Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc.
Citation | 145 P.3d 298,208 Or. App. 501 |
Decision Date | 11 October 2006 |
Docket Number | A131606.,0211-11819. |
Parties | Marilyn C. PEARSON and Laura Grandin, individually and on behalf of all similarly-situated persons, Appellants, v. PHILIP MORRIS, INC., nka Philip Morris USA, Inc., Respondent, and Philip Morris Companies, Inc., Defendant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Oregon |
David F. Sugerman, Portland, and Paul & Sugerman, PC, for application.
William F. Gary, Eugene, and Harrang Long Gary Rudnick P.C. for response.
Before HASELTON, Presiding Judge, and BREWER, Chief Judge, and ORTEGA, Judge.
Plaintiffs seek interlocutory review of the trial court's order denying their motion for class certification in this tobacco products litigation brought under the Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA). We write to address the operation of the class action interlocutory appeal statute, ORS 19.225, which provides:
(Emphasis added.) Below, we explain the factors that we consider in determining whether to permit an interlocutory appeal under ORS 19.225. We then apply those factors to this case and, in light of that analysis, conclude by denying plaintiffs' application for an interlocutory appeal.
How the legislature intended that we exercise our discretion in determining whether to allow interlocutory appeals in class actions presents a question of statutory construction that we analyze by applying the template set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610-12, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). The text alone, under which, assuming that other prerequisites are met, the court is to permit an appeal "in its discretion" is not particularly illuminating. The ordinary meaning of "discretion" is "power of decision: individual judgment * * * power of free decision or choice within certain legal bounds * * *." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 647 (unabridged ed. 2002). That is also the accepted legal meaning of the term. See State v. Rogers, 330 Or. 282, 312, 4 P.3d 1261 (2000) ( ). Thus, a conferral of discretion is elastic, but not without limits. It is possible that the legislature intended for courts to set those limits based on criteria that the courts, themselves, develop. On the other hand, it is also possible that the legislature intended to circumscribe or cabin that discretion in a different way. Because the text and context of the provision do not reveal what limitations, if any, the legislature intended to apply to the court's exercise of its discretion, we turn to legislative history.
The provision that eventually became ORS 19.225 was enacted in 1973 as part of Senate Bill (SB) 163, a bill that created procedures for litigating class actions in Oregon. Or. Laws 1973, ch. 349, § 22.1 SB 163 was modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23, the federal class action provision. Minutes, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 163, April 11, 1973, 3 (statement of Laird Kirkpatrick); Minutes, Senate Committee on Consumer and Business Affairs, SB 163, February 13, 1973, 2 (statement of Ron Loew). SB 163 did not initially contain an interlocutory appeal provision; rather, that provision was added as part of a set of "agreed-upon" amendments. It was derived from the general federal interlocutory appeal statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b). Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 163, May 9, 1973, Tape 30, Side 1 (statement of Preston O'Leary).2
Because ORS 19.225 is modeled on 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b), we assume that the legislature intended to incorporate interpretations of that provision existing at the time that the Oregon statute was enacted. See Southern Pacific v. Bryson, 254 Or. 478, 480, 459 P.2d 881 (1969) ( principle); Waybrant v. Clackamas County, 54 Or.App. 740, 744, 635 P.2d 1365 (1981) ( ). We turn, then, to 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b), its legislative history, and the cases interpreting it before 1973.
28 U.S.C. section 1292(b) provides:
(Italics in original.) The legislative history of the federal provision suggests two points relevant to our inquiry. First, Congress intended for the federal courts of appeal to have very broad discretion in determining whether to allow interlocutory appeals:
S Rep No 85-2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 USCCAN 5255, 5257. Second, "the appeal from interlocutory orders thus provided should and will be used only in exceptional cases where a decision of the appeal may avoid protracted and expensive litigation * * *." Id. at 5259.3
Decisions from the federal courts of appeal—before 1973, when the Oregon legislature adopted the provision—also shed some light on the meaning of the federal provision. Shortly after its enactment, a number of courts held that the determinations required of the trial court—that is, (1) that the order involves a controlling question of law (2) as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and (3) that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation—are not merely to be "rubber stamped" by the appellate court. Rather, the appellate court must independently address those questions. See, e.g., United States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir.1959) () ; In re Heddendorf, 263 F.2d 887, 888-89 (1st Cir.1959) (); Milbert v. Bison Laboratories, 260 F.2d 431, 433 (3d Cir.1958) () . Thus, by 1973, section 1292(b) had been interpreted to require the appellate court to reevaluate the conclusions underlying the trial court's decision to certify the appeal.
The federal courts also generally adopted the view expressed in the legislative history that the provision should not be routinely used to allow interlocutory appeals:
Second, once the appellate court has determined that it...
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...interlocutory appeals in class actions under ORS 19.225 should be reserved for "exceptional cases," Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 208 Or App 501, 514, 145 P.3d 298 (2006) ( Pearson I ), and that our review under ORS 19.225 is discretionary, we decline to address the remaining questions c......
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...the accountant-client privilege”). Despite looking to federal jurisprudence for guidance, see, e.g., Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc., 208 Or.App. 501, 504, 145 P.3d 298 (Or.Ct.App.2006) (“Because ORS 19.225 is modeled on 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b), we assume that the legislature intended to i......
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Bohr v. Tillamook Cnty. Creamery Ass'n
...the rule. In particular, we have stated that interlocutory appeal under ORS 19.225 should be reserved for "exceptional cases." Pearson I, 208 Or.App. at 514. that, at this juncture, our resolution of the three remaining questions would only affect the named plaintiffs-not the putative class......