Pazol v. Tough Mudder Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-40010-TSH |
| Parties | Lisa C. PAZOL, Maria C. Newman, Lisa Russ, and Audrey J. Bennet, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TOUGH MUDDER INCORPORATED, Tough Mudder, LLC, and BK Bridge Events, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Barry M. Altman, Altman & Altman, Wilmington, MA, James L. O'Connor, Jr., Patrick J. Osborne, Nickless Phillips & O'Connor, Fitchburg, MA, for Plaintiffs.
Michael J. Tuteur, Michael Thompson, Olivia B. Luckett, Foley & Lardner, LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket Nos. 18 & 25)
HILLMAN, D.J.
Lisa C. Pazol, Maria A. Newman, Lisa Russ, and Audrey J. Bennet ("Plaintiffs") bring this action asserting several claims against Tough Mudder Inc. ("Tough Mudder") resulting from its failure to hold an event in the advertised location and the subsequent mediation of those claims, which resulted in a settlement.
Tough Mudder now moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract (Count I), breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count II), unjust enrichment (Count (III), violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (Counts IV and VII), and declaratory judgment (Count VIII). For the reasons stated below, Tough Mudder's motion (Docket No. 18) is granted.
In addition, Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on breach of the settlement agreement (Count V). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' motion (Docket No. 25) is also granted. As explained below, however, the Court will not rescind the parties' settlement agreement.
Plaintiffs registered and paid to participate in Tough Mudder's Boston-area "Mudderella" obstacle course event, scheduled to take place on September 6, 2014 in Haverhill, Massachusetts. Just days before the event, Tough Mudder moved the location to Westbrook, Maine. Plaintiffs were unable to attend, and Tough Mudder refused to refund their registration fees.
When registering for the Mudderella Boston event on the Tough Mudder website, each of the Plaintiffs agreed to the "Participant Assumption of Risk, Waiver of Liability, and Indemnity Agreement." (Docket No. 10-3, at 6-12). That agreement contained an agreement to arbitrate claims, reading in relevant part:
Mediation and Arbitration: In the event of a legal issue, I agree to engage in good faith efforts to mediate any dispute that might arise. Any agreement reached will be formalized by a written contractual agreement at that time. Should the issue not be resolved by mediation, I agree that all disputes, controversies, or claims arising out of my participation in the Mudderella event shall be submitted to binding arbitration.
In November 2014, Plaintiffs served their complaint on Tough Mudder. Tough Mudder removed the case to this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Tough Mudder asserted that removal was proper under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), which permits federal courts to adjudicate class actions asserting state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). This Court found jurisdiction proper under CAFA, granted Tough Mudder's motion to compel mediation and arbitration, and denied Plaintiffs' motion to remand. Pazol v. Tough Mudder Inc. , 100 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D. Mass. 2015). On appeal, the First Circuit reversed and held that this Court did not have jurisdiction because the amount in controversy was insufficient to warrant CAFA jurisdiction, and consequently, reversed this Court's ruling on Plaintiffs' motion to remand. Pazol v. Tough Mudder Inc. , 819 F.3d 548 (1st Cir. 2016). The First Circuit did not reach the arbitration issue. Id. at 551.
In Worcester Superior Court, Tough Mudder again moved to compel arbitration. On January 24, 2017, that court dismissed Plaintiffs' action and compelled individual mediation and arbitration of Plaintiffs' claims. On May 7, 2018, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed. Pazol v. Tough Mudder Inc. , 93 Mass. App. Ct. 1109, 103 N.E.3d 1237 (2018). The Appeals Court reasoned that "[n]othing in the setting of its execution suggests that the arbitration provision was procedurally unconscionable." Id. Further, when discussing the scope of the arbitration agreement, the court noted that "[i]n a number of contexts, we have construed the phrase ‘arising out of’ and similar phrases ... in an arbitration clause as constituting ‘broad’ language that invokes the FAA's ... presumption in favor of arbitration" Id. (quoting Warfield v. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc. , 454 Mass. 390, 396-397, 910 N.E.2d 317 (2009) ). The Supreme Judicial Court subsequently denied Plaintiffs' application for further appellate review. 480 Mass. 1104, 104 N.E.3d 665 (2018).
While Plaintiffs' application for further appellate review was pending, the parties agreed to mediate their claims. That mediation resulted in a settlement agreement mandating that Tough Mudder pay Plaintiffs $ 225,000 on or before November 26, 2018. (Docket No. 10-3, at 16-27). Tough Mudder, however, failed to make the payment when it became due.
Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion in the Worcester Superior Court for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) seeking to enjoin Tough Mudder from dissipating its assets or from forming a new company. On January 7, 2019, Plaintiffs moved to amend their Complaint to include several new counts related to Tough Mudder's breach of the settlement agreement. On January 11, 2019, that motion was allowed by a Superior Court Judge.
On January 10, 2019, Tough Mudder removed to this Court on the grounds of diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441. On February 1, 2019, Tough Mudder filed this motion to dismiss several of Plaintiffs' claims.
A defendant may move to dismiss, based solely on the complaint, for the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege "a plausible entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although detailed factual allegations are not necessary to survive a motion to dismiss, the standard "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "The relevant inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of the inference of liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to draw from the facts alleged in the complaint." Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset , 640 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011).
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc. , 199 F.3d 68, 68 (1st Cir. 2000). It is a "context-specific task" to determine "whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief," one that "requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ). On the other hand, a court may not disregard properly pled factual allegations, "even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows, based on the materials in the record, "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A factual dispute precludes summary judgment if it is both "genuine" and "material." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is "genuine" when the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party. Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico , 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir. 1994). A fact is "material" when it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law. Id.
The moving party is responsible for "identifying those portions [of the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). It can meet its burden either by "offering evidence to disprove an element of the plaintiff's case or by demonstrating an ‘absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.’ " Rakes v. United States , 352 F. Supp. 2d 47, 52 (D. Mass. 2005), aff'd , 442 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Celotex , 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). Once the moving party shows the absence of any disputed material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to place at least one material fact into dispute. Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc. , 18 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Scanlon v. Dep't of Army , 277 F.3d 598, 600 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Counts I, II, III, and IV are premised on Tough Mudder's conduct in the underlying dispute which was referred to mediation. As noted above, that mediation resulted in a Settlement Agreement. (Docket No. 1-1, at 54-66). Tough Mudder agreed to pay Plai...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Secure Our City, Inc. v. ECI Systems, LLC
...Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451, 583 N.E.2d 806, 821 (1991) (internal quotations omitted); see also Pazol v. Tough Mudder Inc., 384 F. Supp. 3d 191, 197 (D. Mass. 2019), and cases cited. Summary judgment on a Chapter 93A claim is, however, rare because it generally involves a fact-......
-
Valley Children's Hosp. v. Athenahealth, Inc.
... ... defendants' lack of good faith in breaching contract); ... Pazol v. Tough Mudder Inc., 384 F.Supp.3d 191, 197 ... (D. Mass. 2019) (ruling that ... ...