Pearson v. Miller
| Decision Date | 26 April 2000 |
| Citation | 211 F.3d 57 |
| Parties | (3rd Cir. 2000) JACQUELINE PEARSON, Individually and as Parent & Natural Guardian of Lindsay Pearson, v. BRUCE MILLER; LUZERNE COUNTY CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES, INC. LUZERNE COUNTY CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES, INC., Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff v. KIDSPEACE NATIONAL CENTERS FOR KIDS IN CRISIS, INC., Third Party Defendant Luzerne County Children & Youth Services, Inc.; KidsPeace National Centers for Kids in Crisis, Inc., Appellants No: 99-7047 |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 97-764) District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Chester F. Dudick, Jr., Esq. (Argued) Dudick & Decker, P.C. 1043 Wyoming Avenue Forty Fort, PA 18704, Richard M. Hughes, III, Esq. 387 Wyoming Avenue Kingston, PA 18704, Counsel for Appellee
Bruce Miller #CY-4190 Luzerne County Prison 99 Water Street Wilkes-Barre, PA 18702, Pro Se Appellee
Barbara O'Connell, Esq. (Argued) Sweeney & Sheehan 1515 Market Street, 19th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19102, Counsel for Appellant Luzerne County Children & Youth Services, Inc.
Richard F. Stevens, Esq. Timothy T. Stevens, Esq. (Argued) Stevens & Johnson 740 Hamilton Mall Allentown, PA 18101, Counsel for Appellant KidsPeace National Center for Kids in Crisis, Inc.
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, and GARTH, Circuit Judge, and POLLAK, District Judge.*
OPINION FOR THE COURT
This is an interlocutory appeal1 from a discovery order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in a suit presenting claims arising under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, to which are annexed a variety of pendent state law claims. The order appealed from granted--subject to certain restrictions--plaintiff/appellee Jacqueline Pearson's motions to compel discovery. In the same order, the District Court denied, to the same extent, motions of defendants/appellants Luzerne County Children and Youth Services, Inc. (LCCYS) and KidsPeace National Centers for Kids in Crisis, Inc. (KidsPeace) which sought protective orders authorizing LCCYS and KidsPeace to refrain from providing plaintiff with the information sought under plaintiff 's motion to compel.
The information at the center of the present discovery dispute is information in the possession of LCCYS and KidsPeace concerning defendant Bruce Miller, who was a foster child under the supervision of LCCYS and KidsPeace in December of 1993, when he sexually assaulted Ms. Pearson's daughter. Ms. Pearson seeks to establish that the defendant agencies had knowledge of Mr. Miller's violent sexual propensities sufficient to establish their liability for the assault. Ms. Pearson thus seeks discovery of material that might evidence such knowledge. LCCYS and KidsPeace have resisted plaintiff 's discovery requests on the grounds that such discovery would violate the confidentiality of that information in breach of an array of Pennsylvania statutes.
Primarily on the basis of an "Authorization to Release Information" signed by Mr. Miller, the District Court rejected the argument of LCCYS and KidsPeace that the Pennsylvania statutes barred the sought after discovery. The court held that, subject to certain restrictions necessary to protect other people's interests, Mr. Miller's release was sufficient to waive the bulk of the protections afforded by the Pennsylvania statutes. The District Court thus fashioned an order that compelled discovery of all material sought except to the extent that such material contained information the release of which would violate the rights of third parties protected by the Pennsylvania statutes, as those statutes were interpreted by the District Court.
Because, however, discovery disputes in federal courts are governed by federal law, especially the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, the state statutory confidentiality provisions that have been invoked by appellants--and on the basis of which the District Court fashioned its order--do not directly govern the present dispute. Only to the extent that federal law may recognize the force of those provisions are they relevant here. The ultimate issue is whether the discovery sought is permitted as a matter of federal law.
Acknowledging the applicability of federal law, appellants contend that the state confidentiality provisions ought to be recognized under the federal law of evidentiary privileges. We are thus directed to the question whether the applicability of the federal law governing discovery disputes bars the release of the demanded information either--as appellants have chiefly argued--because federal law recognizes one or more applicable evidentiary privileges, or because federal law otherwise provides for the protection of the information here in dispute.
