Pearl Meadows Mushroom Farm, Inc. v. Nelson

• Citation: 723 F. Supp. 432
• Decision Date: 24 August 1989
• Docket Number: No. C 82-1896 RPA.,C 82-1896 RPA.
• Parties: PEARL MEADOWS MUSHROOM FARM, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Alan NELSON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

723 F. Supp. 432

PEARL MEADOWS MUSHROOM FARM, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Alan NELSON, et al., Defendants.

No. C 82-1896 RPA.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

August 24, 1989.

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Joseph P. Russoniello, U.S. Atty., and Patrick Ramirez S. Bupara, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., and David J. Kline, Asst. Director, Parker Singh and Norah A. Schwarz, Attys., Office of Immigration Litigation, Civ. Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.

John M. True, Employment Law Center, San Francisco, Cal., for defendants.

AMENDED ORDER DENYING RULE 41(b) MOTION

AGUILAR, District Judge.

Plaintiffs allege that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has engaged in a pattern and practice of carrying out workplace raids in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The INS and Border Patrol agents arrive at workplaces in such a manner so as to provoke exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry. Otherwise, the agents enter with constitutionally deficient warrants, or without warrants and without consent. Consent, when requested, is coerced or involuntary. Once inside, the agents target employees of Hispanic appearance for questioning and detention, whether or not the agents have reasonable, articulable suspicion of illegal alien status. Workers are forcibly detained and arrested without probable cause.

A preliminary injunction was issued in 1985, enjoining defendants from conducting workplace raids in a manner which would provoke exigent circumstances. The injunction ordered that INS entries onto workplaces must be based on either a valid warrant or valid consent. Detentive questioning of workers must be based on articulable reasonable suspicions of illegal alienage. Agents may not arrest a worker except upon probable cause. International Molders' v. Nelson, 643 F.Supp. 884 (1986), remanded with modifications, 799 F.2d 547 (9th Cir.1986).

After four calendar months of trial, plaintiffs have closed their case-in-chief. Defendants now move for a Rule 41(b) dismissal of the action. After hearing oral argument on the motion, the Court denied the motion from the bench. This Order serves to provide explanation for the Court's ruling.

For the purposes of this Order, the Court has only addressed those claims which required some explication of the applicable law and a determination of the appropriate burden of proof. The Court is unable, in this short order, to address each of the minor issues raised in the over 300 pages of briefing.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

Under F.R.Civ.Pro. 41(b), the trial court judge, sitting as the finder of fact, may review the evidence and its weight and issue judgment for defendant if plaintiff has not shown a right to relief. The trial judge has the discretion to grant a Rule 41(b) motion even if plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, if the evidence preponderates against the plaintiff. S.E.C. v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 658-59 (9th Cir. 1980).

The Court has received, read and considered the extensive briefing submitted on this motion, it has painstakingly reviewed the complaint, trial transcript and its own copious notes. In addition, the Court heard the oral argument of counsel. Good cause appearing therefor, the Court finds that plaintiffs have shown not only a prima facie case on their claims, but also that the evidence preponderates in their favor at the close of their case-in-chief.

B. Plaintiffs' Standing

This suit challenging the INS' practices during work place raids is brought by five employers and a certified class of "persons of Hispanic or other Latin American ancestry ... subjected to the policies, practices and conduct of the INS and/or Border Patrol during the course of INS area control operations directed at places of employment." Defendants argue that plaintiffs, as named employers and class representatives, have failed to show they have standing to pursue the asserted claims.

(1) Are the class representatives Hispanic?

Defendants contend that plaintiffs Edward Armstrong, Francisco Rivera, Evangelina Mendoza Avalos, Antonio Sanchez-Vaca, and Jose Rodriquez have failed to show they are "persons of Hispanic or other Latin American ancestry" and as such, cannot represent the class.¹ According to defendants, the class-wide claims must be dismissed in the absence of testimony from a representative with standing as an Hispanic.

Edward Armstrong is not alleged to be a class representative in the Seventh Amended Complaint. Although plaintiffs noted this in the opposition papers, defendants reiterated their assertions that Edward Armstrong had failed to show he was Hispanic, in their reply memorandum. Edward Armstrong's racial status is irrelevant to the class claims.

