Peagler v. State

• Decision Date: 28 May 1896
• Citation: 20 So. 363,110 Ala. 11
• Parties: PEAGLER ET AL. v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

20 So. 363

110 Ala. 11

PEAGLER ET AL. v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 28, 1896

Appeal from circuit court, Butler county; John R. Tyson, Judge.

Bob Peagler and others were convicted of murder, and appeal. Affirmed.

Gamble & Powell, for appellants.

Wm. C Fitts, Atty. Gen., for the State.

COLEMAN J.

The appellants were indicted and convicted of murder in the second degree, and judgment and sentence rendered according to the verdict. Two questions are presented in the arguments and briefs of counsel for revision. The first is that the court erred in refusing to charge the jury as follows "If, from the evidence, you have reason to doubt the guilt of the defendants, you should acquit them." The principle and phraseology of this charge was considered in the case of Munkers v. State, 87 Ala. 94, 6 So. 357; and it was held to be an incorrect charge. This ruling was followed in the more recent case of McQueen v. State (Ala.) 18 So. 843. The soundness of our conclusions in these cases is assailed, and it is now strenuously insisted that they be overruled. Counsel seem to have overlooked the case of Ray v. State, 50 Ala. 104, and Bain v State, 74 Ala. 38, in which it was held that the definition that "a reasonable doubt was a doubt for which a reason could be given" was misleading, and should be refused. It is conceded that in all criminal prosecutions a verdict of guilty cannot legally be returned unless the jury are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, from the evidence, of the defendant's guilt, and a refusal to so instruct the jury is error. This was the recognized law when the cases cited were decided, and has always been the law in this state. We think it may be safely asserted that an instruction so worded as to impress a court or jury with the understanding that it asserts a different degree of proof, to authorize a conviction, is calculated to mislead, however plain and simple its meaning may appear to, and made to appear by, learned and ingenious counsel, and all such charges may be safely refused as misleading and confusing. Evidence may admit of different constructions. Reasons may be given for both constructions, but the reasons for one may be weak and unsatisfactory, while the reason for the other may be satisfactory to that degree which satisfies the mind beyond a reasonable doubt. If the charge had read as follows "If, from the evidence, you have no reason to doubt the defendant's guilt, then the jury may convict," certainly such an instruction would have exacted too high a degree of proof, and for this reason might have been refused. There may be a reason to doubt, which does not justify a reasonable doubt or the inference of probable innocence.

The inquiry suggests itself why counsel should adopt the phraseology used, instead of the well-known charge "that if, from the evidence, you have a reasonable...