Pearson v. State

• Citation: 241 N.W.2d 490,308 Minn. 287
• Decision Date: 30 April 1976
• Docket Number: No. 45734,45734
• Parties: Arlen Howard PEARSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Page 490

241 N.W.2d 490

308 Minn. 287

Arlen Howard PEARSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. 45734.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 30, 1976.

C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, David Gross, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Peter W. Sipkins, Sol. Gen., Edward M. Laine, spec. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, John F. Corbey, County Atty., Mankato, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying defendant's petition for postconviction relief. In 1973 defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of theft, Minn.St. 609.52, subd. 2(1), and pursuant to a plea agreement the trial court stayed imposition of sentence for a period of 5 years. The trial court later revoked probation and sentenced defendant to prison for a maximum of 5 years on the ground that defendant had violated certain conditions of his probation. Defendant then filed a petition for postconviction relief in which he requested that the judgment of conviction based on the guilty plea and the revocation of probation and imposition of sentence be declared invalid on the grounds that (1) at the time of the entry of the guilty plea he had denied any criminal intent, and (2) that there was no evidence that he had materially violated his probation. The postconviction court after a hearing denied defendant's petition. We affirm.

1. Defendant's contention that his guilty plea should not have been accepted by the trial court is based on the fact that at the time of the entry of the plea he testified that he did not Think he intended to steal certain camera equipment, the property in question. What defendant testified was that he was intoxicated at the time he took the property and that he could not remember what had happened, but that he did not think he intended to steal the items. He also testified at that time that he knew he had a right to have the intoxication defense considered by the jury in determining whether he had the necessary criminal intent, but that he had made an informed decision upon the advice of counsel to plead guilty and waive that right.

Upon this record we do not believe that the trial court erred in accepting the plea. State v. Hague, Minn., 229 N.W.2d 168 (1975); State v. Fisher, 292 Minn. 453, 193 N.W.2d 819 (1972). ¹ Cf. Beaman v. State, 301 Minn. 180, 221 N.W.2d 698 (1974). In so holding, we do not decide whether a trial court may, under extraordinary circumstances, accept a defendant's guilty plea notwithstanding a defendant's Unequivocal denial of guilt. See, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).

2. On May 31, 1974, the court ordered defendant to appear for a hearing on alleged violations of his probation pursuant to Minn.St. 609.14 and scheduled a hearing for July 5, 1974. Defendant failed to appear although he had knowledge of the hearing, which was subsequently held on July 26, 1974. Probation was then revoked and defendant was sentenced to prison. Two issues are raised relating to the revocation of defendant's probation: Whether the procedures followed violated defendant's right to due process and whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation. ²

In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), the Supreme Court held in part that due process mandates the same types of hearing in probation revocation cases as in parole revocation cases, i.e., the same types of hearing specified by the court earlier in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).

The first type of hearing mandated by Morrissey and Gagnon is a preliminary revocation hearing, which is to be held as soon as convenient after the defendant is arrested. The main reason for such a hearing is that there might be a significant lapse of time between the arrest and a decision on whether to revoke. The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the parolee or probationer has violated conditions of his parole or probation. The probable cause determination must be made by someone other than the supervisory parole or probation officer, and this person or board must be neutral and detached. Additionally, the parolee or probationer must receive notice of the hearing; the notice must allege acts constituting violations of the conditions of parole or probation; the defendant must have the opportunity to appear, to speak, and to bring documents or witnesses; and the defendant generally has the right to have any persons who have information supporting the revocation to be questioned in his presence. Finally, the hearing officer must state the reasons for his decision and summarize the evidence he relied on but need not make formal findings or conclusions.

Prior to a final decision revoking parole or probation, there must be an opportunity for a hearing at which a final evaluation of any contested facts is made. At this hearing the defendant must have an opportunity to be heard and to show that he did not violate the conditions or that, if he did, the circumstances do not warrant revocation. After stating that it did not intend to write a code of procedures for the states, the court in Morrissey set forth the minimum requirements of due process to be afforded the defendant at this final revocation hearing (408 U.S. 489, 92 S.Ct. 2604, 33 L.Ed.2d 499):

'* * * They include (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. We emphasize there is no thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.'

In this case, defendant's first claim relating to the procedures used is that he was not afforded a preliminary hearing. As indicated, the purpose of a preliminary revocation hearing is to give the defendant a...