At first glance, defendants' attack on the remaining class plaintiffs appears frivolous and an exercise in re-stating the obvious. Defendants note that the Court cannot take judicial notice of plaintiffs' racial status. This admonition notwithstanding, the Court, as trier of fact, is competent to make this finding based on the pleadings and evidence submitted at trial.

In their complaint, plaintiffs asserted they were Hispanics of Mexican and Salvadoran descent. All the class representatives have Spanish surnames. The Court observed these plaintiffs testify at trial, their physical characteristics denote Hispanic heritage. In addition, the witnesses spoke Spanish and testified through interpreters. Based on the Court's observations, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court finds that Joseph Angel Chavez, Francisco Rivera, Evangelina Mendoza Avalos, Antonio Sanchez-Vaca, and Jose Rodriquez are "persons of Hispanic or Latin American ancestry" and possess standing to represent the class.²

Rogelio Lona did not testify at trial and no evidence was presented relating to Mr. Lona. Mr. Lona is HEREBY DISMISSED from the case.

(2) Plaintiffs' Standing To Object To A Pattern And Practice Of Using Constitutionally Infirm Warrants

The Court has not certified an employer class. Accordingly, the named employer plaintiffs must have standing to object to the entry of the INS onto business premises where the class members are employed. Only the owner or manager of the business has standing to object to unlawful entries. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 424-26, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (Fourth Amendment rights may not be vicariously asserted.) As this Court has previously held, although the employee class members have suffered injury from the allegedly unconstitutional interrogations, detentions, and seizures, "the corporate entities have their own rights to assert based on the alleged warrantless entries, improper warrants, coerced consent or fabricated exigent circumstances involving their properties." International Molders' v. Nelson, 643 F.Supp. 884, 889 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (Order granting preliminary injunction). In that Order, the Court ruled that "all plaintiffs have standing." Id. The employers have a personal stake in the litigation and an expectation of privacy in their business establishments. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1819-20, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1977) (Constitutional protection of commercial establishments is historically rooted in the Fourth Amendment.) At the same time, however, the employers are seeking injunctive relief, and this Court may, and must, look to evidence of a pattern of unlawful activity to determine whether injunctive relief is appropriate. See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 815, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 2200, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (1973). The inquiry necessarily entails taking evidence of INS conduct at other businesses not named as plaintiffs.

Plaintiff Petaluma Poultry asserts the claim that the INS enters workplaces with general warrants that provide for the seizure of named employees and "others," without particularized probable cause to arrest those unnamed workers.

Defendants argue that this claim must be dismissed because Petaluma Poultry, the only named plaintiff subjected to a general warrant, did not testify at trial. Although several witnesses testified to the events occurring at Petaluma Poultry, none of the witnesses asserted they were testifying on behalf of the business. According to defendants, it follows that plaintiffs failed to produce any witness with standing to challenge the entry into Petaluma Poultry premises.

Defendants have confused the evidentiary proof needed to meet the standing requirement. Defendants' attack does not focus on plaintiffs' showing of an injury or a personal stake in the litigation, but rather on whether plaintiff has authorized the suit. Plaintiff Petaluma Poultry, the business, has initiated and prosecuted this suit.³ In the complaint, plaintiff Petaluma Poultry contests the use of the general warrant. Petaluma Poultry is not under a duty to send a business representative to reiterate that challenge at trial. Petaluma Poultry is already represented through counsel. The standing requirement is met if Petaluma Poultry can produce evidence of injury resulting from the allegedly unconstitutional activity. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984).

That question has already been answered in the affirmative. On November 24, 1987, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of Petaluma Poultry's claim that the general warrant used in the raid of its business establishment was constitutionally infirm, both as an inspection warrant and as a seizure warrant. International Molders v. Nelson, 674 F.Supp. 294 (N.D.Cal. 1987). Subsequently, plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege a claim that as a pattern and practice, the INS employs general warrants to gain entry to businesses and seize unnamed "others".

At trial, plaintiffs submitted evidence of the use of general warrants at thirty-one different businesses. This evidence establishes the claim that the INS has a pattern...