Pazaras v. Onondaga Cnty.
| Decision Date | 25 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | 5:14–CV–1227 |
| Citation | 152 F.Supp.3d 84 |
| Parties | Mary Beth Pazaras, Plaintiff, v. Onondaga County, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Office of James D. Hartt, Attorney for Plaintiff, 70 Linden Oaks, 3rd Floor, Rochester, NY 14625, James D. Hartt, Esq.
Onondaga County Dep't of Law, Attorneys for Defendant, John H. Mulroy Civic Center, 421 Montgomery Street, 10th Floor, Syracuse, NY 13202, Carol L. Rhinehart, Esq.
After a 911 dispatch center call ended with a house fire fatality, the dispatch center engaged in a six month long internal investigation into the event. During the ongoing internal investigation, plaintiff Mary Beth Pazaras, one of the subjects of said investigation, filed gender discrimination complaints against the 911 dispatch center. This is the unfortunate backdrop of the instant action.
Defendant Onondaga County employed plaintiff as a Public Safety Dispatcher at its Department of Emergency Communications Control Center. Plaintiff filed this Title VII action, alleging that her employer retaliated against her for filing gender discrimination complaints with the Onondaga County Department of Personnel and the New York State Division of Human Rights. That is the only cause of action.
Defendant has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Plaintiff opposed. Oral argument was heard in Utica, N.Y. on January 8, 2016. Decision was reserved.
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed.
Defendant is a municipal corporation and operates the Department of Emergency Communications Control Center (“E–911” or “dispatch center”). Plaintiff commenced her employment at E–911 in 1997, as a Public Safety Telecommunicator. In 1999, she was promoted to civil service Public Safety Dispatcher (“PSD”). Plaintiff has an unremarkable disciplinary history, aside from an oral reprimand for calling a male employee an “ignorant asshole” in 2007 or 2008.
The Commissioner of the 911 dispatch center is responsible for the operation of the call center, establishing and implementing policies and procedures with respect to fire, police and emergency dispatch, and managing necessary staff. Like all employees, plaintiff is required to adhere to E–911 Policy and Procedure Directives Manual, and Onondaga County Work Rules. In accordance with these directives, plaintiff may be subject to disciplinary action. Plaintiff's employment is governed by the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between defendant and the Onondaga Local 834 of Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (“CSEA”).
As noted, the instant action stems from a house fire call on November 29, 2012 that ended with a fatality. Plaintiff was the County Fire/EMS Dispatcher on the call. Shortly after the November 29 event, a Quality Assurance Review (“QAR”) was conducted per E911 policy. The QAR identified a delay in dispatching appropriate fire resources by plaintiff.1 As a result of the QAR, the Commissioner asked the Public Safety Shift Supervisor (“PSSS”) to conduct a fact-finding investigation. The PSSS returned his report to the Commissioner on December 3, 2012, recommending a full internal investigation of the event based upon his finding of “a nearly five minute delay” in dispatching appropriate fire resources. Def.'s Stmt. Mat. Facts, at ¶ 15.
On January 10, 2013, plaintiff was notified that she was the subject of an internal investigation. On May 7, 2013, defendant alleges plaintiff received an email from the Commissioner, expressing his intention to interview her within a few weeks. Plaintiff disputes this fact, and instead contends that the Commissioner indicated that the investigation was “wrapped up” by May 7. Pl.'s Stmt. Mat. Facts, at ¶ 18.
On June 14, 2013, plaintiff filed an employee harassment and gender discrimination complaint with the Onondaga County Department of Personnel. Plaintiff also filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”) on the same day.
Plaintiff was finally interviewed by the Deputy Commissioner on July 1, 2013, with respect to the November 29, 2012 house fire call. On August 29, 2013, the Commissioner concluded the internal investigation. The investigation found that plaintiff “had violated Department policy and procedure, and work place rules, and [the Commissioner] recommended that disciplinary action be taken with respect to plaintiff.” Def.'s Stmt. Mat. Facts, at ¶ 23. The investigation also found fault with plaintiff's shift supervisor, and recommended disciplinary action based upon that individual's violations of department policy and procedure. Defendant contends that the Commissioner next consulted with the Onondaga County Law Department and Department of Personnel regarding the investigation and recommendation.
On December 2, 2013, after completing its investigation, NYSDHR returned a determination. NYSDHR found no probable cause to believe defendant had engaged in the gender discriminatory practices complained of by plaintiff and dismissed her June 14, 2013 complaint. Defendant contends that it received the determination on December 5, 2013, but plaintiff disputes this fact.
On December 3, 2013, defendant issued a written reprimand to plaintiff for her action regarding the November 29, 2012 house fire call. The reprimand was issued within the 15–month statutory time frame set forth in the CBA, and plaintiff challenged this disciplinary action, pursuant to the terms of the CBA. On January 28, 2014, plaintiff filed a second complaint with NYSDHR and EEOC, alleging discrimination based on retaliation. Thereafter, CBA arbitration hearings were conducted on January 15, May 15, and June 8, 2014.
Plaintiff commenced this civil action on October 7, 2014. On September 7, 2015, the arbitrator issued a decision that found plaintiff was, in fact, guilty of the charges alleged in the written reprimand, and that said reprimand was appropriate. At the time of this action, plaintiff is still employed as a PSD by defendant at E–911.
The entry of summary judgment is warranted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) ); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is “material” for purposes of this inquiry if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; see also Jeffreys v. City of N.Y., 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir.2005). Such a fact is genuinely in dispute only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of identifying those portions of the record that the moving party believes demonstrate the absence of genuine issue of material fact as to a dispositive issue. Celotex, 477 at 323. If the movant is able to establish a prima facie basis for summary judgment, the burden of production shifts to the party opposing summary judgment, who must produce evidence establishing the existence of a factual dispute that a reasonable jury could resolve in its favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Indeed, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Importantly, a court considering a motion for summary judgment “cannot try issues of fact; it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried.” Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 36–37 (2d Cir.1994) (citations omitted). In making this determination, a court resolves any ambiguities or inferences to be made from the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Jeffreys, 426 F.3d at 553.
At the summary judgment stage, Title VII claims are evaluated under the three part “pretext” or McDonnell Douglas analysis. Hicks v. Bains, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir.2010) ; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973).
The burden shifting analysis begins by requiring the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by a preponderance of the evidence. See Hicks, 593 F.3d at 164. Plaintiff's burden in this regard is “de minimis.” Id. Plaintiff must show: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) defendant was aware of said activity; (3) an employment action or decision that was adverse to plaintiff; and (4) a casual link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 552 (2d Cir.2010).
Once plaintiff establishes each essential element of retaliation, the...
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