Payne v. Tri-State CareFlight, LLC

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
• Decision Date: 17 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. CIV 14-1044 JB/KBM,CIV 14-1044 JB/KBM
• Citation: Payne v. Tri-State CareFlight, LLC, No. CIV 14-1044 JB/KBM (D. N.M. Aug 17, 2016)
• Parties: WILLIAM D. PAYNE, NICOLE PAYNE, LESLIE B. BENSON, KEITH BASTIAN, JAQUELINE FERNANDEZ-QUEZADA, CASON N. HEARD, GREGORY OLDHAM AND SHERRY K. WELCH, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TRI-STATE CAREFLIGHT, LLC, and BLAKE A. STAMPER, Individually, Defendants.

WILLIAM D. PAYNE, NICOLE PAYNE, LESLIE B. BENSON, KEITH BASTIAN,JAQUELINE FERNANDEZ-QUEZADA, CASON N. HEARD, GREGORY OLDHAMAND SHERRY K. WELCH, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TRI-STATE CAREFLIGHT, LLC,and BLAKE A. STAMPER, Individually, Defendants.

No. CIV 14-1044 JB/KBM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

August 17, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Plaintiffs' David and Nicole Payne's Opposed Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Memorandum In Support, filed December 10, 2015 (Doc. 72)("Motion"). The Court held a hearing on January 25, 2016. The primary issues are whether the Court should deny the Motion requesting that Defendants Tri-State Careflight, LLC, and Blake A. Stamper, pay reasonable attorneys' fees to the extent that it seeks fees or costs associated with: (i) the work on class certification, class communication, or other class-related activities; and (ii) the unsuccessful "travel time" claim that Plaintiffs David Payne and Nicole Payne (collectively, "the Paynes") abandoned. The Court will grant in part and deny in part the Motion. The Court will award fees, as the Motion requests, but the requested fees will be reduced with respect to: (i) fees incurred related to class-related work; and (ii) fees or costs related to the Paynes' unsuccessful "travel time" claim. Accordingly, the Court will grant the Paynes' request that it award fees, but will exclude from the award $42,648.29 ($39,788.50 in fees and $2,859.79 in tax).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This is an age-and-hour dispute. Tri-State Careflight operates an air ambulance service in New Mexico. In this case, the Plaintiffs,¹ D. Payne and N. Payne, seek recovery for themselves and all similarly situated individuals that Tri-State Careflight employed in New Mexico at any time since June 19, 2009 for: (i) unpaid premium overtime compensation under the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-4-1 to -30 ("NMMWA"); and (ii) pay for time spent traveling to and from temporary duty locations for Tri-State Careflight's convenience on a theory of unjust enrichment. Tri-State Careflight employed W. Payne as a flight paramedic, and it employed N. Payne as a flight nurse.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Paynes filed their case in state court on September 11, 2014. See Payne v. Tri-State Careflight, LLC, D-101-CV-2014-02048 (1st Jud. Dist. Ct., Cnty. of Santa Fe, State of N.M.)(Montes, J.). The Defendants removed the case to federal court on November 17, 2014. See Notice of Removal, filed November 17, 2014 (Doc. 1)("Notice of Removal"). The Defendants invoked diversity jurisdiction, representing that there is complete diversity of citizenship between the Paynes and the Defendants. See Notice of Removal ¶ 4, at 2. In their Complaint, the Paynes asserted causes of action for: (i) NMMWA violations; and (ii) unjustenrichment. See Representative Action Complaint for Damages for Violation of New Mexico Minimum Wage Act and Unjust Enrichment at 4-5, filed November 17, 2014 (Doc. 1-1)("Complaint"). On September 4, 2015, the Paynes filed Plaintiffs' Motion for and Brief in Support of Class Certification. See Plaintiffs' Motion for and Brief in Support of Class Certification, filed September 4, 2015 (Doc. 48)("Motion for Class Certification"). The Defendants responded on October 5, 2015, see Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, filed October 5, 2015 (Doc. 58), and the Paynes replied on October 14, 2015, see Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Class Certification [Doc. 48], filed October 14, 2015 (Doc. 61). In sum, by October 14, 2015, the parties had completed briefing on the Motion for Class Certification. See Notice of Completion of Briefing, filed October 14, 2015 (Doc. 62). On October 16, 2015, the Court set a hearing on the Motion for Class Certification for January 22, 2016. See Order, filed October 16, 2015 (Doc. 65).

