J.
Having been charged with, and convicted of, five counts of possession of child pornography,1 Korey Vaugh Hamilton Payne raises three challenges to rulings of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.2
In his brief, Payne asks:
Finding neither error nor abuse of discretion by either the motions court or the trial court, we affirm the judgments of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.
Because our review does not implicate the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial, we need not recite the facts underlying the charges, other than to provide context for our discussion of the issues presented. Whitney v. State, 158 Md. App. 519, 524 (2004) (citing Craig v. State, 148 Md. App. 670, 674 n. 1 (2002)). See also, Teixeira v. State, 213 Md. App. 664, 666 (2013) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Robinson, 723 F.3d 624, 628 (6th Cir. 2013)); Washington v State, 190 Md. App. 168, 171 (2010).
Payne filed a timely motion to suppress a statement he made to police, in his home, on the day of the execution of a search warrant. He challenges the voluntariness of the statement, asserting that he was in custody at the time and that his rights under Miranda3 and its progeny had been violated when he had unequivocally invoked his right to counsel, but the police persisted in questioning him thereafter.
The suppression court conducted a hearing on April 5, 2017. In his brief, Payne has included a summary of the testimony developed at the suppression hearing, which, in its brief, the State accepts. We reproduce the summary, with occasional non-substantive editing.4
On July 29, 2016, Detective Erick Patterson, of the Anne Arundel County Police Department, executed a search warrant at Payne's home in Hanover, Anne Arundel County, where Payne lived with his mother. The execution of the warrant was in connection with a child pornography investigation. Patterson was with ten other officers who were members of the child abuse unit, the sex offense unit, and the digital forensic unit. The officers knocked on the door, announced their presence, and identified themselves as county police officers with a search warrant for the residence. Payne answered the door. The officers were dressed in Class C uniforms, consisting of navy-blue cargo work pants and a polo shirt displaying a police badge. They wore tactical or ballistic vests with "Police" on the back of the vests. They were armed with firearms, but there was no testimony that guns were ever drawn. All the officers entered the house at about the same time.
Payne was asked to step outside, where an officer stood with him while other officers went inside to determine the possibility of other occupants. Patterson testified that he did not know if Payne was handcuffed at that time.
After finding no one else in the home, Patterson met Payne in the living room. Payne was not in handcuffs and Patterson did not see Payne restrained in any way. Patterson identified himself to Payne and asked if Payne would speak with him. Patterson testified that he made Payne aware that he was not under arrest. He asked if Payne would accompany him to an upstairs bedroom for an interview. Patterson testified that he would have allowed Payne to leave if he had asked to do so.
A female officer, Detective Kristine Mays,5 was present for the interview which lasted for approximately 45 minutes. According to Patterson, Payne consented to an audio recording of the interview. Neither Patterson nor Mays drew their weapons at any time, nor did Patterson raise his voice or become aggressive during the interview.
Patterson testified that he made no promises or threats, nor did he offer Payne inducements in return for his statement. He did not detect that Payne was under the influence of any substance and he did not have concerns about Payne's mental health. Patterson advised Payne of his Miranda rights. Payne was not arrested that day and charges were not filed until October 3, 2016, more than two months later.
Smita Topiwama, Payne's neighbor, testified that, on the day of the warrant execution, she looked out from her window, and saw five or six police cars, and officers "run into the [sic] Korey's house." Her kitchen window faces Payne's front door. She saw officers taking pictures of the house before they went to the door. Significantly, she testified that she saw an officer place Payne in handcuffs.
After hearing the testimony and arguments of counsel, the court held the matter sub curia and issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order on April 24, 2017, ruling that Payne was not in custody at the time he talked with police. Therefore, the court concluded, the question involving the right to counsel was not implicated.
In its Memorandum Opinion, the court indicated a thorough review of the...
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