Pearson v. South Jordan City

• Decision Date: 29 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 20100446–CA.,20100446–CA.
• Citation: 275 P.3d 1035,2012 UT App 88,705 Utah Adv. Rep. 63
• Parties: Daniel PEARSON, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. SOUTH JORDAN CITY, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

2012 UT App 88

275 P.3d 1035

705 Utah Adv. Rep. 63

Daniel PEARSON, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.SOUTH JORDAN CITY, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20100446–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

March 29, 2012.

Camille N. Johnson and Judith D. Wolferts, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

Gregory G. Skordas and Chad D. Noakes, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before Judges McHUGH, DAVIS, and THORNE.

OPINION

McHUGH, Presiding Judge:

¶ 1 The City of South Jordan (the City or South Jordan) appeals from the trial court's order granting partial summary judgement in favor of Daniel Pearson. The trial court concluded that South Jordan could not terminate Pearson's employment without meeting the procedural requirements afforded to certain public employees under Utah Code sections 10–3–1105 and 10–3–1106. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10–3–1105 to –1106 (2007).¹ We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 This dispute arises from the January 30, 2007 termination of Pearson from his position as assistant police chief of South Jordan. Pearson had held the post since July 2002. The City claimed that Pearson was an at-will employee and thus could “be terminated at any time, with or without cause or explanation.” Pearson was offered a severance package in exchange for his resignation. When Pearson refused to resign, the City terminated his employment without stating a reason.

¶ 3 Because at-will employees are not entitled to administrative review through the City's Employee Appeals procedure, Pearson challenged the City's classification of him as such. After the City's Employee Appeals Board (the Board) upheld his at-will status and termination, Pearson appealed directly to this court. See Pearson v. South Jordan Emp. Appeals Bd., 2009 UT App 204, ¶¶ 5–6, 216 P.3d 996. We dismissed Pearson's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because “jurisdiction for a decision interpreting section 10–3–1105 [exempting certain positions from administrative review] must originate from the district court.” See id. ¶ 15.

¶ 4 Consistent with our decision, Pearson filed a complaint in the third district court in West Jordan on August 17, 2009. The complaint included a request for declaratory judgment regarding his employment status and claims for breach of written and oral contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. Subsequently, Pearson filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether state law allowed the City to classify an “assistant police chief” as an at-will employee. See Utah Code Ann. § 10–3–1105 (2007).² The City opposed Pearson's motion and countered with a cross-motion for partial summary judgment, asking the trial court to conclude that Pearson could be terminated at-will under section 10–3–1105.

¶ 5 After oral arguments, the trial court issued a memorandum decision, granting partial summary judgment in favor of Pearson. The trial court determined that, according to the dictionary, a “deputy” is a “substitute with power to act” or one who “usu[ally] takes charge when his or her superior is absent.” See Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 336 (11th ed. 2004). In contrast, “assistant” is defined as merely a helper. See id. at 74. The trial court reasoned that the statute's exemption of both “a deputy or assistant fire chief” but only “a deputy police chief” indicated a legislative intent to use the two terms to identify different positions within a city department. It then concluded that because the City did not assign Pearson the title “deputy police chief,” it could not treat him as an at-will employee. We granted the City's petition for interlocutory appeal of that decision.³

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6 South Jordan challenges the trial court's partial summary judgment in favor of Pearson on the ground that section 10–3–1105 of the Utah Code does not require the City to classify its assistant police chief as a merit employee. “ ‘[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Knight v. Salt Lake Cnty., 2002 UT App 100, ¶ 6, 46 P.3d 247 (alteration in original) (quoting Schuurman v. Shingleton, 2001 UT 52, ¶ 9, 26 P.3d 227). “ ‘On review of summary judgment, we give no deference to the trial court's conclusions but review them for correctness.’ ” Id. (quoting Brinton v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 964 (Utah 1998)). We view “ ‘the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’ ” Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (quoting Higgins v. Salt Lake Cnty., 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993)).