In late October 2015, the Paynes and the Defendants entered into settlement discussions, resulting in settlements with each of the Paynes reflected in agreements that the Paynes executed on November 19, 2015. See Motion at 4. In other words, the Defendants settled with the Paynes before the Court certified a class, but after the class certification work was complete. The terms of the settlements and the settlements themselves are confidential. See Motion at 4. The Paynes are authorized to represent, however, that, through the settlements, they obtained all relief available to them on their NMMWA claims. See Motion at 4. The settlement agreements also provided that the Defendants would pay the Paynes' reasonable attorney's fees and costs. See Motion at 4. The parties agreed to attempt to negotiate fees and costs, but stipulated that the Paynes would apply to the Court for fees and costs should no agreement be reached. See Motionat 4. On November 5, 2015, counsel provided the Defendants' counsel with a fee statement including all of its fees incurred in representing the Paynes up through October 31, 2015. See Motion at 4. On November 30, 2015, the Defendants' counsel indicated that they would not agree to pay the fees reflected in the November 5, 2015 fee statement, because that statement included fees incurred in prosecuting the case as a class action. See Motion at 4.

1. The Motion.

Because the parties did not reach an agreement, the Paynes filed the Motion on December 10, 2015. See Motion at 1-4. The Paynes argue that, pursuant to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50-4-26(E), a successful claimant under the NMMWA is entitled to reasonable fees and costs. See Motion at 4. The Paynes assert that there is no dispute that they are entitled to fees and costs under this provision, because the settlements into which they entered awarded them full relief on their NMMWA claims. See Motion at 4-5. According to the Paynes, "[t]he only issue before the Court is how much in fees and costs should be awarded." Motion at 5. The Paynes explain that they seek $110,032.00 in fees, $1,659.33 in costs, and $8,027 in required gross receipts tax, for a total of $119,719.14. See Motion at 5. The Paynes further write:

Lead counsel Christopher M. Moody expended 224 hours on the litigation at a rate of $350.00 per hour. Repps D. Stanford, also a partner at the Moody & Warner law firm, devoted 45.5 hours on the litigation at a rate of $300.00 per hour. Associate attorney Alice Kilborn spent 27 hours on the case at $175.00 per hour and paralegals Anne M. Chavez and Chelsea Buldain devoted 45.6 hours and 101.7 hours to the case respectively at $90.00 per hour. The only costs sought are the filing fee ($297.00) and court reporter charges for the depositions of the Paynes and Tri-State ($1,362.33).

Motion at 5-6. The Plaintiffs contend that counsel are entitled to reasonable hourly compensation based upon prevailing market rates, which is "what lawyers of comparable skill and experience practicing in the area in which the litigation occurs will charge for their time."

Motion at 6 (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983)). They attach Mr. Moody's and Mr. Stanford's declarations detailing their experience, billing rates, and the reasonableness of the fees incurred in this case. See Motion at 6. They also submit the Declaration of Bryan J. Davis, filed December 10, 2015 (Doc. 72-3)("Davis Decl."), an attorney in the community with knowledge of prevailing hourly rates and fees. See Motion at 6.²

The Paynes next argue that they obtained full relief and the quality of counsels' performance in the case supports the requested hourly rates that they seek. See Motion at 6. They assert that the principal issue that the Court must address is "whether fees incurred in prosecuting this case as a class/representative action, as opposed to the Paynes solely pursuing individual claims, are recoverable." Motion at 6. The Paynes write:

The Paynes initiated this case as a class/representative action and pursued it on that basis for well over one year before settling their claims on an individual basis. As previously stated in Sections I & II, this case proceeded all along as a class/representative case. After the completion of class discovery and the filing of a motion for class certification, only then did Defendants pursue, albeit belatedly, a strategy of "picking off" the Paynes prior to class certification in this case in an effort to put a stop to the case before it had to confront the inevitable reality of a certified class under the "lenient" standards articulated in Armijo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2007-NMCA-120, ¶¶ 48, 50. The Paynes faced the reality that rejecting a settlement offer pre-class certification might still moot out their claims or that the Court might require them to accept the offer. Of course, hadDefendants waited until after class certification, no settlement would have been possible without the involvement of and approval by the Court.

Motion at 6-7 (citations omitted). The Paynes argue that the Defendants waited for over a year while they were litigating this case as a class action before initiating settlement discussions with them. See Motion at 7. They assert that, as a result, they incurred fees prosecuting the case as a class action, but the Defendants hope to avoid paying those fees, "no matter how reasonably incurred and no matter that Defendants billed their client for the same legal services." Motion at 7.

The Paynes insist that, when a plaintiff files a case as a class case and proceeds to litigate it on that basis, "it is well recognized that fees may be incurred that would not be incurred were the case solely an individual case[.]" Motion at 7-8 (citing Johnson v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 276 F.R.D. 330, 332 (D. Minn. 2011)(Keyes, J.)). They contend that the Defendants knew that the time before the certification of the class is the most expensive when they agreed to pay fees, and argue that ...