Payne v. Wallace
| Decision Date | 14 August 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 25991.,25991. |
| Citation | 136 Idaho 303,32 P.3d 695 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | James R. PAYNE and Diana J. Payne, husband and wife, Stacie Rachelle Payne, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Michael F. WALLACE, individually, Defendant-Respondent. |
Nielson & Reece, P.L.L.C., Pocatello, for appellant. Norman G. Reece Jr. argued.
Cooper Larsen, Pocatello, for respondent. Gary L. Cooper argued.
This action arises from an automobile accident. Plaintiffs James R. Payne and Diana J. Payne, husband and wife, and their daughter, Stacie Rachelle Payne, appeal the district court's denial of their motion to amend their complaint to include a claim for punitive damages and the district court's order granting a directed verdict in favor of defendant Michael Wallace on Stacie Payne's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In addition, they challenge the district court's disposition of the parties' respective requests for costs and attorney fees.
Automobiles driven by Diana Payne and Michael Wallace collided in an intersection after Wallace failed to stop at a stop sign. Diana sustained injuries to her left arm and the right side of her chest, and experienced pain in her hips, as a result of the accident. Stacie, then eight years old, was in the front passenger seat of the Payne vehicle. She did not suffer any physical injuries.
Immediately after the collision, Wallace exited his vehicle and in a belligerent manner began yelling profanities and blaming Diana for the accident. Diana and a bystander, Travis Holt, later testified that Wallace approached the Paynes' vehicle as he was yelling vulgarities but was stopped by Holt. Holt testified that Wallace tried to approach the Paynes twice, and that Holt intercepted Wallace both times. The evidence is in conflict as to how many times Wallace resumed his belligerent shouting, but Diana Payne testified that he repeated this behavior four or five times. The Paynes did not exit their vehicle until the police arrived, by which time Wallace had calmed down. The Paynes filed an action against Wallace in which they sought damages for Diana's physical injuries, James's loss of consortium, and Stacie's emotional distress allegedly sustained as a result of Wallace's aggressive, profane shouting. The Paynes moved for leave to amend their complaint to allege a claim for punitive damages pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1604(2), but the district court denied the motion. Wallace initially denied liability, but on the day before the trial, Wallace's attorney gave notice that Wallace would admit his negligence and concede liability for the accident. Therefore, the trial proceeded on the issues of the extent of Diana's physical injuries and recoverable damages, James's claim for loss of consortium, and Stacie's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
At the close of plaintiffs' trial evidence, the district court granted a motion by Wallace for a directed verdict on Stacie's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Paynes renewed their motion to add a claim for punitive damages, but this motion was denied. The jury thereafter returned a verdict awarding damages of $1,948.51 for Diana's injuries but rejected James's loss of consortium claim.
The first issue on appeal is whether the district court committed error in granting a directed verdict in favor of Wallace on Stacie's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. A directed verdict dismissing a claim is permissible only if there is no substantial evidence upon which the jury could find in favor of the claimant. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 253, 678 P.2d 41, 45 (1984); Curtis v. DeAtley, 104 Idaho 787, 789, 663 P.2d 1089, 1091 (1983). A claim must be submitted to the jury if the evidence is of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the claimant was proper. Elce v. State, 110 Idaho 361, 363, 716 P.2d 505, 507 (1986); All v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 109 Idaho 479, 480, 708 P.2d 884, 885 (1985).
A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress will lie only when there has been extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant and resultant severe emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff. Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 741, 682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Ct.App.1984). The four elements of this tort are: 1) the defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless; 2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; 3) there was a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's emotional distress; and 4) the emotional distress was severe. Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 774, 890 P.2d 714, 725 (1995); Davis, supra. We find it unnecessary to address the first three of these elements, for we agree with the district court's assessment that there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the fourth element, severe emotional distress.
Although it is not necessary to show that the plaintiff's emotional distress resulted in a physical manifestation, Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 601, 850 P.2d 749, 752 (1993), liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress arises only when the emotional reactions are "so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it." Davis, supra. In Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 220, 796 P.2d 87, 97 (1990), and Davis, the Idaho courts adopted the following commentary from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS to describe the severity of the emotional distress that is necessary to support recovery for this tort:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the emotional distress has in fact resulted, and where it is severe. Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises. Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living among people. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965).
With respect to Stacie's claim for emotional distress, Diana testified that during Wallace's initial tirade, Stacie screamed, and each time Wallace resumed yelling insults, Stacie became fearful and began crying again. Stacie told her mother that she was afraid of Wallace. Diana testified that she was able to calm her daughter down after each of Wallace's outbursts. Stacie was a witness at trial. When asked to describe how Wallace's behavior made her feel, she responded that it made her "angry and sad" and that she was afraid that Wallace was going to do something to hurt her and her mother. The only other evidence of Stacie's emotional distress was testimony that Stacie had a sleep disturbance the night following the accident and that she had a continuing aversion to the intersection where the accident occurred. Diana testified that on the night of the accident, Stacie cried out in her sleep several times, and when Diana twice went into Stacie's room to investigate, she found Stacie tossing, yelling and crying in her sleep. There was no evidence that Stacie's sleep problem continued beyond that first night, and the only evidence of any continuing emotional reaction was testimony that she has an aversion to traveling through the intersection. This evidence is insufficient to demonstrate the severe emotional suffering that is required to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
We are not unmindful of Stacie's tender age at the time of the incident. A child victim's age and attendant vulnerability are factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant's conduct was sufficiently outrageous or reckless to give rise to liability, and a child may suffer severe anguish from conduct that would not be likely to cause such reactions in an adult. However, the victim's age does not lessen the requirement that her actual distress be severe. In the case before us, the district court correctly granted Wallace's motion for a directed verdict on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the evidence does not show that Wallace's distasteful behavior caused severe emotional distress to Stacie.
By terms of Idaho Code § 6-1604(2), a party may present a request for punitive damages only with leave of the trial court. The court must allow an amendment of the pleadings to state a prayer for punitive damages "if the moving party establishes ... a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages." I.C. § 6-1604(2). The Paynes contend that the egregiousness of Wallace's behavior was sufficient to warrant presenting a punitive damages claim to the jury and that the district court therefore erred in denying the Paynes' motion to present such a claim.
An award of punitive damages is permissible only where the defendant's conduct was "oppressive, fraudulent, wanton, malicious or outrageous." I.C. § 6-1604. In Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 665 P.2d 661 (1983), the Idaho Supreme Court described the circumstances necessary to justify punitive damages:
An award of punitive damages will be sustained on appeal only when it is shown that the defendant acted in a manner that was "an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act was performed by the defendant with an...
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