ANALYSIS

¶ 7 South Jordan raises two issues before this court in support of its argument that the trial court incorrectly granted partial summary judgment in favor of Pearson. To begin, the City argues that the trial court inappropriately applied the version of section 10–3–1105 in effect when Pearson was fired in 2007, rather than the version in effect when Pearson was hired in 2002. Alternatively, the City argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the 2007 version of the code because “deputy” should be read to mean “second-in-command.”

¶ 8 We first determine that South Jordan did not preserve the issue of whether the trial court should have applied the earlier version of the statute. We then conclude that the trial court did not plainly err in applying the then-current version of the statute. Next, we depart from the trial court's interpretation of the then-current statute, in part. While we agree that the Utah Legislature intended the terms “assistant” and “deputy” to have different meanings, we hold that it is the scope of a municipal employee's responsibilities, rather than the employee's specific job title, that governs whether the City may terminate the employee at-will.

I. The Trial Court Did Not Plainly Err in Applying the Then–Current Statute

¶ 9 Pearson was hired in July 2002, as the assistant police chief of South Jordan. At that time, section 10–3–1105 allowed municipalities to define all “members of the police departments” as at-will employees subject to termination without meeting the requirements of section 10–3–1106 (the 1999 Act). See Utah Code Ann. § 10–3–1105 (1999) In 2004, the Utah Legislature amended the statute to provide that all public employees must be afforded the process provided by section 10–3–1106, unless their position is included on the list contained in section 10–3–1105(2) (the 2004 Act). See Utah Code Ann. § 10–3–1105 (2007). Those statutory exceptions include the municipality's “police chief” and “deputy police chief,” but do not include an “assistant police chief.” See id. § 10–3–1105(2).

¶ 10 Thus, the terms of the 1999 Act, in effect when the City hired Pearson, unambiguously allowed South Jordan to fire him without providing the procedural protections of section 10–3–1106. See Utah Code Ann. § 10–3–1106 (2007). With the 2004 amendments, however, the City's right to terminate Pearson at-will was limited by whether his job fell within one of the positions enumerated in section 10–3–1105(2). See id. § 10–3–1105. According to the City, the 1999 Act should govern this dispute because Pearson's statutory due process rights were fixed at the time of hiring, and because applying the 2004 Act retroactively would negatively affect the City's substantive right to fire Pearson at-will.

A. South Jordan Did Not Preserve Its Argument that the 1999 Act Should Apply

¶ 11 South Jordan did not raise in the trial court its argument that determining Pearson's status under the 2004 Act would result in the improper retroactive application of substantive amendments to the statute. To be preserved for appeal, an “issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.” Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2009 UT 44, ¶ 23, 215 P.3d 152 (internal quotation marks omitted). “An issue is preserved if it is raised in a timely fashion, clearly identified, and adequately briefed.” Id.

¶ 12 In asserting that this issue is preserved, the City points generally to its statements to the trial court that when it hired Pearson in 2002, he was an at-will employee under the 1999 Act. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 10–3–1105 (1999) (providing that “[a]ll appointive officers and employees of municipalities, other than members of the police departments ... shall ... b[e] subject to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided”). However, we could find nothing in the record to indicate that the City argued to the trial court that the statute in effect in 2002 should govern Pearson's termination in 2007. While South Jordan provided factual background that the 1999 Act was in effect when Pearson was hired and would have allowed the City to terminate his employment at-will at that time, it did not ask the trial court to use the 1999 Act to resolve the issues relating to Pearson's termination. Instead, South Jordan focused its arguments to the trial court entirely on the language of the 2004 Act, referring to the 1999 Act only as “the predecessor statute to the one we're looking at.” Because the issue was not presented in a way that the trial court had an opportunity to rule on it, the issue is unpreserved. See Normandeau, 2009 UT 44, ¶ 23, 215 P.3d 152. Consequently, we will review Pearson's argument that the 1999 Act is applicable on appeal only if the trial court plainly erred in deciding the matter under the 2004 Act. See State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ¶ 20, 131 P.3d 202 (stating that an appellant must demonstrate either plain error or exceptional circumstances for reversal based on an unpreserved issue).

B. Any Assumed Error in Applying the 2004 Act Was Not Plain

¶ 13 The City contends that it should have been plain to the trial court that applying the 2004 Act was erroneous due to the general bar on the retroactive...