Peace v. Peace
Decision Date | 07 November 2000 |
Citation | 31 S.W.3d 467 |
Parties | (Mo.App. W.D. 2000) . Deborah L. Peace, Appellant v. William P. Peace, Respondent Case Number: WD58045 Missouri Court of Appeals Western District Handdown Date: |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Jackson County, Hon. Christine Theresa Sill-Rogers, Judge
Counsel for Respondent: Mark E. Allen
Opinion Summary:
Deborah Peace appeals the circuit court's judgment terminating William Peace's child support obligation for their daughter, Nicole Peace. She argues that the circuit court erred in deter-min-ing that statements she made in a pleading constituted binding judicial admissions that Nicole was emancipated, and that the court below should have considered the facts the parties presented at trial in determining emancipation.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Division Two holds: The trial court erred in determining whether Nicole was emancipated based solely on its belief that the admissions made by Mrs. Peace in her Suggestions in opposition to Mr. Peace's motion to modify constituted judicial admissions. Prior cases have held that admissions made in an Answer or in a brief on appeal may constitute judicial admissions, but Mrs. Peace's response here was not a formal answer, and indeed no formal answer is required in response to a motion to modify. Mr. Peace cites us to no prior Missouri cases holding admissions made in suggestions filed in a trial court constitute judicial admissions, as opposed to evidentiary admissions.
We do not think that this is the case in which to so extend the judicial admissions rule, for a number of reasons. First, we note that this case involves the best interests of a child. Prior cases have recognized that where the best interests of a child are at stake, the rules of pleading will not be technically enforced, and the court should decide the case on the merits. Second, we note that leave to amend is to be freely given where timely requested, and a key consideration in deciding whether to grant such a motion is whether to do so would prejudice the other side. No such prejudice would result here if the court were to find Mrs. Peace's original suggestions to constitute only evidentiary rather than judicial admissions. While Mrs. Peace's counsel did not request leave to amend his response to the motion, or file a modified response, prior to the hearing, he did inform Mr. Peace's counsel that the emancipation issue would be contested at trial, and the parties conducted discovery relevant to it. At the hearing, the court took the judicial admissions issue under advisement and then heard the evidence of both parties relevant to that issue, and counsel for Mrs. Peace moved to amend his prior suggestions in opposition immediately following the hearing.
For these reasons, we find that the trial court should not have based its decision solely on what it found to be Mrs. Peace's judicial admissions, but instead should have decided the case based on the evidence presented at the hearing. Opinion Author: Laura Denvir Stith, Judge
Opinion Vote: REVERSED AND REMANDED. Lowenstein, P.J. and Newton, J., concur
Opinion:Deborah Peace appeals the circuit court's judgment terminating William Peace's child support obligation for their daughter, Nicole Peace. She argues that the circuit court erred in determining that statements she made in a pleading constituted binding judicial admissions that Nicole was emancipated, and that the court below should have considered the facts the parties presented at trial in determining emancipation. We agree and reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Petitioner Deborah Peace (Mother) and Respondent William Peace (Father) were married on July 7, 1973, and dissolved their marriage on June 9, 1998. The court granted Mother primary physical custody of the parties' two minor children, Nicole C. Peace, born March 23, 1981, and Garrett W. Peace, born November 14, 1984. The court ordered Father to pay $825.00 in monthly child support to Mother for the care and support of the children.
In the spring of 1998, shortly before the end of her junior year, the parties' eldest child, Nicole, then age 17, dropped out of high school. That fall, Nicole began classes to obtain her General Equivalency Diploma (GED). In April 1999, one month after Nicole's 18th birthday, Father filed a Motion to Modify the Decree of Dissolution. In his motion, he stated that Nicole was 18, had dropped out of school in her junior year, and was not enrolled in any school. He contended that she was self-supporting and that her mother had relinquished her from parental control. Hence, Father claimed that under Section 452.340 Nicole was emancipated and his child support obligation toward her should be terminated.1
When Mother's counsel filed an unverified response to Father's motion to modify on June 3, 1999, counsel knew that Nicole had left high school and that she turned 18 on March 23, 1999, but counsel apparently was unaware that Nicole was taking GED classes and was planning to continue her education at cosmetology school in the fall. As a result, in his responsive brief Mother's counsel admitted the following allegations made in Father's motion to modify: that Nicole became emancipated on her 18th birthday on March 23, 1999; that she was self-supporting and her mother had relinquished parental control; that she was not physically or mentally incapacitated from supporting herself; that she was not enrolled in or attending a secondary school and had not been in such a school during the previous twelve month period; and that she was not enrolled in or attending an institution of vocational or higher education and had not been in such a school during the previous twelve-month period.
Mother's counsel was later told by Mother that Nicole had begun taking GED classes in the fall of 1998 and expected to received her GED in the summer of 1999, shortly after she would have received her high school diploma had she not dropped out of school. Mother also told counsel that she continued to provide Nicole with room, board and financial support. Additionally, Mother noted that Nicole planned to attend cosmetology school. Nicole in fact received her GED in July 1999, and thereafter enrolled in a post-secondary education program in cosmetology. Mother's counsel notified Father's attorney by telephone and letter that Mother believed that Nicole was not emancipated for these reasons, and Father later conducted discovery
on these issues. Mother did not withdraw or amend her original response to the motion, in which she admitted Nicole's emancipation, however.
At the modification hearing held on September 14, 1999, Mother tried to present the evidence just noted that supported a finding that Nicole was not emancipated. Father objected to admission of this evidence on the basis that Mother's admissions in her responsive brief amounted to a judicial admission that Nicole was emancipated and precluded Mother from contesting that issue at the hearing. The court took the issue under advisement and allowed Mother to present evidence that Nicole was not emancipated. The court also allowed Father to present evidence that Nicole was, in fact, emancipated. Father testified that Nicole became emancipated on her 18th birthday because she was out of school, self-supporting and living with her boyfriend at Mother's house, and that Mother had relinquished Nicole from parental control. On cross-examination by Mother's counsel, Father stated although he was previously unaware that Nicole had taken GED classes, that she had passed the GED examination, or that she was enrolled full-time in a cosmetology vocational school, he did believe that she was not under parental control in her Mother's home because he believed she lived there with her boyfriend and was self-supporting. Shortly after the hearing concluded Mother filed a motion to withdraw or amend her original responsive brief to delete her admissions of Nicole's emancipation. On December 9, 1999, the court ruled that Mother's motion to withdraw or amend her brief, filed later on the day of the hearing, "came too late." It held that Mother's admissions in her brief, although contrary to testimony at the hearing, were judicial admissions on the issue of Nicole's emancipation. It therefore did not consider the testimony presented at the hearing and determined, based on the admissions, that Nicole became emancipated on March 23, 1999, and terminated Father's child support obligation for Nicole. Mother now appeals.
We will affirm the trial court's decision on appeal unless "there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law." Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). We "should set aside a judgment on the ground that it is against the weight of the evidence only 'with caution and with a firm belief that the decree or judgment is wrong.'" Harris by Harris v. Harris, 803 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Mo. App. S.D. 1991), quoting, Jun v. Murphy, 763 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988). We additionally afford the trial court deference concerning its determinations of credibility, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision. Shiflett v. Shiflett, 954 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). The trial court's judgment "must be affirmed under any reasonable theory supported by the evidence and should be set aside only upon a firm belief that the trial court's judgment was incorrect." Id.; Guier v. Guier, 918 S.W.2d 940, 946 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996).
In her first point on appeal, Mother asserts that the trial court erred in holding her responsive brief...
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