For the reasons discussed below, we reject appellants' argument that the disputed material is protected by a federal evidentiary privilege. While we accept that appellants may have very legitimate concerns regarding the confidentiality of the information sought, we believe that those concerns are better addressed in the context of the District Court's power to impose reasonable limits on the discovery of sensitive information pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). To enable the District Court to fashion the appropriate accommodation of the competing interests, we will vacate the order appealed from and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The facts relevant to the resolution of the issue before this court are largely undisputed. Plaintiff Jacqueline Pearson--appellee in this court--brought this action on her own behalf and as parent of her daughter Lindsay Pearson. Ms. Pearson alleges, and appellants do not contest, that defendant Bruce Miller abducted and sexually assaulted twelve-year-old Lindsay on December 19, 1993. Mr. Miller was, at the time of the assault and for the previous ten months, living in a foster home in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. He was under the custody and supervision of LCCYS, a county government agency, as he had been for the previous several years. Mr. Miller was placed in the particular foster home in which he lived by KidsPeace, a private organization under contract with LCCYS to provide services to LCCYS's clients. Beyond this general characterization, it is unclear how Mr. Miller's supervision was divided between the two organizations.
Following the attack, a criminal rape charge was brought against Mr. Miller. He pled nolo contendere to the charge, and was sentenced to five to ten years in prison. As far as we are aware, he is currently serving that sentence.
Ms. Pearson initiated the present action against Mr. Miller and appellant LCCYS in December of 1995 in the Court of Common Pleas for Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Thereafter, LCCYS removed the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. LCCYS then brought in appellant KidsPeace as a third party defendant. Ms. Pearson then amended her complaint to assert claims against both agencies.
Ms. Pearson's primary cause of action against appellants is a S 1983 claim alleging that they are liable for the consequences of a "state-created danger." In particular, appellee Pearson alleges that appellants knew Mr. Miller to have had violent sexual propensities that made him a predictable danger to young girls. In light of this knowledge, appellee contends that Mr. Miller "should not have been allowed access to young girls such as he gained by his foster care placement, by being permitted to attend public school, and by being allowed to ride a school bus on his own." In addition to her S 1983 claim, appellee's second amended complaint includes federal equal protection and common law negligence and invasion of privacy claims against appellants, as well as a prayer for punitive damages. On July 10, 1998, the District Court dismissed with prejudice, as against LCCYS only, Ms. Pearson's state law claims, as well as all claims for punitive damages. Thus, appellee's remaining claims against LCCYS are limited to federal ones; as against KidsPeace, on the other hand, the above-noted state law claims remain in the case together with the federal claims.
During the discovery period, Ms. Pearson filed notices of deposition directed to both appellants announcing an intention to depose "all case managers and their supervisors who had responsibility for the management and supervision of Bruce Miller for the five (5) years prior to December 17, 1993." Soon thereafter, plaintiff served interrogatories on LCCYS and KidsPeace that included requests for information which--so both appellants contend --would require the release of sensitive confidential information contained in their respective files on Bruce Miller. In order to avoid that perceived outcome, KidsPeace and LCCYS filed motions for protective orders seeking protection from each of these requests. Appellee responded by filing a motion to compel discovery of the disputed material.
After appellants had filed their motions for protective orders, but prior to the filing of the motion to compel, Ms. Pearson's attorneys obtained an "Authorization to Release Records" signed by Bruce Miller. Mr. Miller had, by that time, reached majority, and was acting as his own attorney. The text of that document is as follows:
I, BRUCE MILLER, hereby authorize Luzerne County Children and Youth Services and/or KidsPeace National Centers for Kids in Crisis, Inc. to release my entire file, including, but not limited to, any and all evaluations, memoranda, correspondence, personal data, recommendations and requests to Chester Dudick, Jr. Esquire and Richard M. Hughes, III, Esquire.
Appellants sought protection from discovery on the basis of the confidentiality provisions...
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