Pearson v. Pearson

• Decision Date: 10 December 1920
• Citation: 230 N.Y. 141,129 N.E. 349
• Parties: PEARSON v. PEARSON.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

230 N.Y. 141

129 N.E. 349

PEARSON

v.PEARSON.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 10, 1920.

Action by Minnie Hatch Pearson against Henry Pearson. Jury waived, judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, where the judgment was reversed (187 App. Div. 645,176 N. Y. Supp. 626), and the plaintiff appeals.

Judgment of Appellate Division affirmed.

See, also, 104 Misc. Rep. 675,173 N. Y. Supp. 563.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

George Gordon Battle, and Lanman Crosby, both of New York City, for appellant.

Howard R. Bayne, of New York City, for respondent.

POUND, J.

This action is brought by wife against husband to recover from the latter the sums which the former claims to have expended out of her separate estate between April 1, 1915, and the commencement of the action, in discharge of his obligation to provide her with the necessaries of life suitable to her condition. De Brauwere v. De Brauwere, 203 N. Y. 460, 96 N. E. 722,38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 508.

While the action was pending the defendant began an action against plaintiff for divorce in the state on Nevada on the ground of extreme cruelty. She appeared and defended the action, denying the allegations of the complaint and setting up abandonment and nonsupport as a defense, but a final decree was entered therein in his favor dissolving the marriage between them. He thereupon served a supplemental answer in this action, setting up the Nevada decree as a bar.

The substance of plaintiff's claim is that defendant, on or about April 1, 1915, abandoned her without providing means to provide for her support, and thereafter contributed nothing to her support except certain payments for rent and food. The substance of defendant's claim is that plaintiff's conduct towards him inter alia in accusing him publicly of unfaithfulness to her was such that his health was injured; that it therefore amounted to cruel and inhuman treatment, although no offer of physical violence was alleged; and that he was thereby justified in leaving her and was relieved from the obligation of supporting her during their separation.

The question is as to the effect of the Nevada decree upon this plaintiff's cause of action. The trial justice, granting judgment for the plaintiff, held that the acts of cruelty alleged in the Nevada complaint would not result in a decree of separation in the state of New York; that the issue in the Nevada case was not raised by the charge and denial of cruel and inhuman treatment or extreme cruelty, but was raised on the facts pleaded and proved; that there was no identity of issue, and therefore no determination of the main issue in this case, which is whether defendant wrongfully failed to support his wife in the state of New York. The Appellate Division reversed the Trial Term, holding that the Nevada court necessarily decided the controversy raised by the wife's denial of her responsibility for the separation, and that plaintiff was therefore bound by the Nevada decree.

Under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution (U. S. Const. art. 4, § 1), the Nevada decree establishes the status of the parties as to the future. It is a judicial finding that they are no longer husband and wife. So far, and so far only, as the issues involved in this action and the Nevada action are practically the same, is it a bar to the present assertion by the wife that her living apart from her husband in New York state prior to the Nevada decree was through no fault of hers, and was not due to any acts or conduct on her part that justified a separation at the suit of her husband in New York. Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317, 25 Sup. Ct. 679, 49 L. Ed. 1066.

The specific allegations of cruelty set forth in the complaint in the Nevada action and found by the court therein to be true are not conclusive on the question of cruel and inhuman treatment in New York. The ethical rule has been declared that ‘Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her.’ If a sister state should incorporate this definition of adultery into its Code, the issue in the action would be determined not by the name of the acts charged but by the facts.

[3][4] When the wife in the Nevada action presented as defenses abandonment and non support, the issue remained the same. If the husband for the misconduct of the wife lawfully separates himself from her, he is not chargeable for necessaries furnished to her. McCutchen v. McGahay, 11 Johns. 281, 6 Am. Dec. 373. Did the acts alleged in the complaint justify the husband in leaving his wife? The Nevada court answered the question in the affirmative. The plaintiff takes the position that the New York courts would say as matter of law that Nevada had found that she was a scolding, nagging, abusive, foul-mouthed wife, but that she was not guilty of cruelty as a ground of legal separation, because her language, though violent, created no reasonable apprehension of bodily harm, and so would do no harm in a legal sense to any husband, however situated and however sensitive, and would not justify him in leaving her without providing means for her support. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 73 N. Y. 369. The question is thus presented, on the facts alleged and...