Payne v. Universal Recovery, Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:11-CV-1672-D-BH,3:11-CV-1672-D-BH |
| Parties | ROGER PAYNE, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSAL RECOVERY, INC., et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Pursuant to Special Order No. 3-251, this case has been referred for pretrial management. Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Hold Case in Abeyance, filed August 19, 2011 (doc. 19), and Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, filed August 24, 2011 (doc. 21). Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the motion to hold the case in abeyance should be DENIED, and the motion to dismiss should be GRANTED in part if Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the allotted time, or DENIED as moot if Plaintiff timely files an amended complaint .
On November 29, 2010, counsel for plaintiff Roger Payne (Plaintiff) filed Civil Action No. 3:10-CV-2411-D (Payne I) against Universal Recovery, Inc. (Universal), and Bradley J. Davis, claiming that they failed to pay Plaintiff minimum and overtime wages in violation of sections 6 and 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207. (doc. 1.) On December 16, 2010, counsel dismissed the action without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). (doc. 8.) On May 16, 2011, Plaintiff filed a pro se motion to reinstate the action, alleging that he had dismissed the action based upon representations from the defendants' employee, Becky Richardson, that she would write him a check for wages due him and that he would not be fired for initiating the action. (doc. 9.) He alleged that the defendants terminated him in retaliation for bringing the action on December 17, 2010, the day following his dismissal of the action. (Id.) He also alleged that Davis and his employees Richardson, Sabrina Miller, Jennifer Wright, and Angela "Doe" conspired to prevent him from receiving unemployment benefits by falsifying the reason for his termination. (Id.) The Court construed the motion to reinstate as a motion under Rule 60(b) and denied it. (doc. 15.) The Court explained that Plaintiff had failed to establish a right to relief under Rule 60(b), and had at most shown a basis to file a new lawsuit based on conduct occurring on or about December 17, 2010. (Id.) Plaintiff's appeal of the ruling to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is now pending. (doc. 16.)
On July 14, 2011, Plaintiff filed this pro se action (Payne II) against Universal, Davis, Richardson, Miller, Wright, and Angela Orta (Defendants), alleging retaliatory termination under the FLSA, failure to pay minimum and overtimes wages in violation of sections 6 and 7 of the FLSA, and a conspiracy to violate his rights to equal protection of the laws and his right to unemployment benefits in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2)-(3) and 2000a-2. (doc. 2, pp. 1-5.) He alleges that he worked for Defendants from January 12, 2010, until December 17, 2010, as a "repo driver/caller." (Id. at 2.) While there, he allegedly worked a minimum of 60 hours per week for four weeks without getting paid and did not get paid for hours he worked from May 2010 to October 2010. (Id. at 2, 18.) He alleges that on December 15, 2010, after he filed Payne I in this Court, Richardson allegedly told him that, she would write him a check for his unpaid wages and he would not lose his job. (Id.) He dismissed the action on December 16, 2010, allegedly based on this conversation. (Id. at 2.) On December 17, 2010, however, Miller informed him that she had been instructed to fire him and escort him out of the property. (Id. at 2.) She also stated that she had $500 severance pay for him, "if and only if" he signed what she presented as a Hold Harmless agreement. (Id. at 2, 18.) He accepted the $500 and signed the Hold Harmless agreement, allegedly under duress, and left the property. (Id. at 2.) The agreement1 stated that Plaintiff released Universal, its employees, owners, and any related entities from "all liabilities" and agreed "to settle all actions and causes of actions against each other present and future known and unknown." (Id. at 8.) It also stated that if either party instituted any legal proceeding against the other, the party covenanted to have it dismissed at that party's own cost with express prejudice to bringing further proceedings against the other party arising out of the same matter. (Id.) The agreement stated that Plaintiff had received $500 gross severance pay in cash to settle and resolve the matter. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that around December 17, 2010, he applied for unemployment benefits from the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC). (Id. at 2, 18.) Defendants then allegedly attempted to deprive him of those benefits by sending several false statements to the TWC. (Id. at 2, 18-19.) The statements, attached to Plaintiff's complaint, assert among other things, that he was fired for not getting any cars, showing up late for work and for required meetings, working on other people's assignments instead of his own, making and receiving personal calls at work, and making personal use of the internet at work. (Id. at 10-16.) Plaintiff alleges that the TWC found these statements not credible and awarded him unemployment benefits. (Id. at 2, 19.) TWC's Wage and Hour Division also allegedly concluded that Defendants had violated the provisions of the Texas Payday Law when they failed to pay his earned wages. (Id. at 19.)
Plaintiff now moves to stay this action pending the disposition of the appeal of his first case. (doc. 19.) Defendants oppose the stay (doc. 24) and move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against them under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (doc. 21). The motions are now ripe for consideration.
Plaintiff moves to stay this action pending the disposition of his appeal to the Fifth Circuit. (Mot. Br. at 1-2.) He argues that it would be in the interest of judicial economy to defer any decision that might be made in Payne II until the Fifth Circuit reaches a decision on the merits of his appeal in Payne I. (Id. at 2.) He asserts that as a practical matter, his allegations of unfair labor practices should go forward as one civil action, especially since the allegations evolve from one continuous incident involving the same parties. (Id.) Defendants respond that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim and there is no substantive reason to abate this suit while he pursues his appeal. (Resp. at 2.)
"The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket." Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706-07 (1997) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); see also Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2901, Vol. 11, p. 491 (West 1995) ("Stays prior to judgement, to await a decision in another forum, or for some other purpose . . . are left to the inherent power of the court"). While the district court possesses the authority to regulate its flow of cases, this authority is largely unreviewable and must not be abused. Coastal (Bermuda) Ltd. v. E.W. Saybolt & Co., 761 F.2d 198, 204 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983). "Where a discretionary stay is proposed, something close to genuine necessity should be the mother of its invocation." Coastal, 761 F.2d at 204 n.6. "Generally, the moving party bears a heavy burden to show why a stay should be granted absent statutory authorization, and a court should tailor its stay so as not to prejudice other litigants unduly." Id.
Here, Plaintiff essentially argues that it is in the interest of judicial economy to stay Payne II until the Fifth Circuit reinstates Payne I and to then consolidate it with Payne II for decision. Aside from his general assertion of judicial economy, however, Plaintiff has failed to show a genuine necessity for the proposed stay. A discretionary stay of the proceedings should be denied.
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's FLSA and conspiracy claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (Mot. Br. at 1-2.) They argue that Plaintiff has failed to make sufficient factual allegations to support the claims and has failed to allege facts to support his contention that the Hold Harmless Agreement is not a valid release of his claims against them. (Id. at 3-5.)
A. 12(b)(6) Standard
Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are disfavored and rarely granted. Sosa v. Coleman, 646 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1981). Under the 12(b)(6) standard, a court cannot look beyond the pleadings. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). Pleadings must show specific, well-pleaded facts, not mere conclusory allegations to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). The court must accept those well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker, 75 F.3d at 196. "[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the alleged] facts is improbable, and 'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citation omitted). Although "detailed factual allegations" are not necessary, a plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555; accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (). The alleged facts must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In short, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it...
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