Payton v. Lamp
| Decision Date | 15 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. ELH-15-3863 |
| Parties | LEVAR PAYTON, #411-397 Plaintiff v. OFFICER LAMP, CLOTHING ROOM Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff Levar Payton, a prisoner incarcerated within the Maryland Division of Correction ("DOC") and housed at North Branch Correctional Institution ("NBCI"), filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking money damages1 from the defendant, Officer Joseph Lamp, a correctional supply officer at NBCI. ECF 1. In his unverified Complaint, Payton alleges that Lamp refused to provide him with appropriate clothing and shoes, provided mildewed sheets and a jumpsuit, and on one occasion during a clothing exchange slammed Payton's hand in the feed slot while using vulgar, sexually inappropriate language. ECF 1.
Lamp has filed an unopposed motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. ECF 7.2 It is supported by a memorandum (ECF 7-1) (collectively, the"Motion") and several exhibits.
No hearing is needed to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the reasons that follow, I shall construe the Motion as one for summary judgment and shall grant it.
Payton is housed in segregation, and his ability to obtain clothing and hygiene material is restricted. NBCI segregation prisoners may exchange two tee shirts, two pairs of underwear, and two pairs of socks every six to eight months upon request. ECF 7-4 (DOC Clothing Directive), at 2.3 On January 6, 2015, Payton received, as requested, four undershirts, three undershorts, two pairs of socks, a pair of shoes, two pairs of thermal underwear, four newspapers, two towels, two washcloths, four pens, one comb, one toothbrush, a cap, two toothbrushes, toothpaste, six bars of soap, a plastic soap dish, twelve packets of shampoo, two packets of deodorant, twelve packets of shaving cream, a bowl, a cup, three rolls of toilet paper, and a sheet set. ECF 7-3 (Declaration of Randy Durst, Correctional Case Manager II), at 2.
In August of 2015, Payton placed an order to exchange socks, tee shirts, and boxer underwear. ECF 7-5 (Declaration of Joseph Lamp). On August 11, 2015, he received two pairs of socks and two tee shirts. However, because the clothing room was out of boxers in Payton's size, he was not provided with the requested underwear. Id.
On November 24, 2015, Payton filed an administrative remedy procedure ("ARP") request, claiming that he had been requesting underwear monthly for six months, yet had not received new underwear. ECF 7-3 (ARP NBCI-2517-15 Response dated 12/29/15), at 4-5. An investigation undertaken in response to the ARP determined that Payton requested a clothingexchange for boxer underwear in August of 2015, but the prison supply department was out of stock. Payton did receive socks and tee shirts on August 11, 2015, and received the boxers plus a knit hat on December 8, 2015. Additional socks and tee shirts were later denied because the prison was on lock-down and the assistant warden indicated that used clothing could be exchanged for new clothing only after a period of six to eight months, pursuant to an institutional directive. ECF 7-3 at 4; ECF 7-4 at 2.
Payton filed an additional ARP on December 5, 2015, stating that he had no shoes and no clothing, except a "filth[y] orange suit," and that his bedding was mildewed. ECF 7-3, ARP NBCI-2518-15 at 8-9. The ARP Coordinator dismissed the ARP on December 22, 2015, and instructed Payton to resubmit it with additional information. Id. Payton did not resubmit the ARP, nor did he appeal the decision to the Commissioner of Correction. ECF 7-6 (Declaration of Christina Ripps, Correctional Case Management Specialist), at ¶ 2.
On December 8, 2015, Lamp went to Payton's cell, opened the slot, and handed Payton his December clothing request slip, which Payton signed and returned. ECF 7-3 at 12 (Report of J. Lamp, dated 12/8/15). Lamp then handed Payton two new pairs of extra-large boxers and an extra-large knit hat, as requested. Id. at 13; ECF 7-4 (ARP NBCI-2517-15), at ¶ 4. The sneakers, blue jeans, and shirt that Payton had requested were not provided, however, because Payton was in disciplinary segregation. ECF 7-3 at 12-13. Payton and Lamp argued over the clothing that had not been provided, and Payton refused to allow Lamp to close the slot. Id. Lamp informed the control center officer about the situation, and was instructed to place a security shield in front of Payton's cell. Id.
Lamp denies that he ever assaulted Payton in any way, used vulgar sexual verbal insults against Payton, or tried to slam Payton's hand in the slot. Lamp Decl., ECF 7-5 at ¶ 5.Moreover, Payton never filed allegations with NBCI's Prison Rape Elimination Act ("PREA") compliance office concerning any inappropriate sexual insults directed at him by Lamp or other NBCI staff. ECF 7-7 (), at ¶¶ 1, 3-5.
Defendant's motion is styled as a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A motion styled in this manner implicates the court's discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kensington Vol. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Montgomery County, 788 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436-37 (D. Md. 2011). Ordinarily, a court "is not to consider matters outside the pleadings or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a motion to dismiss." Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, in its discretion, may consider matters outside of the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(d). If the court does so, "the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56," and "[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, when the movant expressly captions its motion "in the alternative" as one for summary judgment, and submits matters outside the pleadings for the court's consideration, the parties are deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur; the court "does not have an obligation to notify parties of the obvious." Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998).4
A district judge has "complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it." 5 C WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004, 2011 Supp.). This discretion "should be exercised with great caution and attention to the parties' procedural rights." Id. at 149. In general, courts are guided by whether consideration of extraneous material "is likely to facilitate the disposition of the action," and "whether discovery prior to the utilization of the summary judgment procedure" is necessary. Id. at 165, 167.
Summary judgment is generally inappropriate "where the parties have not had an opportunity for reasonable discovery." E.I. du Pon de Nemours v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448-49 (4th Cir. 2011). However, "the party opposing summary judgment 'cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that party has made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was needed for discovery.'" Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996)). To raise adequately the issue that discovery is needed, the non-movant typically must file an affidavit or declaration pursuant to Rule 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f)), explaining why, "for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition," without needed discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); see Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244-45 () And, "to justify a denial of summary judgment on the grounds that additional discovery is necessary, the facts identified in a Rule 56 affidavit must be 'essential to [the] opposition.'" Scott v. NuvellFin. Servs., LLC, 789 F. Supp. 2d 637, 641 (D. Md. 2011) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). A non-moving party's Rule 56(d) request for additional discovery is properly denied "where the additional evidence sought for discovery would not have by itself created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment." Strag v. Bd. of Trs., Craven Cmty. Coll., 55 F.3d 943, 954 (4th Cir. 1995); see Amirmokri v. Abraham, 437 F. Supp. 2d 414, 420 (D. Md. 2006), aff'd, 266 Fed. Appx. 274 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 885 (2008).
If a non-moving party believes that further discovery is necessary before consideration of summary judgment, the party who fails to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit does so at his peril, because "'the failure to file an affidavit . . . is itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim that the opportunity for discovery was inadequate.'" Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244 (citations omitted). But, the non-moving party's failure to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit cannot obligate a court to issue a summary judgment ruling that is obviously premature. Although the Fourth Circuit has placed "'great weight'" on the Rule 56(d) affidavit, and has said that a mere "'reference to Rule 56(f) [now Rule 56(d)] and the need for additional discovery in a memorandum of law in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is not an adequate substitute for [an] affidavit,'" the appellate court has "not always insisted" on a Rule 56(d) affidavit. Id. (internal citations omitted). According to the Fourth Circuit, failure to file an affidavit may be excused "if the nonmoving party has adequately informed the district court that the motion is...
To continue reading
Request your trial