Peak v. Nashua Gummed & Coated Paper Co.

• Decision Date: 04 June 1935
• Citation: 179 A. 355
• Parties: PEAK v. NASHUA GUMMED & COATED PAPER CO.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

179 A. 355

PEAK

v. NASHUA GUMMED & COATED PAPER CO.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Hillsborough.

June 4, 1935.

Transferred from Superior Court, Hillsborough County; Burque, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Arthur S. Peak, employee, opposed by the Nashua Gummed & Coated Paper Company, employer. Transferred on defendant's exceptions.

New trial.

Petition for compensation under P. L. c. 178. Trial by the court.

On January 11, 1932, the plaintiff, while employed by the defendant, was severely burned by molten metal. It was admitted that from that date until August 17, he was totally disabled, and that he has received compensation therefor at the rate of one-half his former average weekly wage of $23.50 per week. On August 17, he returned to work for his former employer, but at a different kind of work for which he received $16 per week. This difference in pay was due to the fact that during his disability the defendant's other employees had voluntarily accepted a 10 per cent. wage cut, and that the weekly hours of work had been reduced because of lack of orders.

On November 3, 1932, the plaintiff was told that there was no more work for him, and that his services were no longer required. For the following year he made diligent efforts to find employment, but was unsuccessful until November 4, 1933, when he obtained work at $12 per week. His inability to find work between November 3, 1932, and November 4, 1933, was "found to be due to a combination of his disability and a lack of work he could do, the latter due to the depression."

The court made no finding of loss of earning capacity, but submitted two alternative computations, one based solely upon the difference between his prior wage and his actual wages after injury; the other upon his prior wage and what would have been his wages after injury had it not been for the pay cut and lack of work due to general business conditions.

BURQUE, J., allowed the defendant's bill of exceptions and transferred the question "as to what the petitioner is entitled to recover."

Ivory C. Eaton, of Nashua, for plaintiff.

Wyman, Starr, Booth, Wadleigh & Langdell, of Manchester (Winthrop Wadleigh, of Manchester, orally), for defendant.

WOODBURY, Justice.

The Workman's Compensation Act is designed to afford compensation for loss of earning capacity due to physical injury. It is not designed to afford compensation for loss of earning capacity due to any other cause. For this reason, "loss of earning capacity due to general business conditions cannot be made the basis of compensation." Plourde v. Auclair, 86 N. H. 303, 304, 167 A. 275, 276. See, also, Cote v. Bachelder-Worcester Co., 85 N. H. 444, 447, 160 A. 101, 82 A. L. R. 1239.

The court found that the plaintiffs loss in pay after his return to work was not due to his injury, but to a general pay cut and to a reduction in hours of work; in other words, that his loss in actual earnings after injury was not a consequence of the accident, but of general business conditions. Therefore, for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation to which he is entitled, it must be considered as if he had returned to work at the same wage he had received prior to injury. It does not follow from this, however, that, as a matter of law, he is entitled to no compensation after August 17, 1932. Actual wages...