Pearman v. State
Decision Date | 05 July 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 4D00-1555.,4D00-1555. |
Citation | 764 So.2d 739 |
Parties | Robert PEARMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert Pearman, Perry, pro se.
No appearance required for appellee.
We affirm the order denying appellant's motion for post-conviction relief.
In 1995, appellant entered guilty pleas to charges of sexual activity with a child and sexual battery with force or injury. He was sentenced on August 24, 1995 to eight years in prison followed by eight years of probation. There was no direct appeal.
On March 11, 1999, the trial court issued an order finding appellant to be a sexual predator pursuant to section 775.21(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1999).1 On August 20, 1999, appellant filed the instant pro se motion to vacate judgment and sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The sole ground for relief was that his original plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily, in that the Legislature enacted section 916.31, Florida Statutes (1999), effective January 1, 1999,2 providing for the involuntary commitment of those convicted of certain sexual crimes. Appellant argued that had he been aware of the new statute at the time of his plea, he would not have entered it and would have insisted on his right to a trial by jury. To support his motion, appellant cited State v. Wiita, 744 So.2d 1232 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
The trial court summarily denied appellant's motion on April 12, 2000, noting that it had reviewed and accepted the state's response. The state's response essentially conceded that this case fell under the exception to the two-year time limitation found at Rule 3.850(b)(1), which applies when "the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or the movant's attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence," but asserted that the motion should be denied on the merits.
Before accepting a guilty or nolo contendre plea, the trial court is required to determine that the plea is voluntarily entered. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.172(a). Ordinarily, the trial court should place the defendant under oath and determine that the defendant understands, among other things, the nature of the charge, any mandatory minimum penalty, and the maximum possible penalty. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.172(c)(1).
However, in determining that a defendant understands the consequences of his plea, the judge is not required to inform a defendant of the collateral consequences of his plea, but only of the direct consequences of it. See, e.g., State v. Fox, 659 So.2d 1324, 1327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
. The determination of whether a consequence of a plea is direct or collateral "`turns on whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment.'" Zambuto v. State, 413 So.2d 461, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) ( ).
rev. denied, 722 So.2d 192 (Fla. 1998), and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1058, 119 S.Ct. 624, 142 L.Ed.2d 563 (1998); Benitez v. State, 667 So.2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
Wiita is distinguishable on its facts. Wiita bargained for anonymity; he was promised that if he successfully completed his probation, his adjudication would be withheld and his file would be sealed. He was told that the charges would be completely wiped off his record. See 744 So.2d at 1233-34. This court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Wiita's sworn...
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