Pearson v. Brooks
Decision Date | 05 December 2003 |
Citation | 883 So.2d 185 |
Parties | Annie PEARSON v. Glenn BROOKS and Michael Black. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
S. Mark Andrews of Morris, Cary, Andrews & Talmadge, LLC, Dothan, for appellant.
Peter A. McInish and William W. Nichols of Lee & McInish Attorneys, P.C., Dothan, for appellees.
Annie Pearson appeals from the trial court's order dismissing, on the basis of a statute-of-limitations defense, her complaint against Glenn Brooks and Michael Black seeking damages for a job-related injury. We affirm.
Pearson was employed initially in the quality assurance and inspection department at Perdue Farms, Inc., a company operating a chicken-processing plant in Dothan. Subsequently, Pearson was transferred to the sanitation department; Brooks was the superintendent of the sanitation department, and Black was Pearson's immediate supervisor. Pearson was responsible for cleaning the "kill floor," where many of the machines used to prepare the chickens for sale and distribution were located. Pearson's cleaning routine required her to spray the machines with a high-pressure hose to remove the chicken remains. On November 17, 1999, while Pearson was cleaning the kill floor, she slipped in the chicken remains. In an attempt to break her fall, Pearson held her hands in front of her. Pearson fell into a "neck-skinning" machine, a machine that removed the skin from the chickens' necks. Pearson's right index finger was amputated when it became entangled in the machine. Apparently, the guard mechanism that would have prevented the blade of the machine from cutting was not in place at the time of Pearson's accident.
On October 17, 2001, one month before the statutory limitations period would have run on her claims, Pearson sued Perdue Farms, Inc.;1 Kurt Andrews, the plant manager; Brian Hughes, the plant safety director; and several of her co-employees —Mike Harp, Dave Jones, and Dennis Widgons—who were involved in the direct maintenance and supervision of the neck-skinning machine. Pearson did not name Brooks and Black, also co-employees, in the original complaint. The complaint alleged negligence and wantonness in the maintenance, repair, and upkeep of the neck-skinning machine, as well as the failure to ensure the safety of the machine. Pursuant to Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., Pearson alleged claims against fictitiously named defendants who were either "that person, corporation or other legal entity who or which designed the machine, which is the subject matter of this lawsuit"; "that person, corporation, or other legal entity who had responsibility for maintenance or repair of the machine which is the subject matter of this lawsuit"; or "that person, corporation, or other legal entity whose negligence, wantonness, recklessness, willfulness or other wrongful conduct caused the injury to Plaintiffs [sic]."
Pearson began the discovery process with the named defendants. Pearson claims that at the August 20, 2002, deposition of Hughes she became privy to an accident investigation report related to her injury, which Hughes had prepared. Hughes stated in the report that Pearson's accident was caused by the "lack of control and supervision by the Sanitation Hourly Supervisor[ ] [Black] and Sanitation Superintendent [Brooks]." On August 30, 2002, Pearson amended her complaint to substitute Brooks and Black for two of the fictitiously named parties. Brooks and Black moved to dismiss Pearson's complaint, arguing that Pearson's claims against them were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Brooks and Black from the action. The trial court certified its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Pearson appeals.
Pearson argues that her complaint was properly amended to add Brooks and Black as defendants pursuant to Rule 9(h), which allows a plaintiff to designate opposing parties by using a fictitious name:
"When a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing party and so alleges in the party's pleading, the opposing party may be designated by any name, and when that party's true name is discovered, the process and all pleadings and proceedings in the action may be amended by substituting the true name."
Further, Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that "[a]n amendment of a pleading relates back to the original date of the pleading when ... relation back is permitted by principles applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule 9(h)." Pearson claims that Brooks and Black were properly named as fictitious parties because when she filed her original complaint, Pearson knew the names of the two men but she was not aware of any facts that would support a claim against them. She argues that her claims against Brooks and Black, therefore, relate back to the time of the commencement of the action, one month before the running of the applicable statutory limitations period. Brooks and Black argue that, based on her knowledge of their job titles and duties, Pearson was not ignorant of the name of an opposing party and was not excused from failing to sue Brooks and Black by their true names in the original complaint.
Based on the record before us, we conclude that Pearson could not have reasonably been ignorant of the identities of Brooks and Black. At her deposition, Pearson testified that she had known for over three or four years that Brooks was the superintendent of the sanitation department and that Brooks had personally trained her to clean the machines:
(Emphasis added.) Pearson also testified that Black was her immediate supervisor in the sanitation department and that he instructed the employees regarding the safety procedures in the plant:
It is apparent from Pearson's testimony that she knew Brooks's and Black's identities as well as their duties regarding plant safety and the safe operation and cleaning of the plant's machinery. These two men were also her department supervisor and her immediate supervisor. It would be unreasonable to believe that Pearson was ignorant of Brooks's and Black's identities as required to proceed under the fictitious-party practice allowed by Rule 9(h).
Pearson further argues that although she may have known Brooks's and Black's identities at the time she filed her complaint, she did not know that Brooks and Black were the parties that she intended to sue. Pearson cites Dannelley v. Guarino, 472 So.2d 983 (Ala.1985), as authority for this argument. In Dannelley, the plaintiff was injured when he fell out of an aerial bucket lift owned by the City of Mobile. The plaintiff and his wife sued the safety director for the City and several fictitiously named defendants. Subsequently, the plaintiffs learned that two other City employees were responsible for the testing and certification of the bucket lift, and they amended their complaint to substitute these individuals for the fictitiously named defendants. The two employees argued that the plaintiffs' claims did not relate back to the original filing date of the complaint because, they said, the plaintiffs were not ignorant of their identities. This Court held that "the record [was] devoid of any factual allegations which would indicate that the plaintiffs ... had knowledge of any facts concerning [the employees'] possible involvement in their personal injury." 472 So.2d at 986. Specifically, this Court stated that although the plaintiffs knew the two employees' names and their job titles, that information would not have placed the plaintiffs on notice that those two employees had anything to do with the safety of City equipment.
Pearson's factual situation, however, is not analogous to the situation in Dannelley. Pearson acknowledges that she was aware of Brooks's role in teaching employees how to properly clean the plant's machinery and of Black's role in instructing employees on safety procedures within the department. Therefore, Pearson knew more than Brooks's and Black's names and job titles; she had firsthand knowledge of their duties in the sanitation department and as to plant safety and how those duties would relate to her injury at the plant. Furthermore, Pearson's claim that she knew that the plant manager and the plant safety manager, whom she named as defendants, were involved in her injury, but that she did not know that the supervisors in her department had any role in her safety at the plant, in face of her deposition testimony about their duties involving training and safety, strains credulity.
Pearson's case is more analogous to Marsh v. Wenzel, 732 So.2d 985 (Ala.1998). The plaintiff in Marsh sued her surgeon, who had removed tissue from her breast but had failed to diagnose it as cancerous. After she deposed the pathologist who had also examined the tissue and had failed to diagnose the cancer, the plaintiff substituted the pathologist for one of the